threat-hunting-ioc-analysis

name	Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis
description	IOC extraction, threat intelligence correlation, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, hunt hypothesis generation, and detection rule creation
version	3.0.0
author	Masriyan
tags	["cybersecurity","threat-hunting","ioc","mitre-attack","threat-intelligence","sigma","detection","siem"]

Threat Hunting & IOC Analysis

Purpose

Enable Claude to assist threat hunters with proactive threat detection, IOC extraction and normalization, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, hunt hypothesis generation, and converting threat intelligence into actionable detection rules across all major SIEM platforms.

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Activation Triggers

This skill activates when the user asks about:

• Extracting IOCs from threat reports, emails, or security advisories
• Mapping behaviors or TTPs to MITRE ATT&CK framework
• Generating hunt hypotheses for a specific threat actor or technique
• Creating Sigma rules, Splunk SPL queries, KQL, or EQL
• Converting threat intelligence into SIEM detection queries
• STIX/TAXII or MISP-compatible indicator formatting
• ATT&CK Navigator layer creation
• Threat intelligence correlation across multiple sources
• Proactive threat hunting in a SIEM or EDR

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Prerequisites

pip install requests pyyaml stix2 taxii2-client

Optional platforms:

• MISP — Threat intelligence sharing platform
• OpenCTI — Threat intelligence platform
• YARA — Pattern matching (→ Skill 05)
• Sigma CLI — Rule conversion tool
• SIEM access (Splunk, Elastic, QRadar, Microsoft Sentinel)

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Core Capabilities

1. IOC Extraction & Normalization

When the user provides a threat report, article, email, or log snippet:

Claude performs these extraction steps:

1. Parse all text for indicators using pattern matching:

IOC Type	Pattern Examples
IPv4	192.0.2.1, defanged: 192[.]0[.]2[.]1
IPv6	2001:db8::1
Domain	evil.example.com, evil[.]example[.]com
URL	hxxp://evil.com/path, https://malicious[.]io/c2
Email	[e-mail], phish[at]evil.com
MD5	32 hex chars
SHA1	40 hex chars
SHA256	64 hex chars
CVE	CVE-2024-XXXXX
ATT&CK ID	T1059.001, TA0001
Registry Key	HKCU\Software\...
File path	C:\Windows\Temp\..., /tmp/...
Mutex	Named mutex patterns

2. Defang extracted indicators — refang before use:

   • hxxp:// → http://
   • [.] → .
   • [at] → @
   • [:] → :

3. Categorize by type: Network / File / Host / Identity / Vulnerability

4. Score by confidence: High (specific, sourced), Medium (inferred), Low (generic)

5. Output in multiple formats:

python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input threat_report.txt --output iocs.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input report.pdf --format stix --output iocs.stix.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input email.eml --defang --output iocs.csv

STIX 2.1 output template:

{
  "type": "indicator",
  "id": "indicator--[uuid]",
  "created": "2025-05-28T00:00:00.000Z",
  "name": "Malicious IP — C2 Infrastructure",
  "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '192.0.2.10']",
  "pattern_type": "stix",
  "valid_from": "2025-05-28T00:00:00Z",
  "labels": ["malicious-activity", "c2"],
  "confidence": 85
}

2. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

When the user provides TTPs, behaviors, or a malware report:

python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --input techniques.txt --output attack_map.json
python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --technique T1059.001 --detection-query splunk

Mapping process:

1. Analyze each behavior against ATT&CK technique descriptions
2. Map to specific Tactic → Technique → Sub-technique (T1059 → T1059.001)
3. Assign confidence level based on evidence quality

ATT&CK Tactics Reference:

Tactic	ID	Description
Reconnaissance	TA0043	Pre-attack information gathering
Resource Development	TA0042	Establishing attack resources
Initial Access	TA0001	Entry into target environment
Execution	TA0002	Running malicious code
Persistence	TA0003	Maintaining foothold
Privilege Escalation	TA0004	Gaining higher permissions
Defense Evasion	TA0005	Avoiding detection
Credential Access	TA0006	Stealing credentials
Discovery	TA0007	Understanding environment
Lateral Movement	TA0008	Moving through network
Collection	TA0009	Gathering data of interest
Command & Control	TA0011	Communicating with compromised hosts
Exfiltration	TA0010	Stealing data
Impact	TA0040	Disrupting/destroying systems

