| name | Transitrix Ingest |
| description | Turn raw organisational material (interviews, policies, org charts, spreadsheets, notes) into Transitrix field artefacts and typed canon candidates at scale, with source-quality scoring and a human review queue. Operates the field→canon derivation pipeline — convert a document, emit a field artefact with provenance and a proposed source_quality, extract typed elements and conservative relations that each cite their field source via derived_from, validate them against the canonical schemas and the adopter's coverage profile, and produce a review queue a human gates before anything is admitted to canon. Never writes canon directly. |
| when_to_use | User says "ingest these documents", "extract a model from this interview / policy / spreadsheet", "fill the field zone from raw material", "turn these notes into canon candidates", "set up the intake pipeline", or drops raw files into an adopter repo's `_intake/inbox/` and wants them processed into field artefacts + reviewable canon candidates. BA-facing shortcut — user says "extract requirements from this interview / project brief / SOP", "get REQUIREMENT / CONSTRAINT candidates out of this writeup", or "run the ingest pipeline motivation-only" — same pipeline, agent runs only `prompts/01_motivation.md` (see [BA quickstart](#ba-quickstart--requirements-from-an-interview)). |
| min_version | 1.0.0 |
| allowed-tools | Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Glob, Grep, WebFetch |
Transitrix Ingest Skill
The front door to a Transitrix repository: it turns raw material into field-zone artefacts and typed canon candidates, at scale, and routes everything through a human review gate. It is the operational counterpart to the per-layer extraction prompts — the part that converts documents, scores source trust, runs the validators, and stages a review queue.
Status — operational. The deterministic CLI (@transitrix/ingest-cli, see § The CLI) implements every subcommand below — scaffold-intake, convert, admit-source (field + codex routes), emit-candidates, validate, review-queue, suggest-profile, check-placement, resolve-placement — and is exercised end-to-end by the bundle's integrity test. Run the CLI-presence pre-check (Step 0) first; if the CLI is not on PATH in this install, install it before proceeding.
The methodology is canon at github.com/transitrix/methodology; this skill is the agent-facing protocol for operating the field→canon pipeline against it. It runs agent-neutrally under Claude and GitHub Copilot — all heavy logic is in the CLI, and this SKILL.md only sequences it.
The one rule that governs everything
Propose, never write admitted canon. This skill emits field artefacts and canon candidates and runs them through the existing validators. It MUST NOT write admitted canon — admitted elements, views, or anything carrying an admission record. Admission stays a deliberate, auditable human gate (admitted_by). (The skill MAY write proposed — non-admitted — entries to the canon/unresolved/ holding area, Step 7; it never writes an admission record there. An admitted-but-untyped entry, §13.1, is written only by the human gate. So this rule is not weakened.) A hallucinated element or relation reaching canon unreviewed is the worst-case failure, and the whole design exists to prevent it. Every step below is built around keeping that gate intact.
Step 0 — CLI-presence pre-check
The deterministic work (document conversion, coverage-profile read, validator pass, artefact + candidate emission, _intake/ moves) is done by the CLI, never reimplemented in the agent. Confirm it is available:
transitrix-ingest --version # primary — local install
# or, once the package is published to npm:
npx @transitrix/ingest-cli --version # equivalent — same binary
- Present under either name → proceed. Use whichever form resolved; both invoke the same CLI, and the rest of this protocol shows the primary form. If only the
npx form is reachable, substitute it for transitrix-ingest in the commands below — the subcommands and flags are identical.
- Absent under both → the CLI is not installed in this environment. Stop and tell the user; do not hand-roll the pipeline, because hand-rolled extraction has no deterministic validator gate and risks the one rule above. Pre-1.0 the package is not yet on npm, so the expected install path is local: clone the methodology repo and
npm install -g ./packages/ingest-cli (which provides the transitrix-ingest bin); the npx @transitrix/ingest-cli form starts to resolve once the CLI is published from its own tooling repo at the ~1.0 extraction.
Also confirm you are operating inside a Transitrix adopter repository (a transitrix.yaml manifest at the repo root; see MANIFEST). If there is no repo yet, the user wants /transitrix:onboard first.
