| name | bounty-scope-source-audit |
| description | Use when auditing bounty scope CSVs, public source repos, or no-account bounty surfaces such as exposed RPC/API services; also use for HackerOne-style reports, weakness classification, and PoC zip attachments. |
| version | 1.1.2 |
| author | Hermes Agent |
| license | MIT |
| metadata | {"hermes":{"tags":["bounty","source-audit","gread","command-injection","report-template","poc-zip"]}} |
Bounty Scope Source Audit
When to Use
Use for:
- scope CSV / 漏洞赏金 scope / bounty scope
- 按 scope 挖源码漏洞
- GitHub 开源仓库审计
- no-account / 不需要账号的公开 RPC、API、service 暴露验证
- CLI / helper script 命令注入
- HackerOne / Report Intent 表单
- 需要 PoC zip 附件
Do not use for broad live target probing. This skill is source-first; live checks must be in-scope, low-volume, read-only, and tied to a source/config hypothesis.
Core Workflow
- Parse scope CSV first; filter
asset_type == SOURCE_CODE.
- Rank by bounty eligibility first, then bounty tier, then direct project relevance.
- Split rows into three buckets before reading code:
eligible_for_bounty == true and eligible_for_submission == trueSOURCE_CODE but not bounty-eligible- non-source rows that still name a repo/path and may help orient the tree
- Pick one repo first; do not spray all repos.
- Map repo tree, then grep narrow sinks:
execSync, exec(, spawn(, shell: trueeval(, new FunctionreadFileSync, writeFileSync, path.join, path.resolvedangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML- archive extraction:
tar, unzip, extract
- web/API routes: look for
parseEntity, parameters(...), path(...), get, post, and any default reference.conf that turns a feature on by default.
- Prove one narrow end-to-end flow before expanding.
- Classify only after proof. Prefer
confirmed, high-risk design, or false lead.
- If the target has a standalone launcher, verify the exact run entrypoint and config file instead of assuming
sbt test is the fastest proof path.
- If a route wrapper exists, inspect the wrapper config too; permissive defaults like wildcard CORS often live outside the route file.
- If no new same-grade finding after one high-risk sweep, stop and formalize report.
- Before treating a signature / auth check as real, verify the effective runtime knob and shipped defaults. A validator behind a default-off feature flag is not proof of enforcement.
- If local regression tests need infra tools such as
atlas, note the environment gap and keep the source conclusion separate from the failed runtime check.
Session References
references/lightspark-withdrawal-validation.md — withdrawal-validation finding and verification caveat.references/no-account-open-source-bounty-triage.md — triage pattern for “no account needed” bounty scope work, including source-first findings and no-account service risks.references/privy-no-account-postmessage-triage.md — Privy/npm package no-account triage: postMessage origin/source validation, popup trust boundaries, and OAuth redirect_to candidates.references/moonpay-agent-skill-supply-chain.md — MoonPay org-level SOURCE_CODE triage with explicit ineligible repo overrides, GitHub org repo enumeration, and http://... | sh agent-skill supply-chain finding pattern.references/chainlink-no-account-source-audit.md — scope CSV triage and code-map notes from the Chainlink session; useful as a worked example of filtering SOURCE_CODE rows, prioritizing bounty-eligible assets, and proving one unauthenticated adapter path.references/plaid-no-account-source-audit.md — SDK/client source audit pattern where the user wanted ready markdown reports plus executable PoC files and a zip archive.
No-account bounty triage
When the user asks for bugs that do not need prepared accounts:
- Start from the scope CSV and separate
SOURCE_CODE targets from live web/mobile targets.
- Prefer public open-source repos and unauthenticated local/service endpoints over member-only flows.
- Do not assume every in-scope row is equally good: rows marked
OTHER may still name repos, but asset_type == SOURCE_CODE is the cleanest first pass.
- After command-injection/eval sweeps, also search for unauthenticated route registration, default CORS, request-body aggregation, compression/decompression, publish/write APIs, and config defaults.
- For SDKs and client libraries, inspect remote script loaders, platform-specific redirect/OAuth bridges, and token-to-handler propagation before hunting broader auth flaws.
- For source-first conclusions, distinguish
confirmed, high-risk design, and needs runtime proof; do not present a config-default concern as a confirmed vuln until local or documented deployment behavior is reproduced.
- For browser popup /
postMessage flows, treat event.origin and event.source as mandatory checks; event.data.type alone is not enough.
- If the only proven impact is spoofed connection state or forced request failure, score it conservatively as Medium unless token theft or signed transaction execution is shown.
- See
references/privy-cvss-postmessage.md for the CVSS pattern used in this session.
- See
references/plaid-no-account-triage.md for the Plaid SDK session pattern: no-account triage, source loader trust boundaries, and why several candidates stop at high-risk design.
No-account service/RPC exposure triage
Use this when a scope row names a public RPC/API host and the user wants no-account findings:
- First inspect source/config/docs for the intended public-safe surface: default bind address, enabled modules, middleware/interceptors, auth flags, TLS/mTLS, and safe/unsafe namespace lists.
