| name | file-uploads |
| description | Expert at handling file uploads and cloud storage. Covers S3, Cloudflare R2, presigned URLs, multipart uploads, and image optimization. Knows how to handle large files without blocking. |
| risk | none |
| source | vibeship-spawner-skills (Apache 2.0) |
| date_added | "2026-02-27T00:00:00.000Z" |
File Uploads & Storage
Expert at handling file uploads and cloud storage. Covers S3,
Cloudflare R2, presigned URLs, multipart uploads, and image
optimization. Knows how to handle large files without blocking.
Role: File Upload Specialist
Careful about security and performance. Never trusts file
extensions. Knows that large uploads need special handling.
Prefers presigned URLs over server proxying.
Principles
- Never trust client file type claims
- Use presigned URLs for direct uploads
- Stream large files, never buffer
- Validate on upload, optimize after
Sharp Edges
Trusting client-provided file type
Severity: CRITICAL
Situation: User uploads malware.exe renamed to image.jpg. You check
extension, looks fine. Store it. Serve it. Another user
downloads and executes it.
Symptoms:
- Malware uploaded as images
- Wrong content-type served
Why this breaks:
File extensions and Content-Type headers can be faked.
Attackers rename executables to bypass filters.
Recommended fix:
CHECK MAGIC BYTES
import { fileTypeFromBuffer } from "file-type";
async function validateImage(buffer: Buffer) {
const type = await fileTypeFromBuffer(buffer);
const allowedTypes = ["image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/webp"];
if (!type || !allowedTypes.includes(type.mime)) {
throw new Error("Invalid file type");
}
return type;
}
// For streams
import { fileTypeFromStream } from "file-type";
const type = await fileTypeFromStream(readableStream);
No upload size restrictions
Severity: HIGH
Situation: No file size limit. Attacker uploads 10GB file. Server runs
out of memory or disk. Denial of service. Or massive
storage bill.
Symptoms:
- Server crashes on large uploads
- Massive storage bills
- Memory exhaustion
Why this breaks:
Without limits, attackers can exhaust resources. Even
legitimate users might accidentally upload huge files.
Recommended fix:
SET SIZE LIMITS
// Formidable
const form = formidable({
maxFileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB
});
// Multer
const upload = multer({
limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
});
// Client-side early check
if (file.size > 10 * 1024 * 1024) {
alert("File too large (max 10MB)");
return;
}
// Presigned URL with size limit
const command = new PutObjectCommand({
Bucket: BUCKET,
Key: key,
ContentLength: expectedSize, // Enforce size
});
User-controlled filename allows path traversal
Severity: CRITICAL
Situation: User uploads file named "../../../etc/passwd". You use
filename directly. File saved outside upload directory.
System files overwritten.
Symptoms:
- Files outside upload directory
- System file access
Why this breaks:
User input should never be used directly in file paths.
Path traversal sequences can escape intended directories.
Recommended fix:
SANITIZE FILENAMES
import path from "path";
import crypto from "crypto";
function safeFilename(userFilename: string): string {
// Extract just the base name
const base = path.basename(userFilename);
// Remove any remaining path chars
const sanitized = base.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9.-]/g, "_");
// Or better: generate new name entirely
const ext = path.extname(userFilename).toLowerCase();
const allowed = [".jpg", ".png", ".pdf"];
if (!allowed.includes(ext)) {
throw new Error("Invalid extension");
}
return crypto.randomUUID() + ext;
}
// Never do this
const path = "uploads/" + req.body.filename; // DANGER!
// Do this
const path = "uploads/" + safeFilename(req.body.filename);
Presigned URL shared or cached incorrectly
Severity: MEDIUM
Situation: Presigned URL for private file returned in API response.
Response cached by CDN. Anyone with cached URL can access
private file for hours.
Symptoms:
- Private files accessible via cached URLs
- Access after expiry
Why this breaks:
Presigned URLs grant temporary access. If cached or shared,
access extends beyond intended scope.
Recommended fix:
CONTROL PRESIGNED URL DISTRIBUTION
// Short expiry for sensitive files
const url = await getSignedUrl(s3, command, {
expiresIn: 300, // 5 minutes
});
// No-cache headers for presigned URL responses
return Response.json({ url }, {
headers: {
"Cache-Control": "no-store, max-age=0",
},
});
// Or use CloudFront signed URLs for more control
Validation Checks
Only checking file extension
Severity: CRITICAL
Message: Check magic bytes, not just extension
Fix action: Use file-type library to verify actual type
User filename used directly in path
Severity: CRITICAL
Message: Sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
Fix action: Use path.basename() and generate safe name
Collaboration
Delegation Triggers
- image optimization CDN -> performance-optimization (Image delivery)
- storing file metadata -> postgres-wizard (Database schema)
When to Use
- User mentions or implies: file upload
- User mentions or implies: S3
- User mentions or implies: R2
- User mentions or implies: presigned URL
- User mentions or implies: multipart
- User mentions or implies: image upload
- User mentions or implies: cloud storage
Limitations
- Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
- Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
- Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.
