mohitagw15856/skillrank

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التثبيت بمساعدة مساعد ذكي

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Follow https://skillsmp.com/skill-install/prompt.md to install Agent Skills from https://github.com/mohitagw15856/skillrank.

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<div align="center"> <img src="assets/banner.svg" alt="skillrank — what can this agent skill actually do to your machine?" width="820"> ![repos](https://img.shields.io/badge/repos-4-blue) ![skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/skills%20scanned-3,300-blue) ![exec](https://img.shields.io/badge/can%20run%20commands-699-orange) ![f](https://img.shields.io/badge/graded%20F-3-red) ![cost](https://img.shields.io/badge/cost%20to%20run-%240.00-brightgreen) <img src="assets/demo.gif" alt="skillrank in action" width="820"> </div> **You installed forty agent skills. Do you know which ones can read your SSH key?** There are at least seven competing directories of agent skills and a combined corpus in the thousands. Every one of them tells you what a skill *does*. None of them tells you what it *can do* — to your files, your credentials, and your machine. This is that layer. ## Scan something right now ```bash npx @mohitagw15856/skillrank ~/.claude/skills # what you have already installed npx @mohitagw15856/skillrank ./some-skill-you-found # before you install it npx @mohitagw15856/skillrank . --min B # exit 1 in CI if anything is worse than B ``` No API key, no account, no model call. (The bare name `skillrank` on npm belongs to a different agent-skills project, which is why this one is scoped.) No API key. No account. No model call. **No tokens spent** — this is regex and file reads, which is a deliberate design constraint: the moment grading costs money per skill, coverage becomes a budget decision and the long tail never gets scanned. The 3,300 skills below were graded in under five seconds for nothing. ## The leaderboard | Repo | Skills | Avg | Grades | Can run commands | Report | | --- | --: | --: | --- | --: | --- | | [pm-claude-skills](https://github.com/mohitagw15856/pm-claude-skills) | 2,879 | **99.7** | A 2869 · B 6 · C 4 | 307 (11%) | [details](reports/pm-claude-skills.md) | | [obra/superpowers](https://github.com/obra/superpowers) | 15 | **97.4** | A 14 · B 1 | 11 (73%) | [details](reports/obra-superpowers.md) | | [borghei/Claude-Skills](https://github.com/borghei/Claude-Skills) | 386 | **96.1** | A 348 · B 17 · C 11 · D 8 · F 2 | 370 (96%) | [details](reports/borghei-claude-skills.md) | | [anthropics/skills](https://github.com/anthropics/skills) | 20 | **88.6** | A 15 · B 3 · D 1 · F 1 | 11 (55%) | [details](reports/anthropics-skills.md) | <sub>Average score, 0–100. A repo of harmless text formatters will beat a repo of deployment tools, and that is correct — the score measures blast radius, not quality.</sub> ## Capability tiers The tier is not a judgement. A deployment skill *should* be T3. The tier exists so you can ask the useful question: **why does a changelog formatter need the network?** | Tier | Meaning | | :-: | --- | | **T0 text** | Text in, text out. Touches nothing. | | **T1 read** | Reads files in the working directory. | | **T2 write** | Writes or edits files. | | **T3 exec** | Runs shell commands or bundled scripts. | | **T4 remote** | Executes code or instructions fetched from the network. | ## What it looks for | Detector | Severity | Why it matters | | --- | :-: | --- | | `pipe-to-shell` | critical | Whatever that URL serves today, it can serve something else tomorrow. There is no review step and no pinned version. | | `zero-width` | critical | Zero-width and bidirectional characters hide instructions from every human reviewer while remaining fully visible to the model. There is no legitimate reason for them in a skill. | | `conceal-from-user` | critical | A skill that asks the agent to keep something from the person running it has inverted who the agent works for. | | `instruction-override` | high | Classic prompt-injection phrasing. A legitimate skill adds capability; it does not countermand the operator. | | `secret-access` | high | Touching key material is a hard prerequisite for every credential-theft path. Sometimes necessary; always worth knowing about. | | `env-key-reference` | low | Documenting `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is not the same as reading a private key. Listed for completeness, priced accordingly. | | `dotenv-access` | low | Extremely common and usually benign — but it is where the keys live, so it is worth listing. | | `network-egress` | medium | The other half of an exfiltration path. Harmless alone, decisive in combination. | | `obfuscation` | high | Encoded payloads defeat review. If the author cannot show you the string, assume you would not like it. | | `encoded-blob` | medium | A 200-character base64 run inside a skill is not documentation. It may be an image; it may not be. | | `destructive` | high | Not automatically wrong, but you should know before you install, not after. | | `privilege-escalation` | high | A skill needing root is a skill that can do anything to the machine. | | `persistence` | high | A skill that edits your shell profile or installs a cron job keeps running long after you stop using it. | | `wildcard-tools` | medium | `Bash(*)` or `allowed-tools: *` means the skill declares no boundary at all, so nothing can be reviewed. | | `ip-literal-url` | medium | Legitimate services have domain names. Raw IPs in a skill are worth a second look. | | `url-shortener` | medium | A shortener hides the destination from review and lets the author change it after you install. | | `unpinned-install` | low | Whatever gets installed at run time is whatever the registry serves that day. | Plus one combination rule: **reading credentials is fine, sending data is fine, doing both in one skill** is the shape of every credential stealer ever written, and costs an extra 35 points. ## Why the grades are not harsher The first version of this scanner graded every security skill in the corpus an **F** — because a skill that teaches you to spot `ignore previous instructions` necessarily contains the string `ignore previous instructions`. An antivirus that quarantines its own definitions file is not a strict antivirus, it is a broken one. So the scanner reads context: - A pattern inside `` `backticks` `` is demoted one level — it is being named, not run. - A quoted example of an injection string does not count against a skill that is documenting it. - `curl http://localhost:3000/health` is not data exfiltration. - `🧑‍💼` is built from U+200D ZERO WIDTH JOINER and is not a hidden-instruction attack. - A hardcoded key in `assets/sample_codebase/` is a teaching aid. - Vendored fonts, binaries and XML schemas are counted and reported as **unscanned**, not silently passed. Each of those is a fixture in `test/fixtures/` and a test in `scripts/test.mjs`, because every false positive we fix has to stay fixed. Run `node scripts/test.mjs`. ## Honest limits Read this part before trusting a grade. - **An A means "no known pattern fired". It does not mean safe.** Novel phrasing, a payload behind a URL, or logic in a compiled binary will all pass. - **Static analysis cannot read intent.** It cannot tell a threat catalogue from a runbook. That is what [`suppressions.yml`](suppressions.yml) is for — a public baseline where a human overrides the scanner, in the open, with a name and a reason attached. Suppressed findings are still shown, just not counted. - **The score is blast radius, not quality.** A brilliant skill that needs shell access scores below a mediocre one that does not. - **A skill can change after you install it.** These grades are a snapshot of a commit, and the fingerprint in each report tells you which one. - **This is not a substitute for reading the skill.** It is a way to know which forty of your skills you can skip reading. ## Add a repo Drop a file in `registry/`, open a PR, and CI clones and scans it on the next run. See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). ## Licence Code MIT, data CC0. If you are a maintainer and think a grade is wrong, open an issue — a wrong grade is a bug, and getting it wrong in public is how it gets fixed. <sub>Generated by `scripts/build.mjs`. Do not edit this file directly.</sub>

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