ATT&CK Navigator Layer format (JSON for visualization):

{
  "name": "Threat Hunt Layer — [Threat Actor/Campaign]",
  "versions": {"attack": "14", "navigator": "4.9"},
  "domain": "enterprise-attack",
  "techniques": [
    {
      "techniqueID": "T1059.001",
      "color": "#ff6666",
      "comment": "Observed PowerShell download cradle",
      "enabled": true,
      "score": 100
    }
  ]
}

3. Hunt Hypothesis Generation

When the user asks for hunt hypotheses:

Use this structured hypothesis template:

## Hunt Hypothesis — [ID]: [Short Name]

**Hypothesis Statement:**
"We believe [Threat Actor/TTPs] may be present in [Environment] based on
[Threat Intelligence / Recent Incidents / Industry Reports]."

**Rationale:**
[Why this threat is relevant to this organization — industry, exposure, recent news]

**ATT&CK Techniques Covered:**
- T1059.001 — PowerShell
- T1053.005 — Scheduled Task/Job
- T1021.001 — Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

**Data Sources Required:**
- Windows Event Logs (Security, System, PowerShell/4104)
- EDR process execution telemetry
- DNS query logs
- Proxy/firewall logs

**Detection Logic:**
[SIEM query or pseudocode]

**Success Criteria:**
- POSITIVE: We find evidence of the technique → escalate to IR (Skill 07)
- NEGATIVE: No evidence after thorough search → document as cleared hunt
- INCONCLUSIVE: Insufficient data → identify logging gaps

**Estimated Hunt Duration:** [X hours]
**Priority:** [High / Medium / Low]
**Analyst:** [Name]

4. SIEM Detection Query Library

When the user asks to build detection queries for specific techniques:

Splunk SPL Queries

// T1059.001 — PowerShell Execution with suspicious flags
index=windows (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104)
| search ScriptBlockText IN ("*DownloadString*", "*IEX*", "*EncodedCommand*", "*bypass*", "*WebClient*")
| stats count by ComputerName, UserName, ScriptBlockText
| where count > 0

// T1003.001 — LSASS Memory Dump
index=windows EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe"
| where NOT (SourceImage IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*"))
| table _time, SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace

// T1547.001 — Registry Run Key Persistence
index=windows EventCode=13 TargetObject IN ("*\\Run\\*", "*\\RunOnce\\*")
| where NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"))
| table _time, ComputerName, Image, TargetObject, Details

// T1021.002 — Lateral Movement via SMB Admin Shares
index=windows EventCode=5140
| where ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\ADMIN$", "\\\\*\\C$", "\\\\*\\IPC$")
| stats count by SubjectUserName, IpAddress, ShareName, ObjectType
| where count > 3

Microsoft Sentinel KQL

// T1110.001 — Brute Force Login Attempt
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| summarize FailCount=count() by TargetAccount, IpAddress=replace(@"\.", "[.]", tostring(parse_json(EventData).IpAddress))
| where FailCount > 20
| join kind=leftouter (
    SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4624
    | summarize SuccessCount=count() by TargetAccount
) on TargetAccount
| project TargetAccount, IpAddress, FailCount, SuccessCount
| where isnotnull(SuccessCount)  // Brute force succeeded!

