用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill source-leak-hunt命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Full WSTG-aligned web application pentest — 12-phase methodology from information gathering through reporting, with concrete commands, expected outputs, pitfalls, and verification per phase.
Attack SAML SSO via XSW, signature strip, metadata extract.
Use when two or more verified findings may combine into a higher-impact authorized attack path.
正在显示 SKILL.md
基于 SOC 职业分类
| name | source-leak-hunt |
| description | Mass scan for exposed env files, backups, and git configs. |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| revision_date | "2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z" |
| license | MIT |
| platforms | ["linux"] |
| compatibility | Requires curl, grep |
| tags | ["recon","source-leak","exposure","secrets","wordpress"] |
| category | recon |
| related_skills | ["wp-mass-recon","js-secrets-extraction","error-log-mining","phpinfo-to-rce","deep-invade"] |
Mass scanning for exposed sensitive files (.env, .git/config, wp-config.php.bak, debug.log, backup.sql, phpinfo.php, Dockerfile, etc.) with content-based false positive filtering. Source leaks are the second most common finding (~7% of targets) after WordPress user enumeration.
skill_view(name='wp-mass-recon') confirms a target is alive.skill_view(name='js-secrets-extraction') for client-side secrets.terminal with curl.$OUTDIR/leaks/.# Quick scan single target (20 paths)
TARGET="https://example.com"
for path in .env .git/config wp-config.php.bak debug.log backup.sql info.php phpinfo.php \
.env.backup .env.local .env.production wp-config.php~ .git/HEAD .backup.sql \
docker-compose.yml Dockerfile .DS_Store robots.txt sitemap.xml; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "$TARGET/$path")
[[ "$code" == "200" ]] && echo "HTTP 200: $TARGET/$path"
sleep 0.2
done
| Path | What It Exposes | Severity |
|---|---|---|
.env | DB creds, API keys, app secrets |
| Critical |
wp-config.php.bak | MySQL root password, salts | Critical |
.git/config | Repository URL, credentials | High |
debug.log | PHP errors, server paths, SQL queries | High |
backup.sql | Full database dump | Critical |
info.php / phpinfo.php | PHP config, disable_functions, server env | High |
docker-compose.yml | Service architecture, env vars | Medium |
Dockerfile | Build config, exposed ports | Low |
.env.backup / .env.local | Same as .env, alternate names | Critical |
wp-config.php~ | Vim swap of wp-config | Critical |
.DS_Store | Directory listing (macOS) | Low |
error_log | PHP error log (can be multi-MB, full of paths/queries) | High |
#!/bin/bash
URLS_FILE="$1" # One URL per line
OUTDIR="$OUTDIR/leaks"
mkdir -p "$OUTDIR"
PATHS=(
".env"
".git/config"
"wp-config.php.bak"
"debug.log"
"backup.sql"
"info.php"
"phpinfo.php"
".env.backup"
".env.local"
".env.production"
"wp-config.php~"
".git/HEAD"
"docker-compose.yml"
"Dockerfile"
".DS_Store"
"robots.txt"
"sitemap.xml"
"error_log"
"wp-content/debug.log"
".backup.sql"
)
# Content verification patterns (avoids SPA catch-all false positives)
declare -A PATTERNS
PATTERNS[".env"]='DB_|APP_|_KEY|_SECRET|DATABASE|PASSWORD|TOKEN'
PATTERNS["wp-config.php.bak"]='DB_NAME|DB_PASSWORD|AUTH_KEY'
PATTERNS[".git/config"]='\[core\]'
PATTERNS["debug.log"]='PHP|ERROR|WARNING|Stack trace'
PATTERNS["backup.sql"]='CREATE TABLE|INSERT INTO|DROP TABLE'
PATTERNS["info.php"]='PHP Version|phpinfo'
PATTERNS["phpinfo.php"]='PHP Version|phpinfo'
PATTERNS[".env.backup"]='DB_|APP_|_KEY|_SECRET'
PATTERNS[".env.local"]='DB_|APP_|_KEY|_SECRET'
PATTERNS[".env.production"]='DB_|APP_|_KEY|_SECRET'
PATTERNS["wp-config.php~"]='DB_NAME|DB_PASSWORD'
PATTERNS["error_log"]='PHP|ERROR|Stack trace'
scan_target() {
local url="$1"
local domain
domain=$(echo "$url" | sed 's|https\?://||' | sed 's|/.*||')
for path in "${PATHS[@]}"; do
local full_url="${url}/${path}"
local code
code=$(curl -sk -o /tmp/leak_check_$$.tmp -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "$full_url" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ "$code" == "200" ]]; then
local content
content=$(head -c 2000 /tmp/leak_check_$$.tmp 2>/dev/null)
local pattern="${PATTERNS[$path]}"
if [[ -n "$pattern" ]] && echo "$content" | grep -qiE "$pattern"; then
echo "[LEAK] $full_url (VERIFIED: $path)"
echo "$full_url" >> "$OUTDIR/${domain}_leaks.txt"
cp /tmp/leak_check_$$.tmp "$OUTDIR/${domain}_${path//\//_}.content" 2>/dev/null
elif [[ -z "$pattern" ]]; then
# No pattern check — just log HTTP 200 (e.g., robots.txt)
local size=$(wc -c < /tmp/leak_check_$$.tmp)
if [[ "$size" -gt 50 ]]; then
echo "[INFO] $full_url (HTTP 200, ${size} bytes)"
echo "$full_url" >> "$OUTDIR/${domain}_leaks.txt"
fi
fi
fi
sleep 0.3
done
rm -f /tmp/leak_check_$$.tmp
}
export -f scan_target
export OUTDIR
export PATHS
# Run 30 parallel workers
cat "$URLS_FILE" | xargs -P 30 -I {} bash -c 'scan_target "{}"'
echo "[+] Done. Results in $OUTDIR/"
# From .env files
grep -rhE '(DB_|APP_|_KEY|_SECRET|DATABASE|PASSWORD|TOKEN|SECRET)=' $OUTDIR/leaks/*.env*.content 2>/dev/null | sort -u
# From wp-config backups
grep -rhE 'DB_NAME|DB_USER|DB_PASSWORD|DB_HOST|AUTH_KEY' $OUTDIR/leaks/*wp-config* 2>/dev/null
# From .git/config
grep -rh 'url = ' $OUTDIR/leaks/*.git_config.content 2>/dev/null
# From SQL dumps
grep -rhE 'CREATE TABLE|INSERT INTO' $OUTDIR/leaks/*backup* $OUTDIR/leaks/*.sql* 2>/dev/null | head -20
for f in $OUTDIR/leaks/*_leaks.txt; do
count=$(wc -l < "$f")
[[ "$count" -ge 3 ]] && echo "$(basename "$f" _leaks.txt): $count leaks"
done | sort -t: -k2 -rn
error_log files can be 1.7MB+. Fetch in chunks or use curl -r 0-5000 for sampling..git/HEAD returning 200 with a legitimate git hash. Verify .git/config first.<title>, or same keyword like "for sale" or "parked"). Add early-exit: if /robots.txt and /.env both return 200 with near-identical HTML, mark domain as parked and skip further source-leak checks..env leak MUST contain at least one of: DB_, APP_, _KEY, _SECRET, PASSWORD, TOKEN.wp-config.php.bak leak MUST contain DB_NAME and DB_PASSWORD..git/config leak MUST contain [core] section header.CREATE TABLE) or DML (INSERT INTO) statements.# bfac — multi-level backup file detection
bfac --url https://target.com \
--detection-technique all \
--level 3 \
--exclude-status-codes 404,500
# Wayback Machine — historical sensitive files
waybackurls https://target.com | grep -iE \
"\.(xls|xlsx|csv|sql|db|bak|backup|old|tar\.gz|tgz|zip|7z|rar|pdf|pem|key|crt|env|json|yml|yaml|conf|config|git|htpasswd|log|dump|DS_Store)" \
| sort -u > sensitive_wayback.txt
# Check which are still accessible
cat sensitive_wayback.txt | httpx -silent -mc 200 -o accessible_sensitive.txt
# Common backup patterns to probe
for ext in bak old backup zip tar.gz tgz sql dump; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com/backup.$ext" | head -1
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com/site.$ext" | head -1
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com/target.$ext" | head -1
sleep 0.3
done
# Google Sheets — internal spreadsheets often left public
# Manual search:
# site:docs.google.com/spreadsheets "target.com"
# site:docs.google.com/spreadsheets "@target.com"
# site:docs.google.com/spreadsheets "password" "target.com"
# Google Drive files
# site:drive.google.com "target.com" "confidential"
# Firebase/Firestore URLs in public search results
# site:firebaseio.com "target.com"
# site:firestore.googleapis.com "target-app"
# GCP buckets
# site:storage.googleapis.com "target"
# site:storage.cloud.google.com "target"