risk-register

name	risk-register
description	Document risks for changes touching auth, data, or migrations. Lists top risks, how to test/monitor them, and rollback strategy.
tools	Read, Grep, Glob
user-invocable	true

Risk Register

For changes that touch sensitive areas (authentication, data, migrations, infrastructure), document the risks explicitly. This is what senior developers do naturally - making it explicit ensures nothing is overlooked.

When to Use

Use this skill when your change involves:

• Authentication/Authorization - Login, sessions, permissions, tokens
• User Data - PII, passwords, payment info, user content
• Data Migrations - Schema changes, data transformations, backfills
• External Integrations - Third-party APIs, webhooks, OAuth
• Infrastructure - Deployment, scaling, configuration changes
• Breaking Changes - API changes, behavioral changes, deprecations

Quick Start

/risk-register

Or specify the change:

/risk-register "Adding password reset functionality"

The Risk Register Template

For each risky change, complete this register:

# Risk Register: [Feature/Change Name]

## Summary
Brief description of what's changing and why it's sensitive.

## Top 3 Risks

### Risk 1: [Name]
**Likelihood:** Low / Medium / High
**Impact:** Low / Medium / High / Critical

**Description:**
What could go wrong?

**Mitigation:**
How are we preventing this?

**Detection:**
How would we know if this happened?

**Response:**
What do we do if it happens?

---

### Risk 2: [Name]
...

### Risk 3: [Name]
...

## Testing Strategy

### Pre-deployment
- [ ] Unit tests cover the change
- [ ] Integration tests for critical paths
- [ ] Manual testing of edge cases
- [ ] Security review completed

### Post-deployment
- [ ] Smoke test in production
- [ ] Monitor error rates
- [ ] Watch for anomalies in [specific metrics]
- [ ] Verify [specific functionality] works

## Monitoring & Alerting

What should we watch after deployment?

| Metric | Normal Range | Alert Threshold | Response |
|--------|--------------|-----------------|----------|
| Login failure rate | < 5% | > 10% | Check auth service |
| API error rate | < 1% | > 5% | Investigate errors |
| ... | ... | ... | ... |

## Rollback Strategy

### Can we rollback?
Yes / Partial / No (explain why)

### Rollback steps
1. [Step 1]
2. [Step 2]
3. [Step 3]

### Rollback time estimate
[X minutes/hours]

### Data implications
What happens to data created after deployment if we rollback?

## Approval

- [ ] Engineer reviewed risks
- [ ] Security reviewed (if auth/data)
- [ ] Stakeholder aware of risks

Risk Categories

Authentication Risks

Risk	Impact	Common Mitigations
Session hijacking	Critical	Secure cookies, HTTPS, token rotation
Credential stuffing	High	Rate limiting, MFA, breach detection
Token leakage	Critical	Short expiry, secure storage, no logging
Privilege escalation	Critical	Strict authz checks, principle of least privilege
Account takeover	Critical	Email verification, suspicious activity alerts

Data Risks

Risk	Impact	Common Mitigations
Data loss	Critical	Backups, soft deletes, transaction safety
Data corruption	Critical	Validation, constraints, idempotency
Data leakage	Critical	Access controls, encryption, audit logs
Privacy violation	High	PII handling, consent, data minimization
Compliance breach	High	Audit trails, retention policies

Migration Risks

Risk	Impact	Common Mitigations
Failed migration	High	Dry runs, backups, reversible migrations
Data inconsistency	High	Validation checks, reconciliation
Downtime	Medium	Rolling deploys, feature flags
Performance degradation	Medium	Index analysis, query optimization

Example Risk Register

# Risk Register: Password Reset Feature

## Summary
Adding password reset via email. Touches auth system, sends emails with tokens,
allows password changes without current password.

## Top 3 Risks

### Risk 1: Token Theft/Replay
**Likelihood:** Medium
**Impact:** Critical

**Description:**
Reset tokens could be intercepted or reused to take over accounts.

**Mitigation:**
- Tokens expire in 1 hour
- Single use (invalidated after use)
- Tokens are cryptographically random (32 bytes)
- HTTPS only

**Detection:**
- Alert on multiple reset attempts for same user
- Log all password resets with IP

**Response:**
- Invalidate all tokens for affected user
- Force password change
- Notify user of suspicious activity

---

### Risk 2: Email Enumeration
**Likelihood:** High
**Impact:** Medium

**Description:**
Attackers could use the reset form to discover which emails have accounts.

**Mitigation:**
- Same response for valid/invalid emails
- Rate limiting on reset endpoint
- CAPTCHA after 3 attempts

**Detection:**
- Monitor for high volume of reset requests
- Alert on requests from same IP for many emails

**Response:**
- Block IP temporarily
- Enable additional rate limiting

---

### Risk 3: Token Logged/Exposed
**Likelihood:** Low
**Impact:** Critical

**Description:**
Reset token appears in logs, error messages, or URLs shared externally.

**Mitigation:**
- Token in POST body, not URL
- Logging excludes token field
- Error messages are generic

**Detection:**
- Grep logs for token patterns
- Review error handling

**Response:**
- Purge affected logs
- Rotate any exposed tokens
- Notify affected users

## Testing Strategy

### Pre-deployment
- [x] Unit tests for token generation, validation, expiry
- [x] Integration test for full reset flow
- [x] Test expired token rejection
- [x] Test reused token rejection
- [x] Security review of token handling

### Post-deployment
- [ ] Smoke test: Complete reset flow in production
- [ ] Monitor email delivery rate
- [ ] Watch for spike in reset requests

## Monitoring & Alerting

| Metric | Normal | Alert | Response |
|--------|--------|-------|----------|
| Reset requests/hour | < 100 | > 500 | Check for abuse |
| Reset completion rate | > 80% | < 50% | Check email delivery |
| Failed reset attempts | < 10% | > 30% | Check token generation |

## Rollback Strategy

### Can we rollback?
Yes - feature flag controls access to reset endpoint.

### Rollback steps
1. Disable `PASSWORD_RESET_ENABLED` feature flag
2. Invalidate all outstanding reset tokens
3. Communicate to support team

### Rollback time estimate
~5 minutes (feature flag toggle)

### Data implications
Outstanding reset tokens will be invalidated. Users mid-reset will need to retry.

Integration with Wiggum

When wiggum detects changes to auth, data, or migrations, it should prompt:

This change touches [auth/data/migrations].
Should we create a risk register? (y/n)

If yes, use this skill to document risks before proceeding.

Remember

• Be specific - "data loss" is too vague; "orphaned records if parent deleted" is actionable
• Be honest - If you can't roll back, say so
• Think like an attacker - What would you try if you wanted to break this?
• Think like ops - How would you know something is wrong at 3am?

The goal isn't to prevent all risks - it's to know what the risks are and have a plan.