aws-iam-enum

name	aws-iam-enum
description	Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
metadata	{"subdomain":"cloud","when_to_use":"aws iam enumeration privesc rhino security labs 21 primitives policy escalation","mitre_attack":["T1087.004","T1069.003","T1078.004","T1098.003"]}

AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc

1. Identity check

aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam get-account-summary

2. Attached policies

aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/attached.json
aws iam list-user-policies          --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/inline.json
aws iam list-groups-for-user        --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/groups.json

For each attached policy ARN:

aws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > /tmp/policy.json

Then:

iam_policy_audit(open("/tmp/policy.json").read())

3. Check each privesc primitive

Rhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any Allow on these is a chain step:

1. iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)
2. iam:CreateLoginProfile
3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile
4. iam:AttachUserPolicy / iam:AttachGroupPolicy / iam:AttachRolePolicy
5. iam:PutUserPolicy / iam:PutGroupPolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy
6. iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)
7. iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
8. iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction
9. iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances
10. iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask / UpdateService
11. glue:CreateDevEndpoint / UpdateDevEndpoint
12. cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole
13. datapipeline:CreatePipeline
14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)
15. iam:AddUserToGroup
16. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
17. iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole
18. codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole
19. sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole
20. aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)
21. sts:AssumeRole (direct)

4. Graph promotion

kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", label="IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover", props={"severity":"critical","source":"aws-iam"})
kg_add_node(kind="crown_jewel", label="AWS Account 1234")
kg_add_edge(src=<vuln>, dst=<crown_jewel>, kind="grants", weight=0.3)

5. Common chains

• Dev user has iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + a Lambda role with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin
• iam:UpdateLoginProfile + sts:GetFederationToken → temporary console access as another user