exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile

Identifies and exploits insecure local data storage vulnerabilities in Android and iOS mobile applications including unencrypted databases, world-readable files, insecure SharedPreferences, plaintext credential storage, and improper keychain/keystore usage. Use when performing mobile penetration testing focused on OWASP M9 (Insecure Data Storage) or assessing compliance with MASVS-STORAGE requirements. Activates for requests involving mobile data storage security, local storage exploitation, SharedPreferences analysis, or mobile data leakage assessment.

仓库: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
最近来源活动: 2026年6月1日 10:13
检测到的 SKILL.md 语言: 英语
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分支: 3,366

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name	exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile
description	Identifies and exploits insecure local data storage vulnerabilities in Android and iOS mobile applications including unencrypted databases, world-readable files, insecure SharedPreferences, plaintext credential storage, and improper keychain/keystore usage. Use when performing mobile penetration testing focused on OWASP M9 (Insecure Data Storage) or assessing compliance with MASVS-STORAGE requirements. Activates for requests involving mobile data storage security, local storage exploitation, SharedPreferences analysis, or mobile data leakage assessment.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	mobile-security
author	mahipal
tags	["mobile-security","android","ios","data-storage","owasp-mobile","penetration-testing"]
version	1.0.0
license	Apache-2.0
atlas_techniques	["AML.T0057"]
nist_ai_rmf	["MEASURE-2.7","MAP-5.1","MANAGE-2.4","GOVERN-1.1","GOVERN-4.2"]
nist_csf	["PR.PS-01","PR.AA-05","ID.RA-01","DE.CM-09"]
mitre_attack	["T1059","T1056","T1036","T1078","T1003"]

Exploiting Insecure Data Storage in Mobile

When to Use

Use this skill when:

Assessing whether mobile applications store sensitive data securely on the device filesystem
Testing for credential leakage through SharedPreferences, SQLite databases, or plists
Evaluating keychain/keystore implementation for proper access control attributes
Performing data-at-rest security assessment during mobile penetration tests

Do not use this skill on production user devices without authorization -- data extraction techniques require physical access or root/jailbreak privileges.

Prerequisites

Rooted Android device or emulator with ADB access
Jailbroken iOS device with SSH access or Objection-patched IPA
ADB (Android Debug Bridge) for Android filesystem access
SQLite3 CLI for database inspection
Frida/Objection for runtime data extraction
Target application installed and exercised (logged in, data cached)

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

Workflow

Step 1: Map Application Data Storage Locations

Android storage paths:

# Internal storage (app-private, requires root)
/data/data/<package_name>/
├── shared_prefs/      # SharedPreferences XML files
├── databases/         # SQLite databases
├── files/             # General files
├── cache/             # Cached data
├── lib/               # Native libraries
└── app_webview/       # WebView data

# External storage (world-readable on older Android)
/sdcard/Android/data/<package_name>/

# Check for world-readable files
adb shell run-as <package_name> ls -la /data/data/<package_name>/

iOS storage paths:

# App sandbox (accessible via SSH on jailbroken device)
/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<UUID>/
├── Documents/         # User data, backed up by default
├── Library/
│   ├── Preferences/   
│   ├── Caches/        
│   └── Application Support/
└── tmp/

# Pull SharedPreferences files
adb shell run-as <package_name> cat shared_prefs/*.xml

# Or on rooted device
adb pull /data/data/<package_name>/shared_prefs/ ./shared_prefs/

# Search for sensitive data
grep -ri "password\|token\|secret\|key\|session\|auth\|cookie" shared_prefs/

<!-- Plaintext credentials -->
<string name="user_password">mysecretpass123</string>
<string name="auth_token">eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...</string>
<string name="api_key">sk-live-abc123def456</string>

<!-- Sensitive PII -->
<string name="user_ssn">123-45-6789</string>
<string name="credit_card">4111111111111111</string>

# Pull databases
adb pull /data/data/<package_name>/databases/ ./databases/

# Open and inspect
sqlite3 databases/app.db
.tables
.schema users
SELECT * FROM users;
SELECT * FROM sessions;
SELECT * FROM tokens;

# Search all tables for sensitive columns
sqlite3 databases/app.db ".dump" | grep -i "password\|token\|secret\|credit"

# If database opens without password, it's unencrypted
sqlite3 databases/app.db "SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master;"
# Success = unencrypted (vulnerability)

# Using Objection
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
ios keychain dump

# Check protection class attributes
# kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked - OK for most data
# kSecAttrAccessibleAlways - VULNERABLE: accessible even when locked
# kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock - acceptable for background apps

# Check if backup is enabled
aapt dump badging target.apk | grep -i "allowBackup"
# android:allowBackup="true" = vulnerability

# Extract backup data
adb backup -f backup.ab -apk <package_name>
java -jar abe.jar unpack backup.ab backup.tar
tar xvf backup.tar
# Inspect extracted data for sensitive information

# Check external storage
adb shell ls -la /sdcard/Android/data/<package_name>/

# Check backup exclusion
# Files in Documents/ are backed up by default
# Check NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey attribute
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
ios plist cat Info.plist

# Dump process memory for sensitive data
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
memory search "password" --string
memory search "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" --string
memory dump all /tmp/memdump/

# Android: Check for sensitive data in logs
adb logcat -d | grep -i "password\|token\|key\|secret"

Term	Definition
SharedPreferences	Android key-value storage in XML format; often misused for storing credentials in plaintext
Keychain Services	iOS secure credential storage backed by Secure Enclave hardware on modern devices
Android Keystore	Hardware-backed cryptographic key storage on Android; keys cannot be extracted from the device
SQLCipher	Transparent encryption extension for SQLite databases; prevents data extraction without password
Data Protection API	iOS file-level encryption tied to device passcode; controlled via protection class attributes