lateral-movement-dtctn

name	lateral-movement-dtctn
description	Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading using SIEM correlation of Windows event logs, network flow data, and endpoint telemetry mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	soc-operations
tags	["soc","lateral-movement","mitre-attack","pass-the-hash","psexec","wmi","rdp","smb","detection"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Token Binding","Execution Isolation","Restore Access","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Process Termination"]
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01","DE.AE-06"]

Performing Lateral Movement Detection

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• SOC teams need to detect attackers pivoting between systems after initial compromise
• Incident investigations require tracking an attacker's movement path through the network
• Detection engineering needs lateral movement rules mapped to ATT&CK TA0008 techniques
• Red/purple team exercises identify lateral movement detection gaps

Do not use for detecting initial access or external attacks — lateral movement detection focuses on internal host-to-host pivot activity.

Prerequisites

• Windows Security Event Logs (EventCode 4624, 4625, 4648, 4672) from all endpoints and servers
• Sysmon deployed with process creation (EventCode 1), network connections (EventCode 3), and named pipe (EventCode 17/18)
• Network flow data (NetFlow/sFlow, Zeek connection logs) for internal traffic analysis
• SIEM with cross-source correlation capability
• Baseline of normal internal authentication patterns

Workflow

Step 1: Detect Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket (T1550)

Pass-the-Hash Detection (EventCode 4624 with NTLM):

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
AuthenticationPackageName="NTLM"
| where TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS LOGON" AND TargetUserName!="$"
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets, values(ComputerName) AS targets
  by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_targets > 3
| eval alert = "Possible Pass-the-Hash: NTLM network logon to ".unique_targets." hosts"
| sort - unique_targets
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_targets, count, targets, alert

Overpass-the-Hash Detection (Kerberos with RC4):

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769
TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
| where ServiceName!="krbtgt" AND ServiceName!="$"
| stats count, dc(ServiceName) AS unique_services by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where count > 5
| eval alert = "Possible Overpass-the-Hash: RC4 Kerberos tickets from ".src_ip
| table _time, src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_services, count, alert

Golden/Silver Ticket Detection (T1558):

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769
| where TicketOptions="0x40810000" OR TicketOptions="0x40800000"
| eval ticket_lifetime = TicketExpireTime - TicketIssueTime
| where ticket_lifetime > 36000  --- >10 hours (abnormal)
| stats count by src_ip, TargetUserName, ServiceName, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions
| eval alert = "Possible Golden/Silver Ticket: Abnormal ticket properties"