nanoclaw-traffic-guardian

name	nanoclaw-traffic-guardian
version	0.0.1-beta5
description	NanoClaw runtime traffic monitoring baseline for host-side proxy inspection with container-safe MCP and IPC status surfaces.
homepage	https://clawsec.prompt.security
author	prompt-security
license	AGPL-3.0-or-later
nanoclaw	{"requires":{"node":">=18.0.0"}}

NanoClaw Traffic Guardian

This is a baseline specification skill. It intentionally does not ship a proxy or runtime implementation yet.

Vercel Skills Installation

Install with the Vercel Skills CLI for this harness:

npx skills add prompt-security/clawsec --skill nanoclaw-traffic-guardian -a openclaw -y

Release Artifact Verification

For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting SKILL.md, skill.json, or the archive. The skill.json file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs checksums.json with the ClawSec release key.

set -euo pipefail

SKILL_NAME="nanoclaw-traffic-guardian"
VERSION="0.0.1-beta5"
REPO="prompt-security/clawsec"
TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}"
BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}"
ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip"
TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT

RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256="711424e4535f84093fefb024cd1ca4ec87439e53907b305b79a631d5befba9c8"

curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')"
if [  !=  ]; 
    >&2
   1


openssl  -d -A -  -out 
openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \
  -inkey  \
  -sigfile  \
  -  >/dev/null

() {
    -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; 
    shasum -a 256  | awk 
  
      | awk 
  
}

() {
  asset=
  path=
  expected=
   [ -z  ]; 
      >&2
     1
  
  actual=
   [  !=  ]; 
      >&2
     1
  
}

expected_archive=
 [ -z  ]; 
    >&2
   1

actual_archive=
 [  !=  ]; 
    >&2
   1


verify_manifest_file  
verify_manifest_file  

 

Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds.

Scope

Builders should use this skill as the NanoClaw landing zone for runtime traffic monitoring:

• host-side HTTP proxy inspection
• optional HTTPS inspection with host-held CA material
• outbound exfiltration detection
• inbound injection detection
• redacted local threat logs
• MCP tools for status, findings, and config checks
• IPC handlers for container-safe host communication

Prefer this as an optional companion to clawsec-nanoclaw, not as a mandatory extension of the existing advisory/signature/integrity suite.

Safety Contract

• Opt-in only.
• Detect-and-log by default.
• No automatic system CA installation.
• No CA private key access from the container.
• No blocking in the first implementation.
• Redact secrets before logs or MCP responses.
• Keep all state under NANOCLAW_TRAFFIC_GUARDIAN_HOME or the host-managed NanoClaw security data directory.

Builder Entry Points

Read SPEC.md before implementing. Use the placeholder folders as follows:

Path	Intended use
lib/	Detector rules, redaction, types, report formatting
host-services/	Host-side proxy lifecycle, log access, IPC handlers
mcp-tools/	Container-side MCP tools for status and findings
test/	Unit tests, host/container IPC tests, redaction tests

Required First Implementation Behavior

1. Validate config without starting the proxy.
2. Start monitor through a host-managed lifecycle path.
3. Keep CA key material on the host side.
4. Inspect HTTP request/response text up to a bounded byte limit.
5. Support optional HTTPS MITM only when the operator supplies per-runtime trust configuration.
6. Emit JSONL findings with redacted snippets.
7. Expose MCP tools that return status and redacted findings only.

Out of Scope for v0.0.1 Implementation

• automatic system trust-store mutation
• transparent network interception
• default blocking
• sending traffic to external services
• exposing raw request/response bodies to the container