| name | code-vulnscan |
| description | Use this when the user wants to find security vulnerabilities in a codebase, perform a security audit, scan for CVEs, detect secrets, review React/Next.js or Go services, audit architecture/application/infrastructure flaws, review auth/API/crypto/business logic, check IaC/cloud/runtime configs, or generate a vulnerability report. Performs taint-flow, control-flow, architecture, and exploitability analysis across Python, JS/TS, Java, Go, PHP, Ruby, C/C++, C#, Rust, and infrastructure. |
Code-VulnScan — Deep Codebase Vulnerability Scanner
This skill performs comprehensive, flow-aware security analysis on any codebase. It combines taint tracking, control-flow analysis, business logic review, API security auditing, secret detection, configuration review, and dependency auditing to find real, exploitable vulnerabilities — not keyword matches.
- Use the IDE's own tools for reading, searching, and reasoning about code.
- Use local Python scripts for deterministic file enumeration, AST-based analysis, secret entropy scanning, dependency checking, state tracking, and report generation.
- Do not call external LLM-provider APIs as part of this skill.
- Every confirmed finding requires a verified evidence chain. Candidates without verification are never reported.
Command surface
vulnscan scan <path> [--lang python,javascript,...] [--severity critical,high,medium,low] [--exclude vendor,tests]vulnscan taint <file> [--lang <language>]vulnscan secrets <path>vulnscan deps <path>vulnscan config <path>vulnscan report [--run-id <id>] [--format markdown|json|sarif] [--min-severity medium]vulnscan statusvulnscan commit <hash> [--repo <path>] [--base <base-hash>] [--severity critical,high,medium,low]vulnscan diff <base> <head> [--repo <path>] [--severity critical,high,medium,low]vulnscan pr <pr-number> [--repo <path>] [--severity critical,high,medium,low]
Commit/diff mode: Scans only the files and code regions changed in a commit or between two refs. Faster than a full scan — designed for CI/CD pipelines and code review. Findings are tagged introduced_in_diff: true (new vulnerability in the changed code) or introduced_in_diff: false (pre-existing vulnerability in code called by the change). Use vulnscan commit HEAD to scan the most recent commit, vulnscan diff main HEAD to scan a feature branch, or vulnscan pr 42 to scan a GitHub PR diff.
Defaults: report critical, high, medium findings. Auto-detect language from file extensions.
Core architecture
sub-skills/ — cognitive instructions for each analysis phase (24 specialized agents)scripts/ — deterministic Python helpers for enumeration, AST analysis, entropy scanning, dependency checking, report generationresources/patterns/ — per-language source/sink/sanitizer pattern definitionsresources/references/ — CWE taxonomy, OWASP Top 10, false-positive guidanceworkspace/ — SQLite scan state, intermediate JSON outputs, final reports
The golden rule: evidence-based findings only
A confirmed finding requires all three:
- A source — user-controlled data enters the system (or a dangerous condition exists).
- A sink / consequence — a dangerous operation can be triggered.
- A path — source reaches sink with no effective mitigation in between.
Pattern-match candidates are never confirmed findings. Every candidate passes through sub-skills/false-positive-filter.md before being reported.
Vulnerability categories covered
| Category | Technique | CWE |
|---|
| SQL Injection | Taint + AST | CWE-89 |
| Command Injection | Taint + AST | CWE-78 |
| Path Traversal | Taint + canonicalization check | CWE-22 |
| XSS (Reflected/Stored/DOM) | Taint + output context | CWE-79 |
| SSRF | Taint + URL validation check | CWE-918 |
| Insecure Deserialization | Taint + API check | CWE-502 |
| Server-Side Template Injection | Taint + template API check | CWE-94 |
| Open Redirect | Taint + redirect target check | CWE-601 |
| XXE | Config + parser API check | CWE-611 |
| Auth Bypass / Broken Access Control | Control flow + logic analysis | CWE-287, CWE-285 |
| Broken Authentication | Session + token analysis | CWE-306, CWE-384 |
| IDOR / BOLA | Authorization logic analysis | CWE-639 |
| Mass Assignment | API + model analysis | CWE-915 |
| Business Logic Flaws | Control flow + state analysis | CWE-840 |
| Race Conditions / TOCTOU | Concurrency + file op analysis | CWE-362, CWE-367 |
| Weak Cryptography | Algorithm + key analysis | CWE-327, CWE-326 |
| Hardcoded Secrets | Entropy + pattern detection | CWE-798 |
| Insecure Randomness | RNG API analysis | CWE-338 |
| Dependency CVEs | Manifest + version analysis | CWE-1035 |
| Information Disclosure | Error handling + logging analysis | CWE-209 |
| Security Misconfiguration | Config + header analysis | CWE-16 |
| IaC Misconfigurations | Dockerfile/K8s/Terraform analysis | CWE-732, CWE-284 |
| Memory Safety (C/C++) | Buffer + pointer analysis | CWE-120, CWE-416 |
| ReDoS | Regex complexity analysis | CWE-1333 |
| GraphQL Security | Query depth + introspection check | CWE-284 |
| React / Client-Side App Security | DOM sink + router + storage analysis | CWE-79, CWE-601, CWE-922 |
| Go Service Security | Handler + binding + timeout + goroutine analysis | CWE-89, CWE-918, CWE-400 |
| Architecture Flaws | Trust boundary + tenant isolation analysis | CWE-284, CWE-862 |
| Application-Layer Vulns | Workflow + abuse-control analysis | CWE-639, CWE-840 |
| Infrastructure Security | Cloud IAM + network/runtime/storage posture | CWE-284, CWE-732 |
| Commit-diff scoped analysis | Changed-file taint + caller/callee tracing | CWE-all |
Full analysis workflow
Phase 0: Strategy (always run first)
Read sub-skills/scan-strategy.md to produce a concrete scan plan:
- Detected languages, frameworks, entry points
- Prioritized file list
- Active vulnerability categories
- Fresh or resume decision
- Whether the scan needs React, Go, architecture, or application-vulnerability deep review
python3 scripts/scan.py --path <target> --status-only
If a recent incomplete run exists, ask whether to resume or start fresh.
python3 scripts/scan.py --path <target> [--lang python,javascript] [--exclude vendor,tests,node_modules]
This populates workspace/scan_state.db with candidate findings. Review the summary before proceeding.
Phase 0A: Technology and architecture deep-review routing
Load these focused reviewers when the scan plan matches their trigger:
sub-skills/react-security-reviewer.md — React, Next.js, Remix, React Router, JSX/TSX, browser tokens, client routing, postMessage, or hydration data.sub-skills/go-security-reviewer.md — Go net/http, Gin, Echo, Fiber, Chi, Gorilla, gRPC, workers, request binding, or Go server hardening.sub-skills/architecture-security-reviewer.md — multi-service systems, SaaS/tenant boundaries, workers/queues, plugins/connectors, cloud trust boundaries, service accounts.sub-skills/application-vuln-reviewer.md — IDOR/BOLA, CSRF, account recovery, mass assignment, file upload/download, session lifecycle, rate limits, billing/workflow abuse.sub-skills/infrastructure-security-reviewer.md — cloud IAM, network exposure, object storage, KMS/secrets, runtime platforms, CI/CD supply chain, audit/logging, backups.
These reviewers do not replace taint analysis. Use them to expand the entry-point list, identify non-obvious sources/sinks, and add manual review targets before Phase 1.
Phase 1: Taint and injection analysis (parallel)
Read sub-skills/taint-analyzer.md. Run per-file taint analysis:
python3 scripts/taint.py --file <path> --lang <language>
Use script output as a starting map. Read every flagged file directly and trace each candidate path step by step. Verify every taint path — source to sink — reading actual code at each hop. Interprocedural traces must follow function calls across file boundaries.
