android-app-pentesting

name	android-app-pentesting
description	Android application security testing and vulnerability assessment. Use this skill whenever the user needs to analyze Android APKs, test for security vulnerabilities, enumerate components, exploit intents/deep links, or assess AIDL/Binder services. Trigger for any Android security testing, mobile pentesting, APK analysis, or Android vulnerability research tasks.

Android Application Pentesting

A comprehensive skill for security testing Android applications, from initial reconnaissance to exploitation of common vulnerabilities.

Quick Start

# Basic APK analysis
adb shell pm list packages -f | grep <package-name>

# Extract and analyze APK
adb pull /data/app/<package-name>/base.apk
apktool d base.apk -o <output-dir>

# List exported components
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 5 "exported"

Android Security Model

Core Concepts

UID Separation: Each app runs under a unique User ID. Apps can only access their own files or shared files. Only the app itself, OS components, and root can access app data.

Sandboxing: Android 5.0+ enforces SELinux, denying all process interactions by default and only allowing expected ones through policies.

Permissions: Declared in AndroidManifest.xml via <uses-permission> elements. Types:

• Normal: Auto-granted, no user approval needed
• Dangerous: Requires user approval, grants elevated access
• Signature: Only apps signed with same certificate
• SignatureOrSystem: Same certificate OR system-level access

Permission Analysis

# List app permissions
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "requested permissions"

# Check granted permissions
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "granted permissions"

APK Structure Analysis

Extract and Decompile

# Pull APK from device
adb pull /data/app/<package-name>/base.apk ./

# Decompile with apktool
apktool d base.apk -o decompiled/

# Extract resources
unzip -l base.apk | grep -E "(AndroidManifest|classes.dex|META-INF)"

Key Files to Analyze

File	Purpose	Security Relevance
AndroidManifest.xml	App configuration	Exported components, permissions, intent filters
classes.dex	Compiled code	Business logic, vulnerability patterns
META-INF/CERT.RSA	Certificate	App signing verification
lib/	Native libraries	Native code vulnerabilities
assets/	Additional files	Hidden code, malware

Smali Analysis

# Decompile DEX to Smali
dex2jar base.apk
jad-decompile classes-dex2jar.jar

# Or use apktool (includes smali)
apktool d base.apk -o decompiled/
# Smali code in decompiled/smali/

Component Enumeration

Activities

# List all activities
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "activities"

# Find exported activities
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep "exported=" | grep "true"

# Check intent filters
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 5 "intent-filter"

Services

# List services
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "services"

# Find exported services
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep "service.*exported"

# List running services
adb shell service list

Broadcast Receivers

# List receivers
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "receivers"

# Find exported receivers
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep "receiver.*exported"

Content Providers

# List providers
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 100 "providers"

# Check provider permissions
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 5 "provider"

Intent Vulnerability Testing

Implicit Intent Testing

# Test VIEW intent with custom scheme
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "<scheme>://<host>/<path>"

# Test SEND intent
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.SEND \
  -t "text/plain" \
  -e android.intent.extra.TEXT "test payload"

Deep Link Exploitation

# Generic implicit VIEW (custom scheme)
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "<scheme>://<host>/<path>?param=value"

# Explicitly target specific Activity
adb shell am start -n <package>/<Activity> \
  -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "<scheme>://<host>/<path>"

# Test javascript: payload (if scheme validation is weak)
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "<scheme>://<host>/web?url=javascript:alert(1)"

Deep Link Discovery

# Find exported activities with VIEW + BROWSABLE
grep -r "android.intent.action.VIEW" decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml
grep -r "android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml

# Extract custom schemes
grep -oP 'android:scheme="\K[^"]+' decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml

Common Deep Link Attack Vectors

1. Open Redirect: myapp://host/path?redirect=https://attacker.tld
2. Auth Bypass: myapp://host/login?token=<malicious-token>
3. WebView Injection: myapp://host/web?url=javascript:alert(1)
4. Parameter Pollution: myapp://host/action?param=value&param=malicious

