菜单
Inspect cryptographic code for timing leaks. Flags variable-time comparisons on secrets, early-exit loops, and library calls known to be variable-time. Limited static scope — the definitive check is micro-benchmarks on compiled binaries, but ~70% of timing bugs show up in source review.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
| name | constant-time-analysis |
| description | Inspect cryptographic code for timing leaks. Flags variable-time comparisons on secrets, early-exit loops, and library calls known to be variable-time. Limited static scope — the definitive check is micro-benchmarks on compiled binaries, but ~70% of timing bugs show up in source review. |
| license | MIT (ZONOVA RESEARCH — coldvault.dev) |
| source_inspiration | trailofbits/skills/constant-time-analysis |
# Direct equality on secret-bearing variables
grep -rnE "(password|pwd|token|secret|hmac|signature|sig|mac|key|nonce)\s*(==|!=|===|!==)" \
target --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,rs,java,c,cpp,php,rb}'
# String.equals / strcmp on secrets
grep -rnE "(strcmp|memcmp|String\.equals|\.equals\()" target
# Python early-exit loops on bytes (classic timing leak)
grep -rnPzo "for .*:\s*\n\s*if .*\s==\s.*:\s*\n\s*return False" target --include='*.py'
hmac.compare_digest(a, b)crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)subtle.ConstantTimeCompareMessageDigest.isEqualCryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEqualssubtle::ConstantTimeEq{
"file": "target/src/session.ts",
"line": 88,
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"category": "timing_side_channel",
"description": "Session token compared with === — variable-time, leaks prefix length",
"exploit_scenario": "Local attacker (or attacker on the same TCP path) can distinguish matching prefixes by measuring request-processing time. Combined with a reuse oracle, token can be reconstructed byte-by-byte in < 2^16 requests.",
"recommendation": "Replace with crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b)).",
"confidence": 0.85,
"source_tool": "manual+semgrep"
}
Conduct a passive, read-only forensic analysis of a potentially malicious source-code tree. Use this skill when the user suspects a repository, archive, or directory contains hidden payloads, C2 code, obfuscated droppers, or compromised build configs (e.g. injected `tailwind.config.js`, trojaned `package.json` postinstall, suspicious base64 blobs). Produces a full report: attacker signature, payload location, statically decrypted IoCs (C2 IPs, ports, paths, XOR keys, drop paths, exfil endpoints).
Render reports/findings.json + reports/SUMMARY.md into a single-file, self-contained reports/SUMMARY.html whose visual quality matches the /reports/example-summary page on coldvault.dev. No external fonts, no JS framework, no network fetches — the user can double-click the file, email it, or host it anywhere.
Audit GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / CircleCI / Azure Pipelines workflows shipped in target/. Flags the high-risk patterns that have caused real-world supply-chain compromises (pwnrequest, pull_request_target, unpinned actions, secret exfiltration, script-injection via PR title/body).
Inventory the suspect repository (languages, frameworks, package managers, entry points, build system, CI) before any scan. Always run this first — subsequent skills depend on its output.
Map the attack surface of target/ — HTTP routes, CLI commands, exported library symbols, message-queue consumers, GitHub Actions triggers, IPC sockets. Produces reports/entry-points.md.
Find default/weak/insecure configurations — weak crypto, TLS disabled, permissive CORS, debug mode in prod paths, unsafe deserialization switches, open S3 buckets, etc. These are the low-hanging fruit most noisy scanners miss.