| 1 | Autonomy-action incident | Agent acts wrongly inside its autonomy level (wrong refund, wrong escalation, wrong message) | Eval thresholds, intervention SLO, drift watch, rollback, prompt regression |
| 2 | Irreversibility incident | Agent takes an action that cannot be undone (payment, public statement, regulatory filing, deletion) | Reversibility classification, L1 gating on irreversible, human-final approval, value bounds, transaction confirmation token |
| 3 | Accountability dispute | A regulator, court, or counterparty seeks to hold a party liable for an agent action | Action audit log, contractual liability allocation, professional indemnity, redress mechanism |
| 4 | Scope creep | Agent's effective scope grows beyond the action catalogue through buyer requests or emergent behaviour | Action catalogue gate, change-control clause, monthly catalogue review, anomalous-action alerting |
| 5 | Multi-agent collusion / failure cascade | Agents in a system reinforce each other's errors or get stuck in loops | Orchestrator-level governance, blast-radius limit, loop detection, replay determinism, anti-collusion guard |
| 6 | Prompt injection via tool output | An external system returns content that injects instructions into the agent's context | Output filtering at tool boundary, system-prompt hardening, content provenance, capability minimisation |
| 7 | Memory poisoning | Persistent memory is corrupted (intentionally or accidentally) and biases future decisions | Memory scoping (per session, per tenant, per task), memory-write review, periodic memory audit, memory reset cadence |
| 8 | Regulator action on agentic system | Regulator suspends agentic operations, requires conformity assessment, imposes ban | Kill-switch, conformity readiness, sovereign-AI option, jurisdictional fallback, regulator-notification runbook |
| 9 | Kill-switch failure | Kill-switch fails in drill or in incident | Multi-layer kill-switch (per-action, per-agent, per-tenant, global), independent authority chain, quarterly drill, post-drill incident review |
| 10 | Identity / impersonation breach | Agent communicates externally without proper identity disclosure, or is mistaken for a human in violation of policy | Identity-and-impersonation policy, signature on every external communication, automated disclosure injection, regulator-aligned transparency |
| 11 | Escalation overload | Intervention rate exceeds supervisor queue capacity; cases time out; SLA breaches; users harmed | Intervention SLO, queue capacity floor, overflow plan, autonomy gating that backs off when queue is saturated |
| 12 | Legacy-system damage | Agent calls a tool that mutates a system in an unintended way (cascading effect, race condition, foreign-key explosion) | Tool-call allowlist with parameter bounds, value bounds, transaction wrapper, dry-run, post-call assertion, automatic rollback |