| name | skill-044 |
| description | Hunt for credential access techniques like LSASS dumping or browser credential theft. Use when searching for evidence of credential harvesting. Takes MITRE technique IDs and searches for behavioral indicators in SIEM. |
Credential Access TTP Hunt Skill
Proactively hunt for MITRE ATT&CK Credential Access techniques (T1003, T1555, etc.) based on threat intelligence or hypothesis.
Inputs
TECHNIQUE_IDS - Comma-separated MITRE technique IDs (e.g., "T1003.001,T1555.003")TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)- (Optional)
TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
- (Optional)
HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
- (Optional)
HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking
Common Techniques
| Technique | Description |
|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory |
| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager |
| T1003.003 | NTDS |
| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets |
| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials |
| T1003.006 | DCSync |
| T1555.001 | Keychain |
| T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers |
| T1555.004 | Windows Credential Manager |
Workflow
Step 1: Research Techniques
For each technique in TECHNIQUE_IDS:
gti-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="Explain MITRE ATT&CK technique T1003.001")
Understand:
- What the technique does
- Common procedures/tools
- Detection methods
Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries
T1003.001 - LSASS Memory Access:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"
Look for suspicious parent processes accessing lsass.exe.
T1003.001 - Known Dumping Tools:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "procdump" OR
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "sekurlsa")
T1555.003 - Browser Credential Files:
metadata.event_type = "FILE_OPEN" AND
(target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Login Data" OR
target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Web Data" OR
target.file.full_path CONTAINS "cookies.sqlite") AND
principal.process.file.full_path NOT IN ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")
T1003.006 - DCSync:
metadata.event_type = "DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_REPLICATION" AND
principal.hostname NOT IN @known_domain_controllers
General - Credential Dumping Tools:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "lazagne" OR
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "pypykatz")
Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.
Step 3: Execute Searches
secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)
Step 4: Analyze Results
Look for:
- Low-prevalence events (unusual parent-child relationships)
- Access from unexpected applications
- Correlation with other suspicious activity
- Known bad tool signatures
Step 5: Enrich Findings
If suspicious events found:
secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=USER_OR_HOST)
For file hashes:
gti-mcp.get_file_report(hash=HASH)
Step 6: Document Hunt
Use /document-in-case:
- Techniques hunted with descriptions
- Queries used
- Findings (positive AND negative)
- Enrichment results
- Risk assessment
Step 7: Escalate or Conclude
Credential theft confirmed:
→ Trigger /respond-compromised-account for affected users
→ Escalate to incident response
→ Consider password resets for exposed credentials
No findings:
→ Document negative results
→ Confirm detection coverage for these techniques
Required Outputs
After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:
| Output | Description |
|---|
FINDINGS | Detected credential access activity (events, processes, files accessed) |
DETECTED_TECHNIQUES | MITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1003.001, T1555.003) |
AFFECTED_ACCOUNTS | Accounts potentially compromised (users whose credentials may be exposed) |
Detection Gaps to Note
If queries return no results, consider:
- Is the required telemetry being collected?
- Are endpoint logs being forwarded to SIEM?
- Do detection rules exist for these techniques?
Document gaps for security engineering follow-up.
