adaptixc2-config-extractor

name	adaptixc2-config-extractor
description	Extract and decrypt AdaptixC2 beacon configurations from malware samples. Use this skill whenever analyzing C2 beacons, post-exploitation frameworks, or malware with embedded RC4-encrypted configs. Trigger on mentions of AdaptixC2, beacon extraction, C2 config parsing, RC4 decryption, or when investigating suspicious PE files with embedded configuration blobs.

AdaptixC2 Configuration Extraction

A forensic skill for extracting and analyzing AdaptixC2 beacon configurations from malware samples. AdaptixC2 is a modular post-exploitation/C2 framework that embeds RC4-encrypted configuration blobs in its beacons.

When to use this skill

Use this skill when:

• You have a suspected AdaptixC2 beacon (EXE/DLL/service) and need to extract its C2 configuration
• You're investigating malware with embedded encrypted configuration blobs
• You need to parse HTTP/SMB/TCP beacon profiles for threat hunting
• You're analyzing post-exploitation framework artifacts
• You want to extract network indicators (C2 servers, ports, URIs) from beacon samples

Quick start

# Extract config from a beacon file
python scripts/extract_adaptixc2_config.py beacon.exe

# Or extract from a pre-isolated blob
python scripts/extract_adaptixc2_config.py blob.bin --blob-mode

Configuration structure

AdaptixC2 embeds encrypted configuration as a tail blob in the beacon PE:

[4 bytes: size (uint32 LE)]
[N bytes: RC4-encrypted config]
[16 bytes: RC4 key]

The beacon loader reads this structure, extracts the key, and RC4-decrypts the config in place. The blob is typically located in the .rdata section.

Beacon profile types

HTTP Beacon

Most common profile type. Fields include:

Field	Type	Description
agent_type	u32	Agent identifier
use_ssl	bool	HTTPS vs HTTP
servers	array	C2 server addresses
ports	array	C2 ports
http_method	string	GET/POST
uri	string	Request path
parameter	string	Custom header name for beacon ID
user_agent	string	HTTP user agent
sleep_delay	u32	Beacon interval (seconds)
jitter_delay	u32	Randomization factor
kill_date	u32	Self-expiry timestamp
working_time	u32	Active hours window

SMB Beacon

Named-pipe peer-to-peer C2 for intranet environments. Uses similar structure with SMB-specific fields.

TCP Beacon

Direct socket communication, optionally with prepended marker bytes for obfuscation.

Extraction workflow

Step 1: Locate the blob

The encrypted config blob is typically in the PE .rdata section. Use the bundled script to scan for the [size|ciphertext|key] pattern:

python scripts/extract_adaptixc2_config.py sample.exe

The script will:

1. Parse the PE file
2. Scan .rdata for plausible blob layouts
3. Attempt RC4 decryption with candidate keys
4. Validate by checking if string fields decode as UTF-8
5. Output the decrypted configuration as JSON

Step 2: Parse the configuration

Once decrypted, the config follows a length-prefixed format:

• Scalars: u32/boolean values
• Strings: u32 length followed by bytes (may have trailing NUL)
• Arrays: count followed by that many elements

The script handles parsing automatically and outputs structured JSON.

Step 3: Extract indicators

From the parsed config, extract:

• C2 servers: servers array
• Ports: ports array
• URI paths: uri field
• Custom headers: parameter field (beacon ID header name)
• User agents: user_agent field
• Timing: sleep_delay, jitter_delay, kill_date, working_time

Network hunting indicators

HTTP C2

• Method: POST to operator-selected URIs (e.g., /uri.php, /endpoint/api)
• Custom header: Beacon ID in custom header (e.g., X-Beacon-Id, X-App-Id)
• User agents: Often Firefox 20 or contemporary Chrome builds
• Polling: Regular intervals based on sleep_delay with jitter_delay randomization

SMB/TCP C2

• SMB: Named-pipe listeners for intranet C2
• TCP: May prepend marker bytes to obfuscate protocol start

Common TTPs

In-memory loaders

• Download Base64/XOR payloads via Invoke-RestMethod or WebClient
• Allocate unmanaged memory, copy shellcode
• Change protection to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE (0x40) via VirtualProtect
• Execute via Marshal.GetDelegateForFunctionPointer + delegate invocation

Persistence mechanisms

• Startup folder: .lnk shortcuts to re-launch loaders at logon
• Registry Run keys: HKCU/HKLM\...\CurrentVersion\Run with benign names like "Updater"
• DLL hijacking: Dropping msimg32.dll under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Templates

Hunting queries

• PowerShell spawning RW→RX memory transitions (VirtualProtect to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
• Dynamic invocation patterns (GetDelegateForFunctionPointer)
• Startup .lnk files in user/common Startup folders
• Suspicious Run keys with names like "Updater", update.ps1, loader.ps1
• User-writable DLL paths containing msimg32.dll

Example output

{
  "agent_type": 3192652105,
  "use_ssl": true,
  "servers": ["tech-system[.]online"],
  "ports": [443],
  "http_method": "POST",
  "uri": "/endpoint/api",
  "parameter": "X-App-Id",
  "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36...",
  "sleep_delay": 4,
  "jitter_delay": 0,
  "kill_date": 0,
  "working_time": 0
}

YARA detection

Consider rules that look for:

• The [size|ciphertext|16-byte-key] layout near PE .rdata end
• Default HTTP profile strings (e.g., /uri.php, X-Beacon-Id)
• RC4 decryption function patterns
• Loader API-hashing constants

References

• AdaptixC2: A New Open-Source Framework Leveraged in Real-World Attacks (Unit 42)
• AdaptixC2 GitHub
• MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 – Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder