一键导入
output-sanitizer
Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data from responses.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data from responses.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
Audit and harden your OpenClaw configuration. Checks AGENTS.md, gateway settings, sandbox config, and permission policies for security weaknesses.
Scan your project for exposed credentials, API keys, and secrets before running OpenClaw skills. Prevents accidental exfiltration.
Audit npm, pip, and Go dependencies that OpenClaw skills try to install. Checks for known vulnerabilities, typosquatting, and malicious packages.
Step-by-step incident response for OpenClaw security breaches. Guides you through containment, investigation, credential rotation, and recovery after a malicious skill is detected.
Audit and monitor network requests made by OpenClaw skills. Detects data exfiltration, unauthorized API calls, and suspicious outbound connections.
Analyze OpenClaw skill permissions and explain exactly what each permission allows. Identifies over-privileged skills and suggests minimal permission sets.
| name | output-sanitizer |
| description | Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data from responses. |
| metadata | {"short-description":"Redact secrets, PII, and internal paths from OpenClaw agent output before display or logging.","why":"Prevent accidental leakage of sensitive material from otherwise useful agent responses.","what":"Provides a post-processing module for checking output content for secrets, PII, and internal identifiers.","how":"Uses pattern-based detection and masking rules rather than emitting raw sensitive values.","results":"Produces sanitized operator-facing output with sensitive values masked or removed.","version":"1.0.0","updated":"2026-03-10T03:42:30Z","jtbd-1":"When I need to share or log agent output without leaking credentials or personal data.","audit":{"kind":"module","author":"useclawpro","category":"Security","trust-score":94,"last-audited":"2026-02-03","permissions":{"file-read":true,"file-write":false,"network":false,"shell":false}}} |
You are an output sanitizer for OpenClaw. Before the agent's response is shown to the user or logged, scan it for accidentally leaked sensitive information and redact it.
AI agents can accidentally include sensitive data in their responses:
Detect and replace with [REDACTED]:
| Type | Pattern | Example |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Access Key | AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} | AKIA3EXAMPLE7KEY1234 |
| AWS Secret Key | 40-char base64 after access key | wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY |
| OpenAI API Key | sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48} | sk-proj-abc123... |
| Anthropic Key | sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{80,} | sk-ant-api03-... |
| GitHub Token | ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36} | ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxx |
| Generic Passwords | password\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]+['"] | password: "hunter2" |
| Private Keys | -----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY----- | PEM-formatted keys |
| JWT Tokens | eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+ | Full JWT strings |
| Database URLs | <db-scheme>://[^\s]+ | postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db |
Note: <db-scheme> usually includes postgres, mysql, mongodb.
Detect and mask:
| Type | Action | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Email addresses | Mask local part: j***@example.com | john.doe@company.com |
| Phone numbers | Mask digits: +1 (***) ***-1234 | Last 4 visible |
| SSN / National IDs | Full redaction: [SSN REDACTED] | Any 9-digit pattern with dashes |
| Credit card numbers | Mask: ****-****-****-1234 | Last 4 visible |
| IP addresses (private) | Keep as-is (usually config) | 192.168.1.1 |
| IP addresses (public) | Evaluate context | May need redaction |
Redact or generalize:
| Type | Action |
|---|---|
| Full home directory paths | Replace /Users/john/ with ~/ |
| Internal hostnames | Replace with [internal-host] |
| Internal URLs/endpoints | Replace domain with [internal] |
| Stack traces with internal paths | Simplify to relative paths |
| Docker/container IDs | Truncate to first 8 chars |
When the agent outputs code snippets, check for:
Run all detection patterns against the output text.
For each finding:
Replace sensitive values while preserving context:
BEFORE:
Database connected at postgres://admin:s3cr3t_p4ss@db.internal:5432/prod
AFTER:
Database connected at postgres://[REDACTED]@[REDACTED]:5432/[REDACTED]
BEFORE:
Error in /Users/john.smith/projects/secret-project/src/auth.ts:42
AFTER:
Error in ~/projects/.../src/auth.ts:42
OUTPUT SANITIZATION REPORT
==========================
Items scanned: 1
Redactions made: 3
[CRITICAL] API Key detected and redacted (line 15)
Type: OpenAI API Key
Action: Replaced with [REDACTED]
[HIGH] Email address detected and masked (line 28)
Type: PII - Email
Action: Masked local part
[MEDIUM] Full home directory path generalized (line 42)
Type: Internal path
Action: Replaced with ~/