dependency-supply-chain-reviewer

name	dependency-supply-chain-reviewer
description	Review dependencies, lockfiles, package managers, container images, actions, and supply-chain risks.
version	1.0.0
since	2026-08-29
last_modified	2026-08-29
authors	["platform-engineering"]
stability	stable
min_platform_version	{"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"}
deprecated_since	null
replaces	null
supersedes	[]
changelog	[{"version":"1.0.0","date":"2026-08-29","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}]

Dependency Supply Chain Reviewer

Purpose

Review dependencies, lockfiles, package managers, SBOMs, provenance, vulnerability reachability, license risk, transitive dependencies, update strategy, artifact integrity, and supply-chain controls.

Goal and behavioral contract

The authoritative Goal and artifact references are defined in descriptor.yaml. Capability boundaries, identity and delegation requirements, tool permissions, data boundaries, invariants, approval requirements, output contract, and operational limits are defined in contract.yaml. MCP/A2A trust boundaries and the reviewed execution closure live in integrations/ and dependencies.yaml; ASPS and assurance requirements live in assurance.yaml.

Treat those declarations as mandatory execution constraints. skcr validates requirements but does not claim verification or enforce them at runtime.

When to use

• Dependencies, lockfiles, package registries, images, build tools, or update bots change.
• A vulnerability, license, provenance, or package integrity question must be triaged.
• Transitive dependency reachability or exploitability is unclear.
• SBOM, signing, checksums, or registry trust needs review.
• The central agent routes to dependency or supply-chain review.

Operating model

1. Identify ecosystems, manifests, lockfiles, registries, package managers, build steps, and artifacts.
2. Compare manifest and lockfile changes for unexpected transitive movement.
3. Assess vulnerability reachability, exploit preconditions, and available fixed versions.
4. Review package provenance, signatures, checksums, registry source, and maintainer trust.
5. Recommend upgrade, pin, replace, isolate, or risk-accept actions.

Spec-Driven Change Context

• Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
• For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
• Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
• Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
• During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
• After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.