code-security-review

name	code-security-review
description	Web/API security lifecycle for Go, Next.js, Python, and Bun — design controls, active testing, supply-chain/CI-CD, and LLM/agentic/MCP coverage. Maps to OWASP Web Top 10 2025 + API 2023 + LLM 2025 + Agentic 2026. Triggers: 'security review', 'revisão de segurança', 'auditar segurança', 'pentest', '/code-security-review'.
source	ValarMindSkills

Code Security Review

Lifecycle skill for REST and GraphQL APIs: covers secure design (controls to implement) and active security testing (payloads to validate those controls). One skill, two complementary modes — invoke whichever fits the current phase of work.

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• Designing or hardening FastAPI / Django / Flask APIs (→ references/python/), Gin / Fiber APIs (→ references/golang/), or Elysia APIs (→ references/DESIGN_CONTROLS.md)
• Reviewing an existing API for security weaknesses against the OWASP Web Top 10 (2025) + API Top 10 (2023)
• Pre-release security assessment before deploying to production (→ references/TESTING_PHASES.md)
• Bug bounty engagements or pentest of an API target
• Implementing or auditing AuthN/AuthZ (JWT, OAuth 2.1, DPoP, API keys, RBAC/ABAC)
• Adding rate limiting, input validation, CORS, or security headers
• Reporting findings — use the standardized template in references/REPORT_TEMPLATE.md
• Consulting the catalog of 100 web vulnerabilities by category (→ references/WEB_VULNERABILITIES.md)
• Auditing CI/CD + software supply chain (GitHub Actions, lockfile pinning, secrets, SBOM) — A03:2025 (→ references/SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md)
• Reviewing LLM / agentic / MCP features (prompt injection, tool misuse, AI-generated-code patterns) — OWASP LLM 2025 + Agentic 2026 (→ references/AI_SECURITY.md)

This skill is fully standalone — every payload, snippet, and checklist needed lives in this directory.

How This Skill Is Organized

File / Directory	Use when
SKILL.md (this file)	Foundations, Phase 0 stack + surface detection, OWASP Web 2025 + API 2023 maps, AI/agentic pointer, audit cheat sheet
references/DESIGN_CONTROLS.md	Implementing or reviewing controls (proactive) — language-agnostic
references/TESTING_PHASES.md	Running 7-phase active testing workflow (reactive) — language-agnostic
references/REPORT_TEMPLATE.md	Documenting findings with consistent severity rubric
references/WEB_VULNERABILITIES.md	Reference catalog of 100 web vulnerabilities by category (XSS, CSRF, deserialization, mobile/IoT, etc.)
references/golang/	Go stack lifecycle (Gin/Fiber): API.md, MIDDLEWARE.md, VULNERABILITIES.md, PATCHES.md, TESTING_PAYLOADS.md
references/python/	Python stack lifecycle (FastAPI / Django / Flask, CPython 3.13/3.14): API.md, CONFIGURATION.md, VULNERABILITIES.md, PATCHES.md, TESTING_PAYLOADS.md
references/nextjs/	Next.js 16 App Router lifecycle: API.md, CONFIGURATION.md, VULNERABILITIES.md, PATCHES.md, TESTING_PAYLOADS.md
references/SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md	A03:2025 deep-dive — dependency pinning, GitHub Actions hardening, secrets, SBOM, incident case studies
references/AI_SECURITY.md	LLM Top 10 2025, Agentic Top 10 2026, MCP security, prompt-injection controls, AI-generated-code review
scripts/	Executable probes — automate Phase 0–10 against a live target, or static phases (07/09/10/11) with STATIC_ONLY=1. See scripts/README.md.

Phase 0 — Stack Detection

Detect the language/framework before loading stack-specific references. Steps 1–4 pick one $STACK (stop at the first match). Step 5 runs always and adds orthogonal surface overlays — AI and CI are independent of the stack.

# Step 1 — Go (Gin / Fiber)
test -f go.mod && grep -E 'gin-gonic/gin|gofiber/fiber/v[23]' go.mod && echo "stack: go"

# Step 2 — Next.js 16+ App Router
test -f package.json && rg '"next":\s*"\^?1[6-9]' package.json && test -d app/ && echo "stack: nextjs-app"

# Step 3 — Python (FastAPI / Django / Flask)
if test -f pyproject.toml || test -f requirements.txt || test -f setup.py; then
    rg -q '\bfastapi\b' pyproject.toml requirements*.txt 2>/dev/null && echo "stack: python (framework: fastapi)"
    rg -q '\bdjango\b'  pyproject.toml requirements*.txt 2>/dev/null && echo "stack: python (framework: django)"
    rg -q '\bflask\b'   pyproject.toml requirements*.txt 2>/dev/null && echo "stack: python (framework: flask)"
fi

# Step 4 — Elysia / generic
test -f bun.lockb && rg 'elysia' package.json && echo "stack: elysia"

# Step 5 — Surface overlays (always run, additive — not exclusive with the stack above)
rg -lq 'openai|@anthropic-ai/sdk|anthropic|langchain|llamaindex|litellm|ai-sdk|mcp' \
    package.json pyproject.toml requirements*.txt go.mod 2>/dev/null && echo "surface: ai-llm"
ls .mcp.json .cursor/mcp.json 2>/dev/null && echo "surface: mcp"
ls .github/workflows/*.y*ml 2>/dev/null && echo 

$STACK	References to load (in addition to generic)	Notes
go	references/golang/{API,MIDDLEWARE,VULNERABILITIES,PATCHES,TESTING_PAYLOADS}.md	Gin v1.10.1+, Fiber v2/v3, OWASP API 2023 + Go-specific (race, slowloris, math/rand, pprof, ServeMux conflicts)
python	references/python/{API,CONFIGURATION,VULNERABILITIES,PATCHES,TESTING_PAYLOADS}.md	FastAPI 0.115+, Django 5.x, Flask 3.x, CPython 3.13/3.14 — Pydantic Settings, ASGI middleware, pickle/yaml deserialization, JWT alg confusion, ALLOWED_HOSTS, SECRET_KEY, free-threaded 3.14t races
nextjs-app	references/nextjs/{API,CONFIGURATION,VULNERABILITIES,PATCHES,TESTING_PAYLOADS}.md	Next.js 16.2.x App Router — RSC, Server Actions, Route Handlers, proxy.ts, "use cache", Image Optimizer
elysia / generic	references/{DESIGN_CONTROLS,TESTING_PHASES,WEB_VULNERABILITIES,REPORT_TEMPLATE}.md	Generic references cover the language-agnostic surface

The generic references (DESIGN_CONTROLS.md, TESTING_PHASES.md, WEB_VULNERABILITIES.md, REPORT_TEMPLATE.md) apply to every stack — load them in addition to the stack-specific bundle. Stack-specific references inherit the OWASP map and severity rubric from the generic ones; do not duplicate.

Step 5 overlays are additive and combine with any $STACK:

Overlay	References to load	Scripts
ai-llm / mcp	references/AI_SECURITY.md	11-ai-llm-probes.sh
ci-cd	references/SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md	09-cicd-workflows.sh, 10-secrets-scan.sh

Security Foundations (Core Principles)

These principles are language and framework agnostic:

Principle	Meaning
Defence in Depth	Multiple independent security layers — one failure should not compromise the system
Least Privilege	Every component and user gets only the minimum access needed
Zero Trust	Never assume a request is safe because it originates inside the network
Shift Left	Embed security checks in development and CI, not only in production monitoring
Fail Secure	On error, deny access rather than allow it

OWASP Top 10:2025 (Web)

The current Web list (final 2025 edition; replaces 2021). Use these tags for web findings; the API list below is a separate, still-current catalog.

#	Category	Key Risk
A01	Broken Access Control	Missing/again-broken authz; SSRF merged in (was A10 in 2021)
A02	Security Misconfiguration	Moved up from #5 — debug on, permissive CORS, missing headers, defaults
A03	Software Supply Chain Failures	Broadened from "Vulnerable Components" — deps, build, CI, registries
A04	Cryptographic Failures	Weak/absent crypto, plaintext secrets, bad TLS
A05	Injection	SQL/NoSQL/command/XSS — untrusted input reaching an interpreter
A06	Insecure Design	Missing controls by design — no rate limit, no threat model
A07	Authentication Failures	Renamed — weak sessions, no brute-force protection, credential stuffing
A08	Software or Data Integrity Failures	Unsigned updates, insecure deserialization, untrusted CI artifacts
A09	Logging & Alerting Failures	Renamed — no audit trail, no alerting on abuse
A10	Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions	New — fail-open error handling, leaked stack traces, logic edge cases

Changes from 2021

• New: A03 Software Supply Chain Failures broadens the old "Vulnerable & Outdated Components" to the whole dependency→artifact path (see references/SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md).
• New: A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions — error-handling and fail-open logic become a first-class category.
• SSRF merged into A01 Broken Access Control (was its own A10 in 2021).
• Security Misconfiguration rose to #2. Several categories renamed (Auth Failures, Logging & Alerting Failures).

The OWASP API Top 10 below is a distinct list; its current edition is still 2023 (no 2025 API release).

OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)

This is the 2023 list — the 2019 list is obsolete.

#	Vulnerability	Key Risk
API1	Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)	Attacker accesses another user's resources by changing an ID
API2	Broken Authentication	Weak tokens, missing expiry, no brute force protection
API3	Broken Object Property Level Authorization	Over-fetching (returning private fields) or mass assignment (accepting unexpected fields)
API4	Unrestricted Resource Consumption	No rate limiting — DoS, cost amplification, brute force
API5	Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA)	Regular users can call admin functions
API6	Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows	Automated abuse of checkout, account creation, voting
API7	Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)	New in 2023 — server makes requests to attacker-controlled URLs
API8	Security Misconfiguration	Debug mode in prod, permissive CORS, missing headers, default creds
API9	Improper Inventory Management	Shadow APIs, deprecated versions, undocumented endpoints
API10	Unsafe Consumption of APIs	New in 2023 — trusting third-party API responses without validation

Changes from 2019

• Removed as separate items: "Excessive Data Exposure" and "Mass Assignment" — merged into API3 (Broken Object Property Level Authorization)
• Renamed: "Lack of Resources and Rate Limiting" → API4 "Unrestricted Resource Consumption"
• Added: API7 SSRF and API10 Unsafe Consumption of APIs

AI / LLM & Agentic Surface

When Phase 0 Step 5 flags ai-llm, mcp, or the code drives LLMs / agents, the web+API catalogs are necessary but not sufficient. Three additional catalogs apply:

• OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection … LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption) — for any LLM-integrated app.
• OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 (ASI01:2026 Agent Goal Hijack … ASI10:2026 Rogue Agents) — for code that acts via tools, runs multi-step, or talks to other agents.
• OWASP GenAI MCP guides (Secure MCP Server Development; Securely Using Third-Party MCP Servers) — for projects wiring Model Context Protocol servers.

Full tables, controls, AI-generated-code review checklist, and testing payloads in references/AI_SECURITY.md. Static + gated active probes in scripts/11-ai-llm-probes.sh.

OWASP → Phase Map

OWASP Item	Design (DESIGN_CONTROLS.md)	Testing (TESTING_PHASES.md)
API1 BOLA	Authorization patterns	Phase 2.2 Cross-User Access
API2 Broken Auth	JWT/OAuth 2.1/DPoP	Phase 1 Authentication Testing
API3 BOPLA	DTOs, mass assignment guards	Phase 2.3 Over-Fetching, Phase 2.4 Mass Assignment
API4 Unrestricted Consumption	Rate limit algorithms	Phase 4 Rate Limiting Testing
API5 BFLA	RBAC enforcement	Phase 2.5 Admin Endpoints
API6 Sensitive Flows	Anti-abuse + MFA	Phase 4.5 Brute Force
API7 SSRF	URL allowlist	Phase 3.4 SSRF Payloads
API8 Misconfiguration	Headers, CORS, debug-off	Phase 5 Info Disclosure, Phase 7 CORS
API9 Inventory	Versioning, doc gating	Pre-Testing Checklist
API10 Unsafe Consumption	Response validation	Phase 3 Input Injection (mirrored)
A03:2025 Supply Chain	SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md — pinning, SBOM	Phase 6/8 (scripts/07, 09)
Secrets (CWE-798)	SUPPLY_CHAIN_CICD.md — secrets hygiene	Phase 9 (scripts/10)
LLM01:2025 / ASI (AI surface)	AI_SECURITY.md — prompt isolation, tool authz	Phase 10 (scripts/11)

Quick Audit Cheat Sheet

Run these checks before deploying any API:

• Auth required: every non-public endpoint returns 401 without a valid token
• Authorization checked: resource ownership verified before returning or modifying data (BOLA)
• CORS explicit: no allow_origins=["*"] + allow_credentials=True combination
• Input validated: all request bodies/params validated against a schema with strict types
• Parameterized queries: no string concatenation in SQL/database calls
• Rate limiting active: auth endpoints ≤ 5 req/15 min; general API ≤ 100 req/min
• Error messages generic: no stack traces or internal details in 4xx/5xx responses
• Security headers present: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP
• Dependencies audited: pip-audit / govulncheck / bun audit / osv-scanner passing in CI; lockfiles committed (A03:2025)
• No debug mode in production: FastAPI app = FastAPI(docs_url=None), Gin gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode), Fiber app := fiber.New()
• CI/CD hardened: GitHub Actions pinned by 40-hex SHA (not tags); no pull_request_target + PR-head checkout; zizmor clean
• No committed secrets: gitleaks / trufflehog clean over tree + history
• AI/LLM surface safe: system prompt isolated from user input; LLM output encoded before any sink; MCP servers version-pinned

Framework-Specific Production Flags

Framework	Production Risk	Check
FastAPI	/docs, /redoc, /openapi.json exposed	curl https://target/docs → should return 404
Django	DEBUG=True, ALLOWED_HOSTS=["*"]	curl https://target/<nonexistent> → must not render Django traceback; python manage.py check --deploy clean
Flask	app.debug=True, missing Flask-Talisman / CSRFProtect	Inspect app.config; curl -I https://target/ must include HSTS + CSP
Gin	Debug mode active	GIN_MODE env var should be release
Fiber	Prefork mode or Helmet missing	Review middleware stack
Elysia	Bun runtime exposes raw errors	Verify global error handler is in place

For detailed implementation patterns per framework, see references/DESIGN_CONTROLS.md. For active probes that exercise these flags, see references/TESTING_PHASES.md.

Workflow Recommendations

Greenfield API

1. Read references/DESIGN_CONTROLS.md end-to-end before writing the first endpoint.
2. Pick framework section; copy auth/validation/rate-limit/CORS scaffolds.
3. After MVP is functional, run references/TESTING_PHASES.md Phase 1–7 against staging.
4. File findings using references/REPORT_TEMPLATE.md.

Existing API (audit / pre-release)

1. Run references/TESTING_PHASES.md Phase 1–7 against the target.
2. For each finding, cross-reference the corresponding section in references/DESIGN_CONTROLS.md to identify the missing or misconfigured control.
3. Apply fix → re-run the specific phase to validate.
4. File using references/REPORT_TEMPLATE.md.

Bug Bounty / Pentest

1. Pre-Testing Checklist in references/TESTING_PHASES.md — confirm scope and authorization.
2. Run all 7 phases; document each finding with references/REPORT_TEMPLATE.md.
3. Severity rubric (CVSS bands) in the same file.

Automated Probes (CI / Pre-Release)

Use scripts/ for hands-off execution:

cd skills/code-security-review/scripts/
export TARGET="https://api.staging.example.com"
export TOKEN_USER_A="..." TOKEN_USER_B="..." USER_A_RESOURCE_ID="42"
export ORIGIN_ALLOWED="https://app.example.com"
export I_HAVE_AUTHORIZATION=1
./run-all.sh                                    # active phases 00–08 + static 09–11

# Static-only — no live target, no authorization needed (deps, CI, secrets, AI):
STATIC_ONLY=1 PROJECT_ROOT=. ./run-all.sh

Each phase from TESTING_PHASES.md has a script counterpart that emits findings as JSON-Lines (out/findings.jsonl) plus an aggregated Markdown report (out/report.md). Active phases (00–08) need an authorized TARGET; static phases (07 supply chain, 09 CI/CD, 10 secrets, 11 AI/LLM) read repository files and run without a target. The active prompt-injection battery in 11 stays gated by LLM_ENDPOINT + I_HAVE_AUTHORIZATION=1. Designed to gate CI on critical/high findings. See scripts/README.md for env vars and CI integration example.

Related Skills

• @code-review — broader code-quality review that pairs with this skill for security-specific concerns. For Next.js performance audits, see @code-review references/NEXTJS.md.

For a formal verification standard, deep audits can map findings to OWASP ASVS 5.0 (17 chapters, levels 1–3); use it to set a coverage bar beyond the Top 10.