rust-security

name	rust-security
description	| Use when this capability is needed.

Rust Security

Practical security guidance for Rust services and libraries. Rust removes many memory-safety bugs, but it does not remove auth bugs, logic bugs, injection, weak crypto, dependency risk, or unsafe-code soundness obligations.

Quick Navigation

• references/crypto_secrets.md - password hashing, tokens, TLS, key handling, zeroization
• references/supply_chain.md - cargo audit, cargo deny, dependency policy, SBOMs

Golden Rules

1. Treat all external input as hostile until parsed into domain types.
2. Use reviewed crypto crates and protocols; do not design cryptography.
3. Keep secrets out of Debug, logs, panics, metrics, and error contexts.
4. Bound work for untrusted requests: size, depth, time, concurrency, and retries.
5. Automate dependency and license policy checks in CI.

Threat Model First

asset: session token
attacker: internet client with many accounts
entry points: login, refresh, logout, API auth middleware
controls: TLS, secure cookies, token rotation, rate limits, audit logs
failure modes: replay, theft from logs, weak signing key, missing tenant check

A short threat model beats scattered hardening. Identify assets, attackers, boundaries, and abuse cases before choosing crates.

Secrets Handling

use secrecy::{ExposeSecret, SecretString};

pub struct Config {
    database_url: SecretString,
}

async fn connect(config: &Config) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
    sqlx::PgPool::connect(config.database_url.expose_secret()).await?;
    Ok(())
}

Use secret wrapper types to avoid accidental Debug output. Avoid attaching raw secrets to errors with .context().

Memory Zeroization

use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};

// Automatic zeroing on drop
let mut key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
key.copy_from_slice(&raw_key);

// Custom types can implement Zeroize
impl Zeroize for SessionKey {
    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
        self.inner.zeroize();
        self.created_at.zeroize();
    }
}

Use zeroize for cryptographic material. Relying on the OS to reclaim memory is not sufficient.

Password Hashing

use argon2::{Argon2, PasswordHash, PasswordHasher, PasswordVerifier};
use password_hash::{rand_core::OsRng, SaltString};

pub fn hash_password(password: &[u8]) -> Result<String, password_hash::Error> {
    let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut OsRng);
    Ok(Argon2::default().hash_password(password, &salt)?.to_string())
}

pub fn verify_password(password: &[u8], encoded: &str) -> Result<bool, password_hash::Error> {
    let parsed = PasswordHash::new(encoded)?;
    Ok(Argon2::default().verify_password(password, &parsed).is_ok())
}

Use password hashing algorithms for passwords, not fast hashes. Tune cost parameters for the deployment budget.

JWT Verification

use jsonwebtoken::{decode, DecodingKey, Validation, Algorithm, TokenData};

#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct Claims {
    pub sub: String,
    pub exp: usize,
    pub iss: String,
    pub aud: String,
}

pub fn verify_token(token: &str, public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Claims, jsonwebtoken::errors::Error> {
    let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256);
    validation.set_audience(&["my-service"]);
    validation.iss = Some("auth.my-service.com".to_string());

    let token_data: TokenData<Claims> = decode(
        token,
        &DecodingKey::from_rsa_pem(public_key)?,
        &validation,
    )?;

    Ok(token_data.claims)
}

Always validate exp, iss, and aud. Never accept alg: "none". Use asymmetric keys (RS256/ES256) so services verify without holding signing keys.

TLS Configuration

use rustls::ClientConfig;
use rustls_platform_verifier::tls_config;

pub fn tls_client() -> ClientConfig {
    // Use the OS-native certificate verifier
    tls_config()
        .with_client_auth(none)  // no client certificate
        .expect("tls config")
}

Pin a minimum TLS version (1.2 or 1.3) and restrict cipher suites to modern options.

Parse, Validate, Authorize

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TenantId(uuid::Uuid);

pub async fn load_invoice(
    auth: &AuthContext,
    tenant_id: TenantId,
    invoice_id: InvoiceId,
) -> Result<Invoice, Error> {
    auth.require_tenant(&tenant_id)?;
    repo::find_invoice(tenant_id, invoice_id).await?
        .ok_or(Error::NotFound)
}

Validate shape at the boundary, then authorize with domain identifiers. Do not rely on UI filtering or hidden route parameters.

Auth Middleware Pattern

use axum::{
    extract::{FromRequestParts, Request},
    middleware::{from_fn, Next},
    response::Response,
};

pub async fn auth_middleware(
    mut req: Request,
    next: Next,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
    let token = req.headers()
        .get("Authorization")
        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
        .and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
        .ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;

    let claims = verify_token(token, &PUBLIC_KEY)
        .map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;

    req.extensions_mut().insert(AuthUser {
        user_id: claims.sub,
        tenant_id: claims.aud,
    });

    Ok(next.run(req).await)
}

Rate Limiting

use governor::{DefaultDirectRateLimiter, Quota, RateLimiter};
use nonzero_ext::nonzero;
use std::num::NonZeroU32;

// Allow 100 requests per second
let limiter = RateLimiter::direct(Quota::per_second(
    NonZeroU32::new(100).unwrap(),
));

async fn handle_request() -> Result<(), StatusCode> {
    if limiter.check().is_err() {
        return Err(StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
    }
    // process request
    Ok(())
}

Use token-bucket or sliding-window ratelimiters. Expose rate limit headers (X-RateLimit-Remaining, Retry-After) for client cooperation.

Input Validation with Bounds

// Use a dedicated validation crate for complex schemas
use validator::{Validate, ValidationError};

#[derive(Debug, Validate, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct SignupRequest {
    #[validate(length(min = 3, max = 100))]
    pub username: String,

    #[validate(email)]
    pub email: String,

    #[validate(length(min = 8, max = 256))]
    pub password: String,
}

Validate at the boundary with explicit constraints. Combine with size limits at the transport layer.

Untrusted Input Bounds

pub fn parse_payload(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Event, Error> {
    if bytes.len() > 64 * 1024 {
        return Err(Error::PayloadTooLarge);
    }

    let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
    parse_event(value)
}

Bound payload sizes, recursion depth, decompression output, regex complexity, and database result sizes.

SSRF Protection

use url::Url;

pub fn validate_outbound_url(raw: &str) -> Result<Url, Error> {
    let url = Url::parse(raw)?;

    let scheme = url.scheme();
    if scheme != "https" && scheme != "http" {
        return Err(Error::DisallowedScheme(scheme.to_string()));
    }

    let host = url.host_str().ok_or(Error::MissingHost)?;
    if is_private_ip(host) {
        return Err(Error::BlockedPrivateHost(host.to_string()));
    }

    Ok(url)
}

fn is_private_ip(host: &str) -> bool {
    // Parse and check against 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x, ::1, 127.x.x.x
    // Consider using a crate like `is-private` or `ipnet`
    false // implementation omitted for brevity
}

Prevent SSRF by filtering private IPs, loopback, and metadata endpoints before making outbound HTTP calls.

Path Safety

use camino::{Utf8Path, Utf8PathBuf};

pub fn resolve_upload(root: &Utf8Path, name: &str) -> Result<Utf8PathBuf, Error> {
    if name.contains('/') || name.contains('\\') || name == "." || name == ".." {
        return Err(Error::InvalidPath);
    }
    Ok(root.join(name))
}

Do not join user-provided paths directly. Prefer opaque IDs and server-generated filenames.

Dependency Supply Chain

# CI steps for every Rust project
cargo audit                  # known vulnerabilities
cargo deny check             # deny list / license policy / advisory DB
cargo sbom --output cyclonedx --format json  # SBOM generation

# .cargo/deny.toml
[advisories]
vulnerability = "deny"
unmaintained = "warn"

[licenses]
allow = ["MIT", "Apache-2.0", "ISC", "BSD-3-Clause"]
deny = ["GPL-3.0", "AGPL-3.0"]

[bans]
multiple-versions = "deny"
wildcards = "deny"
deny = ["ansi_term"]

Anti-Patterns

// Bad: fast hash for password storage.
let digest = sha2::Sha256::digest(password);

// Good: memory-hard password hashing.
let hash = Argon2::default().hash_password(password, &salt)?;

// Bad: secret can leak through logs.
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Login { password: String }

// Good: wrapper prevents accidental Debug exposure.
struct Login { password: secrecy::SecretString }

// Bad: unchecked token deserialization, no audience/issuer validation.
let claims: Claims = decode_header(token).into();

// Good: full validation with audience, issuer, expiration.
let token = decode::<Claims>(token, &key, &Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256))?;

// Bad: comparing secrets with non-constant-time comparison.
if input_token == stored_token { /* ... */ }

// Good: constant-time comparison prevents timing attacks.
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
let result = input_token.as_bytes().ct_eq(stored_token.as_bytes());

Security Checklist

• Threat model names assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and abuse cases.
• Secrets use wrapper types and are excluded from logs/errors/debug output.
• Passwords use Argon2id/bcrypt/scrypt with per-password salts.
• Tokens have expiration, audience/issuer checks, key rotation plan, and replay controls.
• Untrusted input has explicit size/time/depth bounds.
• Authorization checks use server-side domain identifiers.
• CI runs dependency, license, and advisory checks.
• TLS minimum version 1.2, cipher suites restricted to modern set.
• Rate limiting is applied to authentication and resource-intensive endpoints.
• SSRF protection is in place for all outbound HTTP clients.
• Cryptographic keys use zeroize for memory cleanup.

References

• RustSec Advisory Database
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
• cargo-audit
• cargo-deny
• secrecy crate
• zeroize crate

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Source: adxptived/Rust-Skills — distributed by TomeVault.