- Confirm live behavior only with low-cost read-only requests. For JSON-RPC, start with
rpc_modules, web3_clientVersion, net_version, eth_chainId; then prove one exposed sensitive method with bounded output.
- Safe read-only examples: empty
trace_call, debug_getRawHeader latest, debug_getRawBlock latest, txpool_status, truncated txpool_content.
- Avoid mutating or risky methods such as
admin_addPeer, admin_removePeer, debug verbosity/GC controls, broad historical tracing, fuzzing, or high-rate polling.
- Record negative results too. If
admin_* is blocked but trace_* works, report only the confirmed exposed methods and bound the impact.
- Classify exposed dangerous RPC methods as
Exposed Dangerous Method or Function (CWE-749). Use CWE-200 only when the primary proven impact is sensitive data disclosure rather than dangerous functionality exposure.
Unauthenticated signer/service triage
Use this for remote signers, callback signers, validators, and cryptographic service sidecars:
- Trace the public server registration, default bind address, proto/interface, middleware/interceptor chain, and handler validation before claiming exposure.
- Prove the boundary with a local harness when real keys are unnecessary: instantiate the public server with a fake backend and show a client with no metadata, no token, and no client certificate reaches the critical handler.
- Classify unauthenticated access to signing or key-use operations as
Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306).
- Impact wording must be precise: unauthorized signing capability is not the same as private-key extraction.
- Before reporting, verify there is no effective default-on mTLS, bearer token, peer allowlist, proxy auth, or deployment wrapper that blocks the handler.
No-account / pre-login attack surface
Use this section when the user wants findings that do not require preparing a target account.
Typical targets:
- install/update scripts
- auth bootstrap flows before token issuance
- repo-local config ingestion that still runs before login
- downloadable executables and shell wrappers
What to verify first:
- Whether the flow can be reached with only the shipped binary/script and no account.
- Whether remote data becomes a shell command, file path, or executable payload.
- Whether signature or checksum validation is actually enforced before execution.
- Whether a browser-open / auth-url helper is just UX or a real trust boundary.
- Whether the path still needs an existing token, project, config, or dashboard session.
Common pitfall:
- A remote install script is interesting only if you can prove a bypass of verification, path control, or command construction. "Downloads and executes remote script" alone is not enough.
Session note:
- See
references/doppler-no-account-audit.md for the Doppler CLI no-account triage flow and the decisive file map.
- See
references/supabase-storage-x-forwarded-host.md for a trusted-proxy-header tenant-routing example and two false leads from the same session.
Signed webhook / callback replay triage
Use this when the target is a signed webhook, callback, or remote-signing handler:
- Signature validity is necessary, not sufficient.
- If the payload includes
timestamp, prove whether the implementation enforces freshness.
- If the payload includes
event_id / nonce / UUID / delivery id, prove whether replay dedupe exists.
- For action-executing handlers, prove the downstream side effect still fires on a replayed signed payload.
- When a fixture is shipped in the repo, recompute the signature independently with
node:crypto first; do not rely on workspace package-manager state for a basic HMAC proof.
- See
references/webhook-replay-triage.md and scripts/verify-webhook-replay.mjs.
Gread Pattern
Use research/gread for public GitHub source:
curl -s 'https://api.gread.dev/repo?name=owner/repo'
curl -s 'https://api.gread.dev/grep?name=owner/repo&q=execSync&i=true&F=true&C=3&path='
curl -s 'https://api.gread.dev/read?name=owner/repo&paths=path/to/file.ts'
If punctuation queries fail, retry simple tokens (execSync, spawn, shell) and narrow path.
Command Injection Triage
High confidence requires all of:
- user-controlled CLI arg, env var, URL, config, file path, or repo content
- reaches shell string (
execSync(command), exec(command), spawn(..., {shell:true}))
- no strict allowlist or argv separation before sink
- proof that metacharacters survive to shell (
$(), backticks, ;)
Local CLI RCE severity defaults:
- Weakness:
OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
- CVSS 4.0:
AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
PoC Zip Pattern
Provide safe PoC zip with:
README.mdpoc-live.sh when live package execution is practicalpoc-offline.js or equivalent proving vulnerable command construction
For signed webhook / callback replay findings, include a self-contained PoC zip even when package-manager installs are unavailable. The zip should prove all of:
- the shipped fixture or raw payload is valid under
node:crypto
- the payload is stale/replayable because freshness is not enforced
- the downstream handler path is the one that would still execute after verification
Safe marker pattern:
PAYLOAD='$(touch ./poc-owned)'
Avoid destructive commands. Write only temp marker files.
Zip:
cd /path/to/poc-dir
zip -r ../finding-poc.zip .
unzip -l ../finding-poc.zip
When the user says they want "markdown" and "poc", create filesystem deliverables rather than only printing text in chat:
- one
.md report per finding using the HackerOne template
poc/<finding>/README.md- one executable, deterministic PoC script per finding
- a zip containing all reports and PoCs
- run each PoC locally and include only decisive verification lines in the final response
For source-only SDK/client findings where live exploitation would require a link token, account, or mobile runtime, prefer static PoCs that prove the exact source sink and sensitive field shape. Label the runtime limitation in the report instead of overclaiming.
CVSS 3.1 for bounty reports
When the platform asks for the eight CVSS 3.1 metrics, provide them explicitly before giving the score.
For client-side postMessage / popup trust bugs, default conservatively unless the proof shows token theft or transaction execution:
- Attack Vector: Network, if exploit is delivered through web content / browser messaging.
- Attack Complexity: Low, if a forged message with the right
type is enough.
- Privileges Required: None, if no attacker account or target tenant access is needed.
- User Interaction: Required, if the victim must open the dApp or trigger the popup flow.
- Scope: Unchanged, unless the exploit crosses into a different security authority with proven downstream impact.
- Confidentiality: None unless secrets/tokens/user data are exposed.
- Integrity: Low for wallet identity spoof, forged connection state, or UI/security-state manipulation; High only with proven unauthorized transaction/signature execution.
- Availability: Low for forced flow failure/DoS of signing or transaction requests; High only if durable service outage is proven.
Always include the vector string, score, and severity label. Example:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L = 5.4 Medium.
Weakness Classification Rules
The report Weakness: field must be a single clear weakness, not a slash-separated bundle.
Format:
Weakness: <specific weakness name> (CWE-<id>) - <one concrete vulnerable action/surface>
Good examples:
OS Command Injection (CWE-78) - CLI revision reaches shell command constructionMissing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) - unauthenticated access to validator signingExposed Dangerous Method or Function (CWE-749) - public JSON-RPC exposes trace/debug/txpool methodsExposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CWE-200) - unauthenticated endpoint returns pending transaction contents
Rules:
- Pick the CWE that matches the proven sink/impact, not the broadest narrative.
- If two CWEs seem plausible, choose the primary one and mention the secondary effect in Summary or Impact.
- Add one sentence in Summary:
The concrete weakness is CWE-...: ...
- Avoid vague labels like
Improper Restriction, Information Exposure, Auth issue, or Access Control unless the platform forces that exact taxonomy.
HackerOne-Style Report Template
Use this exact markdown skeleton for submissions:
# <descriptive title>
Asset: <scope asset root, e.g. https://github.com/vercel/next.js>
Weakness: <weakness name, e.g. OS Command Injection (CWE-78)>
Severity: <Low|Medium|High|Critical>
Affected version(s): <exact version or range>
Affected file: <blob URL to the vulnerable file>
## Summary
<1-3 short paragraphs. State the source, sink, and why it is unsafe.>
## Expected vs. Actual Behavior
Expected:
- <expected safe behavior>
- <validation or escaping that should happen>
Actual:
- <what really happens>
-
Attack Scenario
<Explain how a realistic attacker influences the parameter: copied command, wrapper script, CI, docs, chat, issue comment, etc.>
Impact
Supporting Material / References
- PoC zip:
- Repository file:
- Entry point:
## Description Field Rule
When the user asks for a bounty report `description`, output the full markdown body, not a prose-only paragraph. Always include these sections in order:
```markdown
## Summary
...
## Expected vs. Actual Behavior
Expected:
- ...
Actual:
- ...
## Steps To Reproduce
1. ...
```bash
...
Attack Scenario
...
Impact
...
Supporting Material / References
- Asset:
...
- Affected file:
...
- Entry point:
...
- Affected version:
...
If the user says "description", assume the report platform's description/body field and provide this complete sectioned markdown block.
## Common Mistakes
- Do not leave report-platform default titles like `Report Intent #...`; use a descriptive vuln title.
- For Asset, use the exact in-scope asset string from the scope table (often the repository root such as `https://github.com/org/repo`), then put file/blob URLs under affected files or references.
- Include Expected vs. Actual behavior in reproduction steps.
- Explain how an attacker realistically influences the vulnerable parameter.
- Use markdown code blocks for commands and vulnerable snippets.
- Do not report examples/tests unless they are shipped and reachable.
- Do not claim RCE from `execFileSync` with argv array unless a shell is involved.
- Do not rely on comments; prove live source-to-sink flow.
- Do not paste massive logs; include decisive lines and PoC zip.
- Do not over-sweep all repos before proving one chain.
- Do not leave `Weakness` vague or multi-headed. Use one CWE-backed weakness and make the vulnerable surface explicit.
- For signed webhook paths, do not stop at HMAC verification; check freshness and replay uniqueness too.
- If the repo's package manager is unavailable, fall back to a self-contained `node:crypto` proof instead of treating that as a blocker.
## This Session Pattern
Confirmed examples:
- `@next/codemod upgrade [revision]`: `revision` -> `resolveSemanticRevision()` -> `execSync("npm view ...")`
- `svelte` playground download helper: URL owner/repo -> `repo_url` -> `execSync("git clone ...")`
- `@ai-sdk/codemod`: CLI args -> `buildCommand()` -> `execSync(command)`
- Remote signer public gRPC: default public listener + no auth interceptor + `Sign` only validates non-empty message -> `CWE-306`.
- Public blockchain JSON-RPC: source says public-safe modules exclude trace/debug/txpool, live read-only probes confirm exposed methods -> `CWE-749`.
