botanary-guarded-agent-spend

name	botanary-guarded-agent-spend
description	Let an agent spend from a Botanary self-custodial smart wallet under an on-chain mandate. Request a bounded delegation, then send, swap, or hire another agent within budget, per-action max, recipient allowlist, allowed venues, and expiry, using build, sign client-side, relay. Includes approval gates, a one-op kill-switch, and a tamper-evident audit trail.

Botanary Guarded Agent Spend

Overview

Use Botanary as the execution layer when an agent must move real money under limits it cannot exceed. The backend never holds keys and never signs: the API returns an unsigned UserOp, the owner or a bounded session key signs it client-side, and POST /userops relays it. AgentGuard enforces the limits on-chain.

When to use

• An agent needs to send, swap, or hire another agent (ACP) with hard spend caps.
• A human wants to delegate bounded, revocable authority to an agent.
• You need an auditable, freezable execution path, not advisory advice.

When NOT to use

• You need a custodial wallet that signs for you. Botanary never signs.
• You need on-chain guardrail enforcement on mainnet today - delegation and AgentGuard are testnet-validated; mainnet is basic tier (owner-signed, no guardrail hook). Use owner-signed send/swap on mainnet, or testnet for the full mandate flow.
• You need advisory-only risk scoring (use a verifier skill instead).

Inputs, tools, credentials, preconditions

• Base URL: your Botanary backend, self-run from https://github.com/Botanary/botanary-be (the hosted API is in private waitlist).
• Auth: an owner session (Privy email-OTP login) for owner-lane actions; a granted mandate (session key) for delegated actions.
• Chain id: a supported chain (e.g. Base 8453 for send/swap on mainnet; Base Sepolia 84532 for the full mandate/guardrail flow).
• A signer available client-side (the owner wallet or the mandate session key). Never send a private key to the backend.

Approval gates (must confirm before relay)

Before signing/relaying ANY fund-moving op, explicitly confirm:

1. chain id, 2. action (send | swap | hire), 3. recipient/venue, 4. amount and token, 5. that amount + venue + recipient are inside the active mandate bounds. Any changed fact requires a fresh confirmation and a fresh build.

Flow

1. GET /chains and GET /gas/methods - confirm the chain and available gas.
2. (Delegated lane) POST /delegations/build with the mandate bounds, owner signs, POST /delegations to activate. (Owner lane) skip to step 3.
3. Build: POST /money/send/build | POST /money/swap/build | POST /marketplace/hire/build. The response is an unsigned UserOp.
4. Optional preview: POST /simulation to see the effect before signing.
5. Sign the UserOp client-side (owner wallet or mandate session key).
6. Relay: POST /userops, then poll GET /userops/:id for inclusion.
7. Verify: GET /activity shows the audited event; GET /balance reflects it.

Stop conditions

• A build returns a decline reason (out of budget, non-allowlisted recipient, disallowed venue, over per-action max, expired mandate): STOP, report the reason, do not retry with the same facts.
• GET /userops/:id shows failure or is uncertain: STOP, check GET /activity before any retry.
• Any bound is ambiguous: STOP and ask the owner. Never widen a bound to proceed.

Kill-switch

POST /account/freeze (or POST /delegations/:id/freeze) halts spending in one op and is gasless via the revoke-only paymaster. Freeze/revoke are always allowed, even when already frozen.

Validation and output contract

Return exactly:

• status: relayed | declined | stopped
• chainId, action, recipientOrVenue, amount, token
• userOpHash and txHash when relayed; declineReason when declined; stopReason when stopped
• activityEventId for the audited record Print allowlisted fields only. Never print keys, signatures, or raw UserOp calldata.