After a methodology upgrade — reinstall the CLI before running the pipeline. A cached or globally-installed binary from a prior release does not auto-update; it may run against stale validators, a stale profile resolver, or stale review-queue logic. Re-run your install command and confirm the version above reflects the new release.
Step 1 — Scaffold the intake folder
_intake/ is an operational folder at the organisation root — not a zone. Zones (canon/, field/, codex/) stay parallel; _intake/ sits beside them as the pipeline's workspace:
<org>/
_intake/ # operational intake pipeline — not a zone
inbox/ # raw dropped files, untouched
processing/ # currently being extracted (artefacts + candidates in flight)
processed/ # source files whose ingest is complete (retained for traceability)
canon/ field/ codex/
transitrix-ingest scaffold-intake <org-root>
Idempotent — it never overwrites existing intake content. A source file flows inbox/ → processing/ → processed/. _intake/ is a per-user, private workspace — its contents are git-ignored and not shared with other modellers, so nothing that participates in the model lives here (an untyped object goes to the shared canon/unresolved/, Step 7, never to _intake/). scaffold-intake drops a .gitkeep in each of inbox/ / processing/ / processed/ so the folder skeleton stays in version control while the working files are ignored — the adopter's .gitignore carries _intake/inbox/*, _intake/processing/*, _intake/processed/* and !_intake/**/.gitkeep (the onboarding skill seeds these). In v0 the _intake/ convention is skill-local: it is documented here and in templates/_intake.README.md, not yet reserved in the methodology MANIFEST/CONTRACT. (Promotion to a reserved org-structure convention is a separate proposal once the skill stabilises.)
Step 2 — Convert the source to Markdown
Office documents are converted to Markdown with MS Markitdown before extraction (per project convention), unless illustrations must be preserved. The CLI shells out to Markitdown; .md / .txt inputs pass through unchanged.
transitrix-ingest convert <_intake/inbox/file> # → _intake/processing/<file>.md
Markitdown is a Python tool (pip install "markitdown[all]"); install it into the environment you run the CLI from, and if you use a virtualenv, activate it first. The CLI looks for the markitdown console-script and falls back to python -m markitdown / python3 -m markitdown — so it still works inside a venv where only the interpreter is on PATH. On Windows, if markitdown/npx are blocked by the PowerShell execution policy, run python -m markitdown directly or Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process RemoteSigned. If Markitdown cannot be reached at all the CLI exits with an actionable message naming the install step. Conversion is the only point of contact with Markitdown — the rest of the pipeline is pure Node and runs identically under either agent.
Step 2b — Privacy pre-admission scan
Before a converted document can be admitted as a field artefact (Step 3), it passes through the privacy pre-admission gate — a fail-closed check that detects and blocks personal and medical data by default.
transitrix-ingest privacy-scan <processing/file.md>
Fail-closed. The gate must exit with outcome CLEAN or STRIPPED before admit-source is called. A REJECTED or ERROR outcome halts the pipeline — do not call admit-source on a document that has not cleared the gate.
Detection — Phase 1 (rule-based, deterministic)
The gate applies deterministic pattern + dictionary matching across a closed set of detection categories. Every blocked fragment is tagged with a reason code:
| Code | Category | Examples |
|---|
PII-001 | National identifier | SSN, NI number, national-ID-shaped tokens |
PII-002 | Date of birth | DOB phrases combined with date-shaped tokens in a personal context |
PII-003 | Medical / health terms | Diagnosis codes, medication names, clinical and diagnostic vocabulary |
PII-004 | Contact PII beyond allowlist | Personal email, personal phone (non-work) |
PII-005 | Financial personal | Credit / debit card numbers, personal bank account numbers |
PII-006 | Biometric / government identifier | Passport numbers, biometric descriptors |
Reason codes are emitted in the privacy report (see below). A scan that fires any code (and the fragment is not cleared by the allowlist) produces a STRIPPED or REJECTED outcome; a scan that fires none produces CLEAN.
