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Hunt single-block oracle manipulation — spot-price AMM oracles, manipulable TWAP, dependent calculations, missing staleness checks.
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基于 SOC 职业分类
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| name | oracle-manipulation |
| description | Hunt single-block oracle manipulation — spot-price AMM oracles, manipulable TWAP, dependent calculations, missing staleness checks. |
| metadata | {"subdomain":"smart-contracts","when_to_use":"oracle manipulation twap price bypass","mitre_attack":["T1565.001","T1190"]} |
DeFi protocols that read a price from an on-chain source are vulnerable when the source can be moved within a single transaction or block. Classic vectors:
reserve1 / reserve0 of a Uniswap V2 pool. Anyone with enough capital (or a flash loan) can push the price for one block.totalSupply() of an LP token alongside reserves.# Common patterns
grep -rn 'getReserves\|getAmountsOut\|getPriceFromSqrtPriceX96\|latestAnswer\|latestRoundData' src/
# Custom oracle reads
grep -rn 'IPriceOracle\|getPrice\|consult' src/
For each call:
slot0.sqrtPriceX96?
→ manipulableOracleLibrary.consult?
→ check the secondsAgo window (>= 1800s = 30 min is the safe minimum)latestRoundData() call?
→ check: is updatedAt validated? Is answeredInRound >= roundId? Is answer > 0? Are L2 sequencer feeds checked?// MISSING — vulnerable
(, int256 price, , , ) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();
// GOOD — explicit staleness + sequencer
(uint80 roundId, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();
require(price > 0, "ORACLE_NEGATIVE");
require(updatedAt > block.timestamp - MAX_DELAY, "ORACLE_STALE");
require(answeredInRound >= roundId, "ORACLE_OLD_ROUND");
// On L2: also check sequencer uptime feed (L2 SequencerUptimeFeed)
The bug isn't oracle-reading — it's oracle-trusting. Find where the price drives a state change:
// Pseudo:
contract Test_oracle is Test {
function test_manipulate() public {
// 1. Flash-loan WETH from Aave / Balancer / Uniswap V3
// 2. Swap WETH → token in target pool, draining one side
// 3. Reserves now skewed → spot price way off
// 4. Call vulnerable protocol's price-dependent function
// (e.g., borrow USDC against overvalued collateral)
// 5. Reverse the swap, repay flash loan
// 6. Profit = whatever was extracted in step 4
assertGt(USDC.balanceOf(attacker), 0, "should profit");
}
}
Decepticon helper:
foundry_oracle_test(target="LendingPool", price_feed="UniV2Pair",
token0="WETH", token1="TARGETTOKEN", target_path="src/LendingPool.sol")
function test_stale_price() public {
// mock the feed to return updatedAt that's 24h old
vm.mockCall(
address(priceFeed),
abi.encodeWithSignature("latestRoundData()"),
abi.encode(uint80(1), int256(STALE_PRICE), uint256(0), block.timestamp - 86400, uint80(1))
);
// call function — should revert if staleness checked, should proceed if not
target.priceDependentFunction();
// If we reach here w/o revert → bug
}
| Manipulation surface | Typical impact | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Spot-price oracle drives liquidation | Drain LPs via fake liquidations | Critical |
| Spot-price drives borrow limit | Borrow more than collateral worth | Critical |
| TWAP < 30 min | Still manipulable on low-liquidity pairs | High |
| TWAP 30 min+ on high-liquidity ETH-USDC | Hard to exploit profitably | Medium-Low |
| Missing staleness check, but feed updates often | Edge-case impact during outages | Medium |
| L2 sequencer not checked | Exploitable during sequencer downtime | High (timing-dependent) |
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 10.0 (Crit)// Use Chainlink properly, not spot-price
function getPrice() internal view returns (uint256) {
(uint80 roundId, int256 answer, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound)
= priceFeed.latestRoundData();
require(answer > 0, "neg price");
require(updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, "stale");
require(answeredInRound >= roundId, "old round");
// L2 only:
(, int256 sequencerStatus, , uint256 sequencerStart, ) = sequencerFeed.latestRoundData();
require(sequencerStatus == 0, "sequencer down");
require(block.timestamp - sequencerStart > 1 hours, "grace period");
return uint256(answer);
}
// Where Chainlink unavailable: use 30+ min Uniswap V3 TWAP w/ deep-liquidity pool
function getTwap(uint32 secondsAgo) internal view returns (uint160 sqrtPriceX96) {
(int24 arithmeticMeanTick, ) = OracleLibrary.consult(pool, secondsAgo);
return TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(arithmeticMeanTick);
}