android-tapjacking-test

name	android-tapjacking-test
description	Test Android applications for tapjacking vulnerabilities. Use this skill whenever you're doing Android app security testing, pentesting, or analyzing exported activities for clickjacking risks. Trigger when the user mentions tapjacking, clickjacking, overlay attacks, exported activities, or Android UI security testing.

Android Tapjacking Testing

A skill for detecting and testing tapjacking vulnerabilities in Android applications.

What is Tapjacking

Tapjacking is an attack where a malicious application positions itself on top of a victim application, tricking users into interacting with the victim app while believing they're interacting with the overlay. This effectively blinds users to their actual actions.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

• Testing Android apps for UI security vulnerabilities
• Analyzing exported activities in Android manifests
• Investigating overlay-based attack vectors
• Reviewing Android app security posture
• Preparing penetration test reports for Android applications

Detection Workflow

Step 1: Analyze the Android Manifest

Check for exported activities that could be vulnerable:

# Extract and analyze the manifest
unzip -p app.apk AndroidManifest.xml | grep -A 5 "<activity"

Look for:

• Activities with intent-filter (exported by default)
• Activities without android:exported="false"
• Activities protected only by custom permissions

Step 2: Check Minimum SDK Version

# Check minSdkVersion in manifest
unzip -p app.apk AndroidManifest.xml | grep "minSdkVersion"

Risk assessment:

• minSdkVersion < 30: Higher risk (older default behaviors)
• minSdkVersion >= 31: Android 12+ has default blocking

Step 3: Runtime Detection (Android 12+)

Monitor for blocked touches during testing:

# Watch for occlusion warnings
adb logcat | grep -i "untrusted touch\|occlusion"

Look for: Untrusted touch due to occlusion by <package>

Step 4: Check for Protection Flags

Search the decompiled code for protection mechanisms:

# Check for filterTouchesWhenObscured
strings app.apk | grep -i "filterTouchesWhenObscured"

# Check for onFilterTouchEventForSecurity override
strings app.apk | grep -i "onFilterTouchEventForSecurity"

Exploitation Testing

Using Tapjacking-ExportedActivity Tool

The most recent tool for testing exported activity tapjacking:

1. Clone the repository:

   git clone https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity
   

2. Build and install the test APK

3. Run against the target app's exported activities

Manual Testing Approach

1. Identify target activities from manifest analysis
2. Create overlay app with transparent or semi-transparent UI
3. Position overlay to match target UI elements
4. Test touch forwarding to verify vulnerability

Testing Android 12+ Bypass

Android 12 blocks overlays with opacity ≥0.8. Test bypass:

# Disable blocking for PoC testing (requires root/adb)
adb shell am compat disable BLOCK_UNTRUSTED_TOUCHES com.example.victim

# Re-enable after testing
adb shell am compat reset BLOCK_UNTRUSTED_TOUCHES com.example.victim

Protection Recommendations

For Developers

1. Set filterTouchesWhenObscured on sensitive views:

   <Button android:text="Confirm"
           android:filterTouchesWhenObscured="true"
           ... />
   

2. Override onFilterTouchEventForSecurity in activities:

   @Override
   public boolean onFilterTouchEventForSecurity(MotionEvent event) {
       if ((event.getFlags() & MotionEvent.FLAG_WINDOW_IS_PARTIALLY_OBSCURED) != 0) {
           return false; // Drop tap when partially obscured
       }
       return super.onFilterTouchEventForSecurity(event);
   }
   

3. Use FLAG_SECURE for sensitive screens:

   getWindow().setFlags(
       WindowManager.LayoutParams.FLAG_SECURE,
       WindowManager.LayoutParams.FLAG_SECURE
   );
   

4. Android 14+: Set android:accessibilityDataSensitive="accessibilityDataPrivateYes" on sensitive views

For Security Teams

1. Audit exported activities in all app releases
2. Test with overlay tools before production
3. Monitor for accessibility service abuse in production apps
4. Review minSdkVersion and update if below 30

Modern Threat Context

Recent Malware Techniques

• Hook/Ermac variants: Use alpha < 0.8 overlays to bypass Android 12 blocking
• Anatsa/TeaBot: Full-screen "maintenance" overlays with ATS automation
• Hidden-VNC RATs: Brief phishing overlays + covert VNC for replay

Accessibility Overlay Phishing

Modern banking trojans (ToxicPanda, BrasDex, Sova) use:

1. BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE permission
2. TYPE_ACCESSIBILITY_OVERLAY windows
3. WebView overlays with touch forwarding
4. FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE | FLAG_NOT_TOUCH_MODAL flags

Detection Commands

# Check for apps with accessibility service
adb shell pm list packages -3 -e | grep -i accessibility

# List apps with BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE
adb shell pm list packages -3 -e BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE

Reporting

When documenting findings:

1. Vulnerability: Tapjacking / Clickjacking
2. CVSS Vector: Consider UI manipulation, data exposure, action hijacking
3. Affected Activities: List specific exported activities
4. Proof of Concept: Include overlay app or tool output
5. Remediation: Reference protection recommendations above

References

• Android Developers – Tapjacking risk & mitigations
• Tapjacking-ExportedActivity Tool
• FloatingWindowApp Example
• Qark Security Scanner