AIDL/Binder Service Testing

Service Discovery

# List all running services
adb shell service list
adb shell am list services

# Output format:
# 145  mtkconnmetrics: [com.mediatek.net.connectivity.IMtkIpConnectivityMetrics]
# 146  wifi             : [android.net.wifi.IWifiManager]

Service PING (Interface Check)

# Transaction code 0x5f4e5446 (1598968902) returns interface name
adb shell service call <service-name> 1

# Valid response returns interface name as UTF-16 string

Transaction Calling

# Syntax: service call <name> <code> [type value ...]
# Types: i32 <int>, i64 <long>, s16 <string>

# Example: call transaction 8 with int parameter 1
adb shell service call mtkconnmetrics 8 i32 1

Brute-Force Method Discovery

# Iterate transaction codes to find valid methods
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
    printf "[+] %2d -> " $i
    adb shell service call <service-name> $i 2>/dev/null | head -1
done

Method Mapping via onTransact()

# Decompile service implementation
dex2jar <service-jar>

# Search for onTransact switch statement
grep -A 100 "onTransact" <decompiled-class>

# Look for:
case TRANSACTION_methodName:  // code
    data.enforceInterface(DESCRIPTOR);
    int param = data.readInt();
    methodName(param);
    reply.writeNoException();
    return true;

Permission Check Analysis

# Look for missing permission checks in service implementation
grep -B 5 -A 10 "updateCtaAppStatus\|startMonitor\|privileged" <smali-file>

# Vulnerable pattern (no permission check):
private void updateCtaAppStatus(int uid, boolean status) {
    // No permission check - VULNERABLE
    /* privileged code */
}

# Secure pattern:
private void updateCtaAppStatus(int uid, boolean status) {
    if (!isPermissionAllowed()) {
        throw new SecurityException("uid " + uid + " rejected");
    }
    /* privileged code */
}

Content Provider Testing

Provider Enumeration

# List all providers for app
adb shell dumpsys package <package-name> | grep -A 20 "provider"

# Check read/write permissions
grep -A 5 "<provider" decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml

Provider Access Testing

# Query provider
adb shell content query --uri "content://<authority>/<path>"

# Insert test data
adb shell content insert --uri "content://<authority>/<path>" \
  --bind "column1:string:value1"

# Update data
adb shell content update --uri "content://<authority>/<path>" \
  --bind "column1:string:newvalue" \
  --selection "column2=?" --selection-arg "value2"

# Delete data
adb shell content delete --uri "content://<authority>/<path>" \
  --selection "column=?" --selection-arg "value"

SQL Injection Testing

# Test in selection parameter
adb shell content query --uri "content://<authority>/<path>" \
  --selection "1=1 OR 1=1"

# Test in projection
grep -r "projection" decompiled/smali/ | grep -v "projectionMap"

WebView Security Testing

WebView Configuration Analysis

# Find WebView usage
grep -r "WebView" decompiled/smali/

# Check JavaScript enabled
grep -r "setJavaScriptEnabled" decompiled/smali/

# Check file access
grep -r "setAllowFileAccess" decompiled/smali/

# Check content access
grep -r "setAllowContentAccess" decompiled/smali/

JavaScript Bridge Testing

# Find @JavascriptInterface methods
grep -r "@JavascriptInterface" decompiled/smali/

# Test bridge injection
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "<scheme>://<host>/web?callback=javascript:alert(1)"

Pre-Installed App Analysis

System App Discovery

# List system apps
adb shell pm list packages -s

# List privileged apps
adb shell pm list packages -3

# Check /system/app and /system/priv-app
adb shell ls -la /system/app/
adb shell ls -la /system/priv-app/

Permission Analysis for System Apps

# Check if system app has excessive permissions
adb shell dumpsys package <system-package> | grep -A 100 "requested permissions"