Allowlist — always admitted
A narrow, explicit list of business-contact fields on ACTOR / ORG element records is never blocked. The default allowlist:
| Field | Permitted on |
|---|
first_name | ACTOR, ORG |
last_name | ACTOR, ORG |
work_phone | ACTOR, ORG |
work_email | ACTOR, ORG |
The allowlist is never inferred from context — it is extended only by deliberate edit in the config.
Outcomes
| Outcome | Meaning | Next step |
|---|
CLEAN | No blocked content found | Proceed to admit-source (Step 3) |
STRIPPED | Blocked fragments redacted; clean copy ready | Proceed to admit-source on the redacted copy |
REJECTED | Document blocked entirely (e.g. predominantly PII) | Do not admit; human reviews privacy report |
ERROR | Scan could not complete (config error, unreadable file) | Do not admit; fix the issue and re-scan |
For STRIPPED: the CLI writes <file>.redacted.md alongside the original. admit-source is run on the redacted copy; raw_source on the resulting field artefact still points to the original retained in _intake/processed/ — the original is never discarded. The privacy report records what was stripped.
Configuration
The gate is enabled by default (enabled: true). Configure it in transitrix.yaml under ingest.privacy_gate:
ingest:
privacy_gate:
enabled: true
on_detection: strip
allowlist:
- field: first_name
on: [ACTOR, ORG]
- field: last_name
on: [ACTOR, ORG]
- field: work_phone
on: [ACTOR, ORG]
- field: work_email
on: [ACTOR, ORG]
Privacy report
The CLI writes a privacy-report.yaml per ingest run, alongside the review-queue.yaml. Schema: schemas/privacy-report.schema.json.
The report lists every document scanned with its outcome. For STRIPPED and REJECTED outcomes it records the blocked fragments with reason codes — truncated previews only, never verbatim PII — so a human can audit false positives and false negatives and adjust the allowlist or detection rules if needed.
Step 3 — Emit the field artefact (with proposed source_quality)
Each converted document becomes one field artefact carrying a complete admission record — provenance (who / when / in what setting) and a proposed source_quality. The field artefact is what lives in field/; the original raw bytes stay in _intake/processed/ so the artefact is traceable to its source.
transitrix-ingest admit-source --zone field <processing/file.md> \
--type INTERVIEW|SURVEY|OBSERVATION|DRAFT --role "<role>" --date YYYY-MM-DD
The CLI fills the admission record (zone: field, gate_checks.provenance) and proposes a source_quality from the document type. It also fingerprints the raw bytes as source_hash: sha256:<hex> alongside raw_source — tamper-evidence for adopters with audit needs (GDPR / SOX / ISO 27001) and source-replacement detection: a re-saved "same" file is caught by hash mismatch, not by silent drift. The schema is schemas/field-artefact.schema.json; the canonical contract is CONTRACT §6 (admission record) and §11.2 (the source-trust scale).
The same source_hash deduplicates: if the identical content was already admitted to the zone, admit-source skips it (naming the existing artefact) rather than minting a second one — pass --force to admit a deliberate duplicate. (When two artefacts share a hash, review-queue surfaces the cluster under duplicate_sources.) This applies to both the field and codex routes.
Proposed source_quality by document character — closed set, the human confirms at admission:
| Document character | Proposed source_quality | Weight |
|---|
| Signed policy, system of record, the accountable owner stating it directly | authoritative | 1.0 |
| The same fact confirmed across more than one independent field source | corroborated | 0.8 |
| One uncorroborated informant or observation | single_source | 0.5 |
| Draft, assumption, inference, hearsay | unverified | 0.25 |
The skill proposes; a human confirms. Never silently bake a higher trust than the source warrants.
Codex sources — laws, regulations, policies, standards — take the parallel codex route: transitrix-ingest admit-source --zone codex <processing/file.md> --type LAW|REGULATION|POLICY|INTERNAL_STANDARD --effective-date YYYY-MM-DD [--jurisdiction <code>] [--source-authority <who>]. A codex artefact is authoritative by construction — it carries no source_quality, records a snapshot of the source + a source_hash, and lands in codex/external/<jurisdiction>/ (LAW/REGULATION) or codex/internal/ (POLICY/INTERNAL_STANDARD) per 14-codex.md. Its obligations are derived in Step 4 as REQUIREMENT + ASSERTION candidates that cite it via derived_from.
