| name | detecting-azure-storage-account-misconfigurations |
| description | Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak or long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption at rest, disabled HTTPS-only traffic, and outdated TLS versions using the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | cloud-security |
| tags | ["Azure","storage-accounts","blob-storage","ADLS","SAS-tokens","encryption","public-access","cloud-misconfiguration","azure-mgmt-storage"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_ai_rmf | ["MEASURE-2.7","MAP-5.1","MANAGE-2.4"] |
| atlas_techniques | ["AML.T0070","AML.T0066","AML.T0082"] |
| nist_csf | ["PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01"] |
Detecting Azure Storage Account Misconfigurations
Overview
Azure Storage accounts are a frequent target for attackers due to misconfigured public access, long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption, and outdated TLS versions. This skill uses the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK with StorageManagementClient to enumerate all storage accounts in a subscription, inspect their security properties, list blob containers for public access settings, and generate a risk-scored audit report identifying critical misconfigurations.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure storage account misconfigurations
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Detection Gaps & Validation
Where azure-mgmt-storage audits give false assurance:
- Container ACLs override the account flag.
allow_blob_public_access=False on the account still leaves containers whose public_access is Blob/Container exposed — you must enumerate blob_containers.list() and check each container's public_access, not just StorageAccount.allow_blob_public_access.
minimum_tls_version == None on older API versions means the default TLS1_0, i.e. non-compliant, not "unknown" — treat null as a finding.- SAS issuance is invisible to this SDK.
StorageManagementClient cannot see account-SAS / user-delegation SAS tokens or their scope/lifetime — that requires Storage Analytics logs or Defender for Storage.
network_rule_set.default_action == 'Deny' with bypass including AzureServices still exposes data to trusted Microsoft services across tenants.require_infrastructure_encryption defaults to None/False — absence is not "double-encrypted."
Validate: assert the service principal holds Reader on every target subscription (a mis-scoped SP makes storage_accounts.list() return empty silently, faking a clean result); cross-check one supposedly private container with an anonymous GET .../container?restype=container&comp=list (200 + XML listing = real exposure).