# Look for apps with root-level permissions
grep -r "android.permission.*ROOT\|android.permission.*SYSTEM" decompiled/AndroidManifest.xml

Digital Signature Analysis

Certificate Extraction

# Extract certificate from APK
unzip -p base.apk META-INF/CERT.RSA > cert.pem

# View certificate details
keytool -printcert -file cert.pem

# Check signing key
apksigner verify --print-certs base.apk

Signature Verification

# Verify APK signature
apksigner verify base.apk

# Check for multiple signatures (indicates tampering)
keytool -printcert -jarfile base.apk

Common Vulnerability Patterns

1. Exported Components Without Permission

<!-- VULNERABLE: Exported without permission -->
<activity android:name=".SensitiveActivity" android:exported="true" />

<!-- SECURE: Exported with permission -->
<activity android:name=".SensitiveActivity" 
          android:exported="true"
          android:permission="com.example.CUSTOM_PERMISSION" />

2. Weak Intent Filter Validation

// VULNERABLE: Weak validation
if (uri.toString().contains("myapp://")) {
    // Process intent
}

// SECURE: Strict validation
if (uri.getScheme().equals("myapp") && 
    uri.getHost().equals("secure")) {
    // Process intent
}

3. Insecure Content Provider

<!-- VULNERABLE: No write permission -->
<provider android:name=".MyProvider"
          android:exported="true"
          android:readPermission="com.example.READ"
          android:writePermission="" />

<!-- SECURE: Both permissions defined -->
<provider android:name=".MyProvider"
          android:exported="true"
          android:readPermission="com.example.READ"
          android:writePermission="com.example.WRITE" />

4. Sticky Broadcasts

// VULNERABLE: Sticky broadcast (deprecated, data sniffable)
sendStickyBroadcast(intent);

// SECURE: Use LocalBroadcastManager
LocalBroadcastManager.getInstance(context).sendBroadcast(intent);

Testing Workflow

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

1. Pull APK from device
2. Decompile with apktool
3. Analyze AndroidManifest.xml
4. List all exported components
5. Document permissions

Phase 2: Component Testing

1. Test each exported Activity with various intents
2. Test each exported Service
3. Test each exported Broadcast Receiver
4. Test each Content Provider

Phase 3: Deep Link Testing

1. Enumerate all custom schemes
2. Test each scheme with various payloads
3. Check for open redirects
4. Test for auth bypass
5. Test WebView injection

Phase 4: AIDL/Binder Testing

1. List all running services
2. PING each service to get interface
3. Brute-force transaction codes
4. Map methods via onTransact()
5. Test for missing permission checks

Phase 5: Reporting

1. Document all findings
2. Provide PoC for each vulnerability
3. Suggest remediation steps
4. Prioritize by severity

Tools Reference

Tool	Purpose	Command
apktool	APK decompilation	apktool d app.apk -o out/
dex2jar	DEX to JAR conversion	dex2jar classes.dex
jadx	DEX to Java decompilation	jadx -d out/ app.apk
adb	Android Debug Bridge	adb shell
am	Activity Manager	am start -a ACTION
service	Service management	service list
content	Content provider access	content query --uri
Deep-C	Deep link automation	deep-C --apk app.apk
binder-scanner	AIDL service scanning	python binder-scanner.py

Security Checklist

• All exported components have appropriate permissions
• Intent filters use strict validation
• No sticky broadcasts in use
• Content providers have both read and write permissions
• WebView has JavaScript disabled (if not needed)
• WebView has file access disabled
• No hardcoded secrets in code
• Proper certificate pinning for network calls
• Sensitive data encrypted at rest
• No debug mode enabled in production

References

• Android Developer Docs - Security
• Android Developer Docs - Intents
• Android Developer Docs - Content Providers
• Android Developer Docs - AIDL
• OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide
• Deep-C - Android deep link exploitation
• binder-scanner - AIDL service scanner