菜单
Use Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats.
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| name | auditing-uefi-firmware-with-chipsec |
| description | Use Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | hardware-firmware-security |
| tags | ["hardware-firmware-security","uefi","chipsec","spi-flash","bios-write-protection","secure-boot","firmware-assessment","platform-security"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["ID.AM-02"] |
| mitre_attack | ["T1542.001"] |
Authorized Use Only: CHIPSEC loads a kernel driver and reads/writes low-level hardware registers, SPI flash, and SMM. Run it only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess, ideally on dedicated test hardware. Misuse (especially write/modify modules) can brick a machine. Never run write-capable modules on production systems.
CHIPSEC is the open-source Platform Security Assessment Framework created by Intel's Advanced Threat Research team. It inspects the low-level security configuration of x86 platform firmware and hardware — the layer below the operating system where bootkits and firmware implants live. CHIPSEC loads a signed kernel driver (Linux, Windows, or it can run from the UEFI shell) to read and write hardware registers, Model-Specific Registers (MSRs), PCI config space, SPI flash, and UEFI variables, then runs an automated test suite that checks whether the platform's defensive locks are actually engaged.
The threat CHIPSEC addresses is MITRE ATT&CK T1542.001 — Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware: adversaries who modify system firmware (the BIOS/UEFI image on SPI flash) to gain stealthy, persistent, OS-survivable control. Firmware implants persist across OS reinstall and disk replacement and are invisible to most EDR. CHIPSEC's value is verifying the prerequisites that prevent such implants: that the SPI flash BIOS region is write-protected (BIOS_CNTL BLE/SMM_BWP, SPI Protected Ranges), that the flash descriptor locks region access, that SMRAM/SMRR are configured, and that Secure Boot variables are protected. It also dumps the SPI flash for offline forensic comparison.
Sources: Intel/CHIPSEC project (https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec), CHIPSEC documentation (https://chipsec.github.io/).
--no_driver for limited checks)Install CHIPSEC:
# From PyPI
pip install chipsec
# Or from source (builds the kernel helper/driver)
git clone https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
cd chipsec
python setup.py install # builds and installs, including the Linux driver
# Verify
sudo chipsec_main --help
sudo chipsec_util --help
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1542.001 | Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware | Persistence / Defense Evasion |
CHIPSEC defends against T1542.001 by verifying that the controls preventing unauthorized firmware modification are enabled. A FAIL on common.bios_wp (BIOS not write-protected) or chipsec.modules.common.spi_lock (flash descriptor unlocked) means an attacker with OS privileges could rewrite the SPI flash and implant persistent firmware — exactly the precondition for this technique.
chipsec_main with no module argument runs every applicable security check for the detected platform and prints a summary of PASS/FAIL/WARNING/INFORMATION results.
sudo chipsec_main
# Save machine-readable output for reporting / diffing
sudo chipsec_main -j results.json -x results.xml -l chipsec.log
The common module group contains the OEM-independent security checks. Run the group or specific modules:
# Run the whole common group
sudo chipsec_main -m common
# BIOS write protection: checks BIOS_CNTL BLE/SMM_BWP and SPI protected ranges
sudo chipsec_main -m common.bios_wp
# SPI flash descriptor lock (FLOCKDN) — are flash region accesses locked?
sudo chipsec_main -m common.spi_lock
# SMRR programming — protects SMRAM from cache-based attacks
sudo chipsec_main -m common.smrr
# SMM BIOS write protection
sudo chipsec_main -m common.smm
# S3 resume boot-script protection (against bootscript table attacks)
sudo chipsec_main -m common.uefi.s3bootscript
# Checks that Secure Boot UEFI variables are properly protected
sudo chipsec_main -m common.secureboot.variables
# To actively test write protection of the variables (test hardware ONLY):
sudo chipsec_main -m common.secureboot.variables -a modify
# Report SPI flash regions, descriptor, and access permissions
sudo chipsec_util spi info
# Check the SPI access-control module
sudo chipsec_main -m common.spi_access
Dumping the flash lets you decode the firmware volumes and compare against a known-good OEM image.
# Dump the entire SPI flash to a file
sudo chipsec_util spi dump rom.bin
# Decode the dumped image: extracts firmware volumes, files, NVRAM variables, etc.
sudo chipsec_util decode rom.bin
# List all UEFI variables from the runtime interface
sudo chipsec_util uefi var-list
# List variables directly from the SPI image (offline)
sudo chipsec_util uefi var-find PK
sudo chipsec_util uefi var-read db <GUID> db.bin
# Decode the UEFI firmware structure
sudo chipsec_util uefi decode rom.bin
Where loading the driver is impossible (locked-down Secure Boot), some checks still run read-only.
sudo chipsec_main -n # --no_driver: skip checks that need the driver
sudo chipsec_main -p <PLATFORM> # force platform code if auto-detect fails
bios_wp / spi_lock → firmware is rewritable from the OS: high risk for T1542.001.secureboot.variables → Secure Boot policy can be tampered.spi dump against the OEM's known-good image (hash firmware volumes) to detect unauthorized modification.| Tool | Purpose | Source |
|---|---|---|
| chipsec_main | Automated platform-security test suite | https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec |
| chipsec_util | Manual hardware/firmware access (spi, uefi, decode) | https://chipsec.github.io/ |
| UEFITool | GUI/CLI parsing of dumped UEFI images | https://github.com/LongSoft/UEFITool |
| Binarly fwhunt | Firmware vulnerability/implant hunting rules | https://github.com/binarly-io/fwhunt-scan |
| NSA UEFI Secure Boot guidance | Hardening reference | https://media.defense.gov/ |
| Module | Checks |
|---|---|
| common.bios_wp | BIOS_CNTL BLE / SMM_BWP and SPI Protected Ranges |
| common.spi_lock | SPI flash descriptor FLOCKDN |
| common.spi_access | SPI flash region read/write permissions |
| common.smrr | System Management Range Registers programming |
| common.smm | SMM BIOS write protection |
| common.secureboot.variables | Secure Boot variable protection |
| common.uefi.s3bootscript | S3 resume boot-script protection |
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