network-appliance-offensive

name

network-appliance-offensive

description

Offensive testing of perimeter network appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec (aggressive-mode, transform/DH enum, NAT-T), Check Point SIC/OPSEC, safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate/PAN-OS/Cisco ASA/Citrix feeding CVE applicability, NTLM Type-2 target-info decode, handshake-completion TLS-version probing, and an RST-TTL forgery discriminator. The active/offensive counterpart to the static firewall-review skill. Use when a perimeter firewall/VPN/appliance is in scope and you must test it (not just audit a config), without reinventing raw-socket protocol tooling each engagement.

Network-Appliance Offensive

firewall-review audits a config statically; infrastructure covers generic ports/DNS/SMB. Neither tests a live perimeter appliance or its VPN crypto — so IKE builders, SIC/OPSEC fingerprinting, and TTL discriminators were reinvented from raw sockets each engagement, often shallowly, and CVE applicability was left UNDETERMINED across whole estates. This skill provides the deterministic, tested tools and the precondition-gated methodology. Non-destructive only — every tool observes/decodes/infers; none fires an exploit, and CVE applicability is a precondition check, never a blind "vulnerable."

Tools

Tool	Does	Anti-footgun
tools/ike_enum.py	IKEv1 aggressive-mode detection, IKEv1/IKEv2 transform + DH-group enum, NOTIFY / NAT-T decode (wraps ike-scan, raw ISAKMP SA_INIT builder fallback)	Aggressive-mode support (PSK-hash leak) is the finding; enumerate, don't crack in-band
tools/checkpoint_sic_opsec.py	Fingerprint SIC (18190/1), OPSEC LEA/ELA (18183/4), CA (18192/18210), FW1 (256/264), Gaia Portal; emit a CVE-precondition map incl. CVE-2024-24919	CVE-2024-24919 is applicable ONLY when the RA/Mobile-Access marker is observed — else undetermined
tools/appliance_version_infer.py	Safe firmware/patch-level inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix from headers, login markers, cert CN/serial → CVE applicability	Never asserts applicable on a low-confidence / unknown version — returns undetermined
tools/tls_handshake_probe.py	Which TLS versions are supported, by completed handshake per pinned protocol	Fixes the openssl s_client exit/SECLEVEL false-positive — an aborted handshake ≠ support
tools/ntlm_decode.py	Decode an NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) AV_PAIR block → NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, OS build	Info-leak finding from an unauthenticated challenge; no auth attempted
tools/perimeter_forensics.py	RST-TTL forgery discriminator (real host vs firewall forging a RST) + IKE NOTIFY decode	Never asserts "internal host behind FW" on RSTs alone — a firewall forges RSTs indistinguishably at this layer; returns undetermined without an open-service TTL baseline

Workflow

1. Fingerprint the appliance — from the port set + banners + login markers, run appliance_version_infer.py (vendor + version guess + confidence) and, for Check Point, checkpoint_sic_opsec.py. A version guess of undetermined/low-confidence stays undetermined — do not score CVEs against it.
2. VPN crypto — on UDP 500/4500, run ike_enum.py: flag IKEv1 aggressive mode (leaks the PSK hash → a finding), enumerate accepted transforms + weak DH groups (1/2/5), and decode NAT-T/NOTIFY. IKEv2-only where IKEv1 RA is absent (a CVE requiring IKEv1 aggressive mode is not_applicable there — see severity-calibration.md rule 5).
3. TLS posture — tls_handshake_probe.py per host: report only handshake-completed versions; TLS 1.0/1.1 completion is the weak-protocol finding (not an openssl exit code).
4. Info leaks — decode any NTLM Type-2 challenge (ntlm_decode.py) for internal host/domain/OS intel; record it as an information-disclosure finding.
5. CVE applicability (precondition-gated) — for each surfaced appliance CVE, take the vendor+version from step 1 and the precondition map (checkpoint_sic_opsec / appliance_version_infer applicability) and mark applicable / undetermined / not_applicable. Enrich the CVE via python3 tools/nvd-lookup.py. An undetermined applicability is reported as such — never inflated to a confirmed vuln.
6. Forensics — if a "closed" host appears live behind the firewall, run perimeter_forensics.py --classify-ttls before asserting anything: distinguish a real host RST from a filter-forged RST (needs an open-service TTL baseline; otherwise undetermined).

Anti-Patterns

• Do not score an appliance CVE as confirmed on a version banner alone — banners are backported/spoofable; gate on applicability (severity-calibration.md rules 4-5).
• Do not claim TLS 1.0/1.1 support from an openssl s_client non-zero exit — require a completed handshake (tls_handshake_probe.py).
• Do not assert "internal host behind the firewall" from RSTs — a firewall forges RSTs; use the TTL discriminator and accept undetermined.
• Do not crack an IKE aggressive-mode PSK hash in-band on the engagement — capturing/flagging the aggressive-mode exposure is the finding; offline cracking needs explicit authorization.

Reference

• Static counterpart: firewall-review (config audit). Generic network: infrastructure.
• CVE precondition / applicability discipline: ../coordination/reference/severity-calibration.md (rules 4-5).