用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt;运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/vibeeval/vibecosystem --skill config-security-scan命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地?可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Claude Code CLI commands, flags, headless mode, and automation patterns
OpenAI Codex CLI + Claude Code (Hizir) birlikte kullanim rehberi. Is dagitim pattern'leri, GitHub Actions workflow ornekleri, review dongusu ve iki AI yazilim asistaninin guclu yanlarini birlestiren orchestration stratejileri.
Meta-skill for internal codebase exploration at varying depths (quick/deep/architecture)
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | config-security-scan |
| description | Scan .claude/ directory for security misconfigurations, exposed secrets, unsafe permissions |
| allowed-tools | ["Bash","Read","Grep","Glob"] |
| keywords | ["security","config","scan","audit","claude","settings","mcp","hooks","agents","secrets","permissions"] |
Scan your .claude/ directory and related configuration files for security issues. Inspired by AgentShield pattern - checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP configs, hooks, and agent definitions for misconfigurations, exposed secrets, and unsafe permissions.
/config-security-scan [path]
Default path: .claude/ in current project.
- API keys, tokens, passwords in CLAUDE.md
- Hardcoded credentials in hook scripts
- Secrets in MCP server configs
- Bearer tokens in agent definitions
- .env files committed to git
- dangerouslySkipPermissions in settings.json
- Overly broad tool permissions (all tools for simple agents)
- MCP servers with filesystem write access
- Hooks with shell execution and no validation
- Agents with Bash tool that don't need it
- Unknown/untrusted MCP servers
- MCP servers with network access + filesystem access
- Missing authentication on MCP endpoints
- MCP servers running as root/admin
- Unverified npm packages in MCP configs
- Hooks that execute user input
- Hooks without error handling
- Hooks that modify git config
- Hooks that access external networks
- Hooks with hardcoded paths
- Agents with unnecessary tools
- Agents with system-level Bash access
- Agent descriptions that could enable prompt injection
- Agents without clear scope boundaries
- Unused MCP server configs
- Deprecated settings
- Conflicting rules
- Missing recommended security settings
# Step 1: Find all config files
find .claude/ -type f \( -name "*.json" -o -name "*.md" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.mjs" -o -name "*.ts" \)
# Step 2: Secret patterns
grep -rn "api[_-]?key\|password\|secret\|token\|bearer\|sk-\|pk_\|ghp_\|gho_\|xoxb-\|xoxp-" .claude/
# Step 3: Permission checks
grep -rn "dangerouslySkipPermissions\|allowedTools.*Bash\|shell_exec\|eval(" .claude/
# Step 4: MCP config review
cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null | jq '.mcpServers | keys'
# Step 5: Hook review
ls .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null
# Config Security Scan Report
Scanned: [path]
Date: [timestamp]
## Summary
- CRITICAL: X issues
- HIGH: Y issues
- MEDIUM: Z issues
- LOW: W issues
## CRITICAL Issues
### [Issue Title]
**File:** [path]
**Line:** [number]
**Issue:** [description]
**Fix:** [remediation]
## Recommendations
1. [Action item]
These are NOT security issues in the .claude/ context: