supply-chain-dependency-security

name

supply-chain-dependency-security

description

Dependency and lockfile supply-chain security review with 2025–2026 attack campaign patterns. Use when reviewing package.json, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, pixi.toml, conda-lock.yml, or any lockfile; when evaluating a new dependency for addition; or when responding to a supply-chain compromise incident. Contains patterns for detecting maintainer-account-takeover style attacks that CVE scanners miss.

Supply Chain Dependency Security

Threat Model (2025–2026)

The dominant supply-chain threat is maintainer account takeover of legitimate, widely-trusted packages — not typosquatting. Your CVE scanner will not catch these.

Active campaigns:

• Shai-Hulud: 500+ npm packages compromised via maintainer account takeover
• TeamPCP: Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Bitwarden CLI, SAP CAP — targeted at security tooling
• axios: 100M weekly downloads; compromise via release tag hijack
• LiteLLM 1.82.8: malicious .pth file injected for persistent execution on every Python startup

Review Checklist

Lockfiles

• Lockfile committed (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pixi.lock, conda-lock.yml)
• Lockfile is used in CI (npm ci, pip install --require-hashes, uv sync --frozen, pixi install)
• No floating version specs in production paths (e.g., *, without upper bound in lockfile-less environments)