Step 4 — Extract typed candidates (entity-strong, relation-conservative)
The agent runs the per-layer extraction prompts in prompts/ over the field artefact; the CLI receives the result and emits typed canon candidates. Each candidate:
- uses a canonical ID (
<TYPE>-[<middle>-]<INTEGER>, IDS §1);
- carries
derived_from: [<FIELD-ARTEFACT-ID>] citing its field source;
- carries
admitted_to: pending — the human gate completes admission;
- carries an
extraction_confidence flag (high | medium | low) — see the two-axes rule below.
transitrix-ingest emit-candidates <field/artefact.yaml> # → _intake/processing/candidates/
Schema: schemas/candidate.schema.json.
Relations are the risky part. Extracting entities is tractable; extracting correctly typed relations of a closed kind is not. v0 is entity-strong and relation-conservative: a relation (closed REL kind) is only emitted as a candidate above a high confidence threshold. Everything below threshold goes to the review queue as a suggestion, not a candidate. Entities flow normally.
Two axes of trust — never merge them
source_quality — trust in the source (Step 3). A closed ordinal label on the field artefact's admission record. Fixed once a human confirms it.extraction_confidence — "did the model read the document correctly". A separate review flag on the candidate. It surfaces in the review queue and is never folded into source_quality and never persisted into canon (CONTRACT §11.8).
These are different questions with different fixes (get a better source vs. re-read the document). The schemas keep them in separate fields; collapsing them is a defect.
Tiered approval — routing by extraction_confidence
extraction_confidence also drives reviewer-authority routing (tiered approval — CONTRACT §6.2). Admitted canon carries a reviewer_authority tier, ai_reviewed < expert_confirmed, and the tier a draft is eligible for is decided by its extraction confidence:
- High
extraction_confidence → the draft is eligible for tool admission to ai_reviewed — the lower canon tier, marked as reviewed by a tool (admitted_by = the tool id), surfaced distinctly in views and coverage. The threshold is adopter-configured in the manifest (transitrix.yaml); below it, nothing auto-admits.
- Medium / low
extraction_confidence → routed to the expert review queue unchanged. Tool admission is forbidden; a human admits to expert_confirmed.
The hard rule is unchanged in spirit (see the one rule): a tool never writes expert_confirmed. It may only mark the lower tier and route the draft; the human gate keeps exclusive authority over the top tier. ai_reviewed is still admitted canon — it is provisional confirmation, not a bypass — so it must clear the same structural validators (Step 5) before admission.
Not yet wired into the CLI. This routing is the defined policy; the current @transitrix/ingest-cli still only proposes (it never auto-admits), and the manifest extraction_confidence threshold schema is a downstream follow-up (per the ADR's out-of-scope). Until both land, every candidate continues through the human gate (Step 6); the tier is recorded by whoever admits.
Step 5 — Validate (coverage-profile aware)
Every candidate is run through the canonical validators — ID grammar, TYPE registry, closed REL kinds, lifecycle fields — and the adopter's coverage profile.
transitrix-ingest validate <processing/candidates/>
The CLI reads the repo's coverage_profile (COVERAGE_PROFILES) and resolves membership before classifying each candidate: it ships the preset definitions (§3 / §3.1) and resolves all three declared forms — a short-form preset (coverage_profile: core), a custom map (extends: a preset + per-layer add/remove/disabled deltas, §4), and the absent default (full). A TYPE / REL kind in the resolved profile is in_profile; one outside it is flagged out_of_profile per CP-003. ASSERTION and codex artefacts are never bounded by the profile (§2.1). Out-of-profile or invalid candidates are flagged with an actionable reason — not silently emitted into canon, and not silently dropped. A flagged candidate is a review-queue item, not a rejection.
If a profile is present but cannot be resolved (unknown preset, missing extends:, malformed), the CLI does not silently treat the repo as full: it resolves permissively but emits an explicit WARNING (in CLI output and as coverage_warning in the review queue), so the unreliable coverage signal is visible rather than hidden.