Covers: SQL injection, command injection, path traversal, XSS, SSRF, SSTI, XXE, deserialization, open redirect.
Phase 2: Input validation analysis
Read sub-skills/input-validator.md. For every entry point identified in Phase 0:
- Verify validation is present and appropriate for the sink context
- Check for allowlist vs blocklist approach
- Test regex anchoring, type juggling bypasses, encoding bypasses
- Check second-order validation gaps
Phase 3: Business logic and control flow analysis
Read sub-skills/business-logic-analyzer.md and sub-skills/application-vuln-reviewer.md. Analyze:
- Authentication and authorization decision points
- Workflow state machines (can steps be skipped or reversed?)
- Price/quantity/permission manipulation opportunities
- Race conditions and TOCTOU patterns
- Privilege escalation paths through indirect logic
- Account recovery, CSRF, rate limiting, upload/download, cache leakage, and session lifecycle gaps
Phase 4: API security analysis
Read sub-skills/api-security-reviewer.md. For every REST, GraphQL, or RPC endpoint:
- Check for IDOR/BOLA (missing object-level authorization)
- Check for mass assignment in request body → model binding
- Check for excessive data exposure in responses
- Check rate limiting, authentication enforcement
- GraphQL: introspection, depth limits, batch query abuse
If the system has multiple services, tenants, workers, plugins, or cloud resources, also read sub-skills/architecture-security-reviewer.md and verify authorization, tenant scoping, and trust-boundary enforcement across the full request/job path.
Phase 5: Authentication and authorization review
Read sub-skills/auth-reviewer.md. Examine:
- Authentication mechanisms and bypass paths
- Session management, fixation, expiry
- JWT/token construction and validation
- Authorization middleware — is it applied consistently?
- Privilege escalation and horizontal access control
Phase 6: Cryptography and secrets review
Read sub-skills/crypto-reviewer.md and sub-skills/secret-detector.md.
Run entropy-based secret scanning:
python3 scripts/secrets.py --path <target>
Analyze:
- Algorithm selection (MD5/SHA1 for security, ECB mode, DES/RC4)
- Key sizes and generation
- Hardcoded credentials, API keys, tokens
- IV/nonce reuse, predictable keys
- Certificate validation bypasses
Phase 7: Configuration and infrastructure security
Read sub-skills/config-security-reviewer.md, sub-skills/iac-security-reviewer.md, and sub-skills/infrastructure-security-reviewer.md.
Check:
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, CORS)
- Debug mode, verbose errors, stack traces in production
- TLS/SSL configuration
- Dockerfile, Kubernetes manifests, Terraform configs
- Cloud IAM policies, public storage buckets, open security groups
- Runtime platform posture, CI/CD deployment trust, KMS/secrets policy, audit logging, public snapshots/backups
Phase 8: Memory safety (C/C++/Rust only)
Read sub-skills/memory-safety-analyzer.md when the codebase includes C, C++, or unsafe Rust.
Covers: buffer overflows, use-after-free, format string vulnerabilities, integer overflows in allocation sizes, null pointer dereferences.
Phase 8A: React and Go framework-specific review
When React/Next.js/TSX is present, read sub-skills/react-security-reviewer.md and verify client-side DOM XSS, open redirects, browser token storage, postMessage origin checks, hydration data leaks, and client-only authorization.
When Go is present, read sub-skills/go-security-reviewer.md and verify request body binding, SQL construction, command execution, SSRF, file access, template use, HTTP server timeouts, CORS, body limits, and concurrency races.
Phase 9: Error handling and information disclosure
Read sub-skills/error-handling-reviewer.md. Check:
- Stack traces and exception details leaked to clients
- Verbose SQL errors, file path disclosure
- Enumeration through differential error messages
- Logging of sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII)
Phase 10: Dependency audit
python3 scripts/dependency.py --path <target>
Read sub-skills/dependency-auditor.md to assess exploitability of flagged packages. Check all manifest types: requirements.txt, Pipfile, pyproject.toml, package.json, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Gemfile, composer.json, Cargo.toml.
Phase 11: False positive elimination
Read sub-skills/false-positive-filter.md. Apply three-pass protocol to every candidate:
- Pass 1 — Source reachability: is the input genuinely user-controlled?
- Pass 2 — Path completeness: does the taint path hold end-to-end?
- Pass 3 — Exploitability: can an attacker realistically trigger this?
Only confirmed and likely findings survive to the report.
Phase 12: Classification and scoring
Read sub-skills/vuln-classifier.md. For every surviving finding assign:
- CWE identifier
- OWASP Top 10 / OWASP API Top 10 category
- CVSS v3.1 base score and vector string
- Severity:
critical, high, medium, low, informational
Update the database:
python3 scripts/scan.py --update-findings workspace/confirmed_findings.json
Phase 13: Report generation
Read sub-skills/report-generator.md, then generate all formats:
python3 scripts/report.py --format markdown --min-severity medium
python3 scripts/report.py --format sarif
python3 scripts/report.py --format json
Save findings to Vulnscan_results.md in the scanned project directory. Copy the Markdown report output there so the results are co-located with the codebase:
cp workspace/reports/report_*.md <target_path>/Vulnscan_results.md
If workspace/reports/ does not contain the file, write the Markdown report content directly to <target_path>/Vulnscan_results.md. This file is the primary human-readable deliverable and must always be created at the end of a full scan.
Targeted scan commands
vulnscan taint <file>
- Read
sub-skills/taint-analyzer.md.
- Run:
python3 scripts/taint.py --file <file> [--lang <language>]
- Read the actual file and verify every path in the output.
- Report confirmed paths with taint trace.
vulnscan secrets <path>
- Run:
python3 scripts/secrets.py --path <path>
- Read
sub-skills/secret-detector.md to verify high-entropy hits.
vulnscan deps <path>
- Run:
python3 scripts/dependency.py --path <path>
- Read
sub-skills/dependency-auditor.md to assess exploitability.
vulnscan config <path>
- Read
sub-skills/config-security-reviewer.md.
- Read
sub-skills/iac-security-reviewer.md.
- Review all config, infra, and environment files in the path.
vulnscan status
python3 scripts/scan.py --status-only
Natural-language prompt examples
Scan this codebase for vulnerabilitiesFind SQL injection and XSS in this Flask appCheck for hardcoded secrets or weak cryptoAudit the authentication and authorization logicAre there any vulnerable dependencies?Check the taint flow from HTTP params to database callsFind command injection in this Node.js appReview the Dockerfile and Kubernetes configs for security issuesCheck the API endpoints for IDOR and mass assignmentFind any race conditions or business logic flawsFind React/Next.js client-side vulnerabilitiesReview this Go API for handler, binding, SSRF, and SQL injection flawsLook for architecture and tenant-isolation vulnerabilitiesFind application-level vulns like account recovery, CSRF, upload, cache, and workflow abuseReview cloud infrastructure, IAM, storage, network exposure, and CI/CD deployment securityGive me a full security report in SARIF format
Reference files
sub-skills/scan-strategy.mdsub-skills/taint-analyzer.mdsub-skills/input-validator.mdsub-skills/business-logic-analyzer.mdsub-skills/application-vuln-reviewer.mdsub-skills/api-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/react-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/go-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/architecture-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/infrastructure-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/auth-reviewer.mdsub-skills/crypto-reviewer.mdsub-skills/secret-detector.mdsub-skills/config-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/iac-security-reviewer.mdsub-skills/memory-safety-analyzer.mdsub-skills/error-handling-reviewer.mdsub-skills/dependency-auditor.mdsub-skills/vuln-classifier.mdsub-skills/false-positive-filter.mdsub-skills/report-generator.mdresources/references/cwe-taxonomy.mdresources/references/owasp-top10.mdresources/references/false-positive-guide.md