// T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application
AzureDiagnostics
| where Category == "ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog"
| where action_s == "Blocked"
| where ruleSetVersion_s startswith "3."
| summarize count() by clientIp_s, requestUri_s, ruleId_s
| where count_ > 100
| order by count_ desc

Elastic EQL

// T1055 — Process Injection
sequence by host.name
  [process where process.name : "notepad.exe" and event.type == "start"]
  [process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "notepad.exe"
   and not process.name in ("conhost.exe")]

// T1566.001 — Spearphishing with attachment
sequence by user.name within 5m
  [file where file.extension in ("doc", "xls", "pdf") and 
   process.name : ("outlook.exe", "WINWORD.EXE")]
  [process where process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")]

Sigma Rule Template

title: Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle
id: a3c2f1b4-8e9d-4a2c-b7f6-1234567890ab
status: stable
description: Detects PowerShell commands used to download and execute code from the internet
author: Threat Hunter
date: 2025/05/28
modified: 2025/05/28
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: ps_script
  product: windows
  definition: Script Block Logging enabled (EventID 4104)
detection:
  
    
       
       
  
    
       
       
       
       
       
     

     
    
 

5. Threat Intelligence Correlation

When the user asks to correlate IOCs or identify threat actors:

1. Cross-reference infrastructure across known campaigns:

   • Same registrar + similar registration dates → likely related infrastructure
   • IP hosting multiple C2 domains → infrastructure cluster
   • Certificate SAN fields → reveal connected domains

2. Map to threat actor groups:

   • MITRE ATT&CK Groups: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
   • VirusTotal/OpenCTI actor tracking
   • Mandiant / CrowdStrike / SentinelOne threat intel reports

3. Generate Threat Assessment:

   ## Threat Assessment — [Campaign Name]
   
   **Threat Actor:** [APT Group / Criminal Group / Unknown]
   **Confidence:** [High / Medium / Low]
   **Motivation:** [Espionage / Financial / Hacktivism]
   **Targeting:** [Industries / Countries / Organization types]
   
   **Campaign IOCs:**
   - Infrastructure: [IPs, domains]
   - Malware: [Family names, hashes]
   - TTPs: [ATT&CK technique IDs]
   
   **Relevance to Organization:**
   [Why this threat is or isn't relevant]
   
   **Recommended Actions:**
   1. Block IOCs in firewall/proxy
   2. Hunt for T1XXX in SIEM
   3. Deploy YARA rules for detection
   

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Script Reference

ioc_extractor.py

python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input threat_report.txt --output iocs.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input report.pdf --format stix --output iocs.stix.json
python scripts/ioc_extractor.py --input email.eml --defang --output iocs.csv

mitre_mapper.py

python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --input techniques.txt --output attack_map.json
python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --technique T1059.001 --detection-query splunk
python scripts/mitre_mapper.py --actor "APT29" --output apt29_layer.json

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Skill Integration

Condition	Adjacent Skill
IOCs from malware samples	← Skill 05 (Malware Analysis)
IOCs from IR engagement	← Skill 07 (Incident Response)
Feed hunting queries to SIEM	→ Skill 12 (Log Analysis)
Generate detection rules	→ Skill 15 (Blue Team Defense)
Automate response to findings	→ Skill 11 (CSOC Automation)

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References

• MITRE ATT&CK Framework
• ATT&CK Navigator
• Sigma Rules Repository
• STIX/TAXII Standards
• Threat Hunting Playbook
• MISP Threat Intelligence
• OpenCTI Platform
• CISA Advisories

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v3.0 Enhancements (2026 Update)

Threat-informed, repeatable hunting:

• ATT&CK current version — map to the latest Enterprise matrix (incl. updated cloud, identity, and containers techniques); call out sub-techniques explicitly.
• PEAK hunting framework — structure hunts as Prepare → Execute → Act with a documented hypothesis, data sources, and ABLE (Actor/Behavior/Location/Evidence) baselining.
• Identity-centric hunting — Entra ID / Okta logs: impossible travel, illicit OAuth consent grants, MFA-fatigue, token theft & replay, and risky sign-in correlation.
• Living-off-the-land — baseline LOLBin/LOLBAS usage and hunt deviations rather than static signatures.
• Detection-as-code — express hunt findings as Sigma rules under version control with test data, then promote validated hunts into Skill 12/15 detections.
• Hunt maturity — track from ad-hoc → data-driven → automated; record which hunts became scheduled detections.

Precision rule: every hunt yields a hypothesis, the query, the result (found/not-found/inconclusive), and a disposition (new detection / tuned alert / closed).