When a corpus keeps surfacing the same out-of-profile TYPE, suggest-profile turns that signal into a concrete proposal instead of a manual profile edit:
transitrix-ingest suggest-profile <processing/candidates/> # read-only; prints to stdout
It scans the candidates, collects the out-of-profile element TYPEs and relation kinds, and prints a paste-ready coverage_profile delta (extends: the active base + the TYPEs grouped under their layer). It never widens the profile itself — the profile is the guardrail; the human reviews the proposal and edits transitrix.yaml deliberately. TYPEs whose layer the CLI cannot derive are listed under unplaceable to site by hand.
Step 6 — Produce the review queue
transitrix-ingest review-queue <processing/candidates/> # → review-queue.yaml
The queue is the human gate. It lists every field artefact (with its proposed source_quality), every candidate element and relation (with derived_from, extraction_confidence, and any validation/coverage flags), and the relation suggestions that fell below threshold. Schema: schemas/review-queue.schema.json.
The queue is idempotent against canon. review-queue reads canon/ (read-only — it never writes there) and excludes any candidate already admitted — matched by id for elements/assertions, and by the (type, from, to) triple for relations. So re-running after admitting one source, or ingesting a second source while the first's candidates still sit in processing/, surfaces only the not-yet-admitted candidates instead of re-listing admitted ones for re-approval. Excluded candidates are summarised under excluded_admitted for the audit trail.
Nothing lands in canon/ from this skill. A human reviews the queue, confirms or revises each proposed source_quality, and runs the canon admission gate (uniqueness, consistency, completeness — CONTRACT §6) to admit candidates. When ingest is complete for a source, its raw file moves to _intake/processed/.
Placement is deterministic — pinned to ELEMENT_PRIMITIVES §4
Where an admitted element lands is not a judgement call. Every element TYPE has a canonical materialisation mode + layer + folder in ELEMENT_PRIMITIVES.md §4; the CLI resolves it so equals are treated equally — ACTOR, ROLE, PROCESS, PRODUCT, APPLICATION are all standalone and each gets its own per-TYPE folder, never inline-by-accident.
- The review queue annotates each element candidate with its resolved
placement (mode, layer, folder). Admit a standalone element to exactly that folder, one file per element.
- Check any TYPE on demand:
transitrix-ingest resolve-placement <TYPE>.
- Honour the §1 promotion rule explicitly. A
view-defined / contained TYPE (INTEGRATION, STEP, EQUIPMENT, INFORMATION_ENTITY, registry rows) stays inline in its host/view document and is promoted to its own catalogue file only when a second document references it — the id never changes on promotion. Do not pre-create a standalone file for a still-single-reference element.
- After admitting, verify placement:
transitrix-ingest check-placement [org-root] flags any admitted element sitting outside its §4 folder (and any view-defined TYPE wrongly given its own catalogue file). Read-only over canon/.
Step 7 — Zero information loss (extensions: and canon/unresolved/)
Real source rows always carry more than the schema defines. Two mechanisms (CONTRACT §12 / §13) guarantee nothing is silently dropped — the pipeline never discards source data it cannot map, and it never guesses a TYPE to make the data fit.
Mechanism 1 — extensions: on a known entity. When a candidate IS a known entity (PRODUCT, ROLE, …) but the source row has fields that map to no schema field, those fields are preserved in an open extensions: bag on the candidate. They ride through admission verbatim onto the entity — the validator passes extensions: through untouched (EXT-001), so an extended entity validates cleanly.
type: PRODUCT
id: PROD-001
name: Widget Pro
extensions:
materials: ["Steel 316L", "Rubber gasket B12"]
source_table: product_equipment_matrix
Mechanism 2 — canon/unresolved/ for an untyped object. When the object itself has no known TYPE — and is not merely an attribute of a known object — it is parked in canon/unresolved/ with its ingestion provenance, never force-fitted to a TYPE and never dropped.
ingest_status: unresolved
ingest_source: product_equipment_matrix.xlsx
ingest_field: materials
ingest_date: "2026-06-10"
related_to: [PROD-001]
data: ["Steel 316L", "Rubber gasket B12"]
canon/unresolved/ holds canon-grade content whose only gap is an unresolved TYPE — not low-trust material (CONTRACT §13.1). Type resolution is a second axis, orthogonal to admission: an entry MAY be proposed-untyped (just ingested) or admitted-but-untyped (a human confirmed the content is accurate, but no TYPE is assigned yet). It is segregated from typed canon only because the canon machinery is TYPE-keyed (<TYPE>-N ids, per-TYPE placement, TYPE-keyed views) — so an untyped entry never renders in a typed view and is skipped by every typed canon walker, while its content stays authoritative. Because it carries real model knowledge it lives in shared, committed canon/unresolved/, never in the per-user, private _intake/ workspace. The skill itself only ever emits proposed (non-admitted) entries here; admitting one to admitted-but-untyped is the human gate's act — so the one rule holds.
Routing — which mechanism applies:
| Situation | Action |
|---|
| Known object, unknown fields | extensions: on the object |
| Unknown fields clearly belonging to a known object | extensions: on the parent |
| Object is a law / rule / standard | codex zone (Step 3 codex route) — never canon/unresolved/ |
| Standalone object, unknown TYPE | canon/unresolved/ |
| Same unknown TYPE recurs across ingestions | Propose a new entity TYPE in the methodology |
The reviewer resolves each canon/unresolved/ entry to exactly one of promote (admit as a real TYPE through the §6 gate), fold (move into a parent's extensions:), or discard.
Wired in the CLI. emit-candidates does both mechanically from the extraction result: it carries each element's extensions: onto its candidate (verbatim, EXT-001), and it shapes the result's unresolved[] items into canon/unresolved/UNRES-NNN.yaml holding files (the §13.2 fields; non-admitted — no admission record). An item missing ingest_field / data is dropped with a warning, never emitted malformed. validate flags EXT-002 (an extensions: key shadowing a defined field); repo-check reports the holding count and flags malformed entries (UNRES-001..003); and every typed canon walker (buildCanonIndex, check-placement, repo-check's typed tally) skips canon/unresolved/ so an untyped entry is never counted as a typed element (UNRES-004).
The CLI
All deterministic behaviour lives in @transitrix/ingest-cli — document conversion, coverage-profile read, validator pass, field-artefact + candidate emission, and the _intake/ moves. This keeps the deterministic guarantees independent of which agent drives the skill (the same principle as the methodology's CI validators): neither Claude nor Copilot reimplements the logic, and both get identical results.
The CLI is resolved as a standalone package — installed locally (it provides the transitrix-ingest bin) and, once published from its own tooling repo at the ~1.0 extraction, equivalently via npx @transitrix/ingest-cli. It is not vendored per skill and not referenced by a sibling path — a sibling-path reference would dangle when only this skill directory ships into a Copilot .github/skills/ install. Its subcommands are the contract above: scaffold-intake, convert, privacy-scan, admit-source (--zone field|codex; field-artefact / codex-artefact remain as deprecated aliases for one release), emit-candidates, validate, review-queue, suggest-profile, check-placement, resolve-placement.
Portability — Claude + GitHub Copilot
This skill is one shared SKILL.md in the converged Agent Skills format. It is auto-loaded by Claude (as /transitrix:ingest) and picked up by Copilot from .github/skills/ingest/ or ~/.copilot/skills/ingest/. Discipline that keeps it portable:
- All heavy logic is in the CLI, not in agent-specific tool calls.
- This
SKILL.md is agent-neutral — it references the CLI and the procedure, with no Claude-only or Copilot-only assumptions.
- The skill directory is self-contained: prompts and schemas live in the bundle, never referenced from a sibling skill.
BA quickstart — requirements from an interview
A common shortcut for the BA persona: an interview writeup (or a project brief, or an SOP) is already Markdown, and only motivation-layer candidates are wanted — REQUIREMENT, CONSTRAINT, and the surrounding GOAL / STAKEHOLDER context. The four business/application/implementation layers are not needed. The full pipeline still applies; the only change is scope.
Scope-narrowing is agent-side, not CLI-side. The CLI never runs the prompts itself — it receives a JSON extraction result from the agent (see Step 4). The four per-layer prompts under prompts/ are independent and self-contained (prompts/README.md); running only prompts/01_motivation.md and skipping 02_business.md / 03_application.md / 04_implementation.md is the supported shortcut. No CLI flag is needed and none exists — the agent simply omits the other prompts.
Motivation-only run (assumes _intake/ already scaffolded; source file is already .md, so convert is skipped):
- Drop the writeup into
_intake/inbox/ and move it to _intake/processing/ (or just save it there directly).
- Admit as a field artefact:
transitrix-ingest admit-source --zone field _intake/processing/<file>.md \
--type INTERVIEW --role "<role>" --date YYYY-MM-DD
The type is INTERVIEW for a transcript, DRAFT for a brief/spec/SOP (the source-quality proposal follows the Step 3 table).
- Extract, motivation-only. Feed the field artefact body to
prompts/01_motivation.md as the system prompt and save the JSON extraction result (single object with elements[] / relations[] / unresolved[], per prompts/README.md). The prompt sets origin on every REQUIREMENT from source-document context — a project brief yields origin: project-product, an SOP origin: process-product, a law/regulation/policy origin: legislative (see the origin table in prompts/01_motivation.md). Do not run 02/03/04 for this persona.
- Emit candidates + review queue (unchanged from the main pipeline):
transitrix-ingest emit-candidates <field/artefact.yaml> --from <result.json>
transitrix-ingest validate _intake/processing/candidates/
transitrix-ingest review-queue _intake/processing/candidates/
Everything downstream — validation, coverage-profile flags, the human review gate, the one rule — is identical. Nothing is admitted to canon; the reviewer confirms origin alongside source_quality on the field artefact and each candidate.
Worked example — project brief → project-product REQUIREMENT
Source (an excerpt from _intake/processing/customer-portal-brief.md, admitted as --type DRAFT --role "Product Manager"):
The customer portal must expose a self-service password reset flow. Users must be able to reset their password without contacting support. The reset must complete within 3 minutes end-to-end.
Motivation-only extraction result the agent produces from prompts/01_motivation.md:
{
"elements": [
{ "id": "REQUIREMENT-PORTAL-1", "name": "Self-service password reset",
"element_type": "REQUIREMENT",
"extraction_confidence": "high",
"extraction_notes": "explicit \"must\" in a project brief for the customer portal",
"origin": "project-product" },
{ "id": "REQUIREMENT-PORTAL-2", "name": "Password reset completes within 3 minutes",
"element_type": "REQUIREMENT",
"extraction_confidence": "high",
"origin": "project-product" }
]
}
After emit-candidates, each becomes a candidate under _intake/processing/candidates/ with derived_from: [<the field artefact id>], admitted_to: pending, origin: project-product, and the extraction_confidence review flag preserved. The review queue lists them for the human gate; nothing lands in canon/ until admitted.
For a process-product origin, swap the source: an SOP passage like "the returns process shall produce a completed refund confirmation within 24 hours" yields a REQUIREMENT with origin: process-product under the same steps. For a legislative origin, use the codex route (Step 3 — admit-source --zone codex --type LAW|REGULATION|POLICY|INTERNAL_STANDARD) instead of the field route; the motivation-only extraction still applies.
What this skill does NOT do
- It does not write admitted canon. Ever. It emits candidates and a review queue; a human admits. (It MAY emit
proposed, non-admitted entries to canon/unresolved/ — Step 7 — but the admission record on an admitted-but-untyped entry is written only by the human gate.)
- It does not ship the methodology canon. It reads the published specs (via
WebFetch when deeper than this protocol).
- It does not fold
extraction_confidence into source_quality, or persist either extraction-confidence value into canon.
- It does not emit TYPEs or REL kinds outside the adopter's coverage profile — out-of-profile material is flagged for review.
- It does not auto-admit, auto-reaffirm, or move data between zones.
derived_from is a citation, not a migration.
- It does not bypass the privacy gate. No document reaches
admit-source unless privacy-scan exits CLEAN or STRIPPED. The gate is fail-closed and enabled by default; disabling it requires an explicit adopter decision in transitrix.yaml.
