| name | ai-security |
| description | Runs security gates: SAST with OWASP/CWE mapping, dependency vulnerability scans, secret detection, SBOM generation for compliance, pre-release security verdict. Trigger for 'is this secure', 'audit dependencies', 'check for secrets', 'security report', 'is this package safe', 'compliance review'. Not for governance process; use /ai-governance instead. Not for runtime payload inspection; use prompt-injection-guard hook instead. Not for code quality metrics; use /ai-verify quality instead. |
| effort | mid |
| argument-hint | all|static|deps|secrets|sbom|--fix |
| tags | ["security","sast","dependencies","sbom","owasp","enterprise"] |
| requires | {"anyBins":["cdxgen","pip-audit"],"bins":["gitleaks","semgrep"]} |
| model_tier | sonnet |
| mirror_family | antigravity-skills |
| generated_by | ai-eng sync |
| canonical_source | .claude/skills/ai-security/SKILL.md |
| edit_policy | generated-do-not-edit |
Security Scanning
Quick start
/ai-security all # full sweep: static + deps + secrets (aggregated report)
/ai-security static # SAST only (semgrep)
/ai-security deps # dependency audit only
/ai-security secrets # gitleaks scan
/ai-security sbom # CycloneDX SBOM for compliance
/ai-security deps --fix # audit + auto-fix where safe
Unified security assessment for regulated industries. Zero tolerance for medium+ findings. Each finding carries severity, location, fix suggestion, and CWE reference.
Workflow
Principles applied: §10.2 YAGNI (every dependency and exposed endpoint is attack surface — the smallest surface is the safest).
Step 0 — load contexts: read .ai-engineering/manifest.yml providers.stacks; load .ai-engineering/overrides/<stack>/conventions.md per stack + .ai-engineering/overrides/_shared/conventions.md; load .ai-engineering/team/*.md.
all (default) runs static -> deps -> secrets in sequence and emits one aggregated report. Per-mode procedure:
- static (SAST) — run
gitleaks detect --source . --no-git (any finding critical; full-repo scan, distinct from the pre-commit gitleaks protect --staged); run semgrep scan --config auto --json (parse rule IDs, severity, CWE); manual review of what tools miss — auth on every endpoint (A01), parameterized queries only (A03), secrets from env/vault never hardcoded (A02), HTTP security headers (A05), no user-controlled URLs in HTTP clients (A10); classify severity + OWASP per finding.
- deps — identify lock files (
uv.lock / package-lock.json / Cargo.lock / *.csproj) from providers.stacks; run Python uv run python -m ai_engineering.verify.tls_pip_audit --strict --desc, Node npm audit --json, Rust cargo audit --json; mark unreachable paths reduced-severity with justification; report upgrade paths.
- secrets —
gitleaks detect --source . --no-git --report-format json (full) + gitleaks protect --staged --no-banner (staged); per finding: file, line, rule, remediation (rotate credential, move to vault).
- sbom —
cdxgen -o sbom.json --spec-version 1.5 (CycloneDX JSON); validate every direct dep has version + license + package URL; flag copyleft (GPL/AGPL) conflicting with the project license.
--fix — secrets: remove from source, add to .gitignore, warn to rotate; deps: pip install --upgrade <pkg> for fixable vulns; lint: semgrep --autofix where rules support it; report what was fixed vs what needs manual work.
Severity Classification
| Severity | Definition | Gate Impact |
|---|
| Blocker | Actively exploitable, breach imminent | Blocks release |
| Critical | High-impact, exploit feasible | Blocks release |
| Major | Significant risk, requires conditions | Resolve before next release |
| Minor | Low risk, defense-in-depth | Resolve during maintenance |
Output Contract
# Security Report: [mode]
## Score: N/100
## Verdict: PASS (>=80) | WARN (60-79) | FAIL (<60)
## Findings
| # | Severity | OWASP | CWE | Description | Location | Fix |
|---|----------|-------|-----|-------------|----------|-----|
## Tool Outputs
- gitleaks: [N findings / clean]
- semgrep: [N findings / clean]
- pip-audit: [N findings / clean]
Common Mistakes
- Suppressing findings with
# nosec — fix the root cause or use risk acceptance.
- Ignoring transitive dependency vulns — they are still exploitable.
- Running
gitleaks detect on the full repo for pre-commit — use gitleaks protect --staged.
Examples
Example — pre-merge security sweep
User: "is this PR secure to merge?"
/ai-security all
Runs SAST + deps + secrets (+ optional SBOM), scores against the gate, and emits PASS / WARN / FAIL with a fix hint per finding.
Integration
Called by: /ai-verify (security mode delegation), /ai-verify --release (aggregates results), pre-commit hooks (gitleaks protect --staged), pre-push hooks (semgrep, pip-audit). Risk acceptances go to decision-store.json via /ai-governance risk. See also: /ai-governance, /ai-mcp-audit (skill behavior), /ai-pipeline (CI security), /ai-schema (DB schema/injection review).
References
- Per-