| name | js-secrets-extraction |
| description | Analyze JS bundles and source maps for hardcoded secrets, API keys, JWTs, and internal endpoints |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| revision_date | "2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z" |
| license | MIT |
| category | recon |
| tags | ["js","secrets","API-key","jwt","source-map","recon"] |
JS Bundle & Source Map Analysis -- Secret Extraction
When to Use
- ALWAYS after initial web enumeration
- When you find modern SPA (React, Angular, Vue)
- When target uses Firebase, Supabase, Auth0
- Higher yield than directory scanning on many targets
Why Analyze JS Bundles
Modern JavaScript bundles (Webpack, Vite, esbuild) often contain:
- Hardcoded API keys and tokens
- Internal API URLs
- Firebase, Auth0, Supabase configurations
- Environment variables (VITE_, REACT_APP_, NEXT_PUBLIC_*)
- Internal routes
Bundle Download and Analysis
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://target.com" > index.html
grep -Eo 'src="[^"]*\.js"' index.html | cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://target.com$js" > "$(basename $js)"
done
grep -rEn "(apiKey|api_key|API_KEY|token|secret|password|clientId|client_id|auth0|firebase|supabase)[\"'\"]?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"'\'][^\"'\']{8,}" *.js
Source Map Reconstruction
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com/assets/index-abc123.js.map"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com/static/js/main.12345.js.map"
Real-world case: Enterprise Angular SPA admin, 2 JS bundles (250KB each) exposed:
- Internal API URL (apiv3.empresa.com.br)
- Firebase API key (AIzaSy...2GXA)
- Encryption keys (AD5oDjsJaTJOzLe1Llj9mz)
- Cloudinary upload endpoint
Port-Specific URL Analysis
Modern deployments often serve the main SPA on port 443 and admin/API on separate ports (8080, 8081, 8084). Always check JS bundles on ALL discovered ports:
for port in 443 8080 8081 8084; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com:$port/static/js/main.*.js.map" 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://target.com:$port/assets/index-*.js.map" 2>/dev/null
done
Source maps on administrative or alternate-port applications may expose a
different route and configuration set from the public SPA. Analyze each
authorized application independently.
Admin Portal JS Analysis Pattern
When you find an admin portal on a separate port, the JS bundle often contains different secrets than the main site:
base = "https://target.com:8080"
js = requests.get(f"{base}/static/js/main.*.js").text
api_urls = re.findall(r'https?://[^\"\'[[:space:]]\\n,)>\\]]+', js)
routes = re.findall(r'[\"\'](/[a-zA-Z0-9_/.-]*(?:admin|chat|bot|message|user|auth|login|token|config|setting|dashboard|hospital|pharmacy|drug|payment)[a-zA-Z0-9_/.-]*)[\"\']', js, re.IGNORECASE)
Source Map Content Analysis (1,200+ Files)
When source maps are available, analyze the sourcesContent array for hardcoded secrets:
import json, re
data = json.loads(open("bundle.js.map").read())
all_source = " ".join(data.get("sourcesContent", []))
patterns = {
"password": r'[\"\']([^\"\']*(?:password|passwd|pwd)[^\"\']*)[\"\']\s*[:=]\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+)[\"\']',
"token": r'[\"\']([^\"\']*(?:token|jwt|api_key|apikey|secret)[^\"\']*)[\"\']\s*[:=]\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+)[\"\']',
}
for name, pat in patterns.items():
matches = re.findall(pat, all_source, re.IGNORECASE)
if matches:
print(f"[{name}] {matches[:5]}")
- Cloudinary upload endpoint
Secret Regex Patterns Catalog
import re
patterns = {
"Firebase API Key": r'apiKey:\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{30,})',
"AWS Key": r'(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}',
"Google API Key": r'AIza[0-9A-Za-z\\-_]{35}',
"JWT": r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]{10,}',
"Mercado Pago": r'APP_USR-[a-f0-9]{8,}',
"Stripe": r'(?:sk_live|pk_live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}',
"Auth0 Domain": r'(?:domain|auth0_domain):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']+\.auth0\.com)',
"Auth0 Client ID": r'(?:client_id|clientId|AUTH0_CLIENT_ID):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{20,})',
"Supabase URL": r'(?:supabaseUrl|SUPABASE_URL):\s*[\"\'](https://[^\"\']+\.supabase\.co)',
"Supabase Key": r'(?:supabaseKey|anonKey|SUPABASE_ANON_KEY):\s*[\"\'](eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\\-]+)',
"Heroku": r'[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}',
"Generic Secret": r'(?:secret|password|token|key):\s*[\"\']([^\"\']{8,})',
}
Batch Bundle Download + Grep
import requests, re, json
base = "https://target.com"
html = requests.get(base).text
js_urls = re.findall(r'src="([^"]*\.js)"', html)
for js_url in js_urls:
if js_url.startswith("/"):
js_url = base + js_url
content = requests.get(js_url).text
for name, pattern in patterns.items():
matches = re.findall(pattern, content)
for m in matches:
if isinstance(m, tuple):
m = m[0]
if len(m) > 6:
print(f"[{name}] {m[:80]}")
Pitfalls
| Issue | Solution |
|---|
| Bundles too large | Use grep -Eo with specific patterns |
| Minified code (1 char names) | Use source maps for reconstruction |
| False positive matches | Validate keys by testing API endpoint |
| Rate limiting | Add delays between bundle downloads |
Backend URL Discovery
JS bundles frequently leak production backend URLs, enabling direct API attacks bypassing CDN/WAF:
grep -Eo 'https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+\.(fly\.dev|azurewebsites\.net|onrender\.com|vercel\.app|netlify\.app)[^"'\'' ]{0,40}' /tmp/*.js
grep -Eo 'https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.\-]+\.(supabase\.co|r2\.dev|blob\.vercel-storage\.com)[^"'\'' ]{0,40}' /tmp/*.js
grep -Eo 'functions/v1/[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+' /tmp/*.js
grep -Eo '["\x60]/api/v1/[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+["\x60]' /tmp/*.js
Real Field Patterns
| Pattern | Platform | Example | Secret? |
|---|
*.fly.dev | Fly.io | ht-prod-backend.fly.dev | ✅ Backend URL |
*.azurewebsites.net | Azure | consigpro-api-prod-... | ✅ Backend URL |
*.onrender.com | Render | clickcity-api.onrender.com | ✅ Backend URL |
*.supabase.co | Supabase | jxhvjufqtabpeieyhkgk.supabase.co | ✅ Anon key is public; backend URL is intel |
*.r2.dev | Cloudflare R2 | pub-xxx.r2.dev | ✅ Storage URL |
functions/v1/* | Supabase Edge | provision-openrouter-key | ✅ Endpoint name |
dpl_* | Vercel DPL | dpl_BCoyPsxxYLZ... | ❌ NOT a secret — public deploy ID |
Verification
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/v1/accounts:signUp?key=AIza..."
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://PROJECT.supabase.co/rest/v1/users?limit=1" -H "apikey: ANON_KEY" -H "Authorization: Bearer ANON_KEY"
Phase 5 — Source Map Exploitation
Recover full pre-compiled source code when .js.map files are left in production:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=*.target.com/*&collapse=urlkey&output=text&fl=original&filter=original:.*\.js\.map$" \
| sort -u > map_urls.txt
wget https://target.com/static/app.js.map
node -e "
const map = require('./app.js.map');
map.sources.forEach((src, i) => {
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFileSync(src.split('/').pop(), map.sourcesContent[i]);
});
print('Extracted ' + map.sources.length + ' source files');
"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com/static/app.js.map" | grep "200\|Content-Type"
Phase 6 — Deep JS Crawling
Crawl JS files recursively for embedded URLs, APIs, and IPs:
python3 lazyegg.py https://target.com
python3 lazyegg.py https://target.com/js/auth.js
waybackurls target.com \
| grep '\.js$' \
| awk -F '?' '{print $1}' \
| sort -u \
| xargs -I{} bash -c 'python3 lazyegg.py "{}" --js_urls --domains --ips' \
> lazyegg_output.txt
cat all_urls.txt | subjs | tee js_files_full.txt
Phase 7 — Per-File AI-Assisted Code Review
JS bundles are source code — even minified. A disciplined per-file (per-chunk) review finds what autonomous agents miss:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com" | grep -Eo 'src="[^"]+\.js[^"]*"' | \
cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "$js" -o "chunks/$(basename $js)"
done
for chunk in chunks/*.js; do
echo "=== $chunk ==="
grep -Eon 'eval\s*\(|new\s+Function\s*\(' "$chunk"
grep -Eon '(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|bearer)\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]{8,}' "$chunk"
grep -Eon 'postMessage\s*\(' "$chunk"
grep -Eon '__proto__|constructor\.prototype' "$chunk"
grep -Eoin 'debug|test|staging|localhost' "$chunk"
grep -Eon '(?:isAdmin|isVip|isPremium|isModerator|role)\s*[=:]\s*true' "$chunk"
done > ai_review_findings.txt
grep -c ai_review_findings.txt
grep -c ai_review_findings.txt
Key insight: autonomous agents told "find bugs" in a whole codebase burn budget and miss things. A guaranteed per-file pass with fixed output structure produces repeatable hits. Each finding still needs manual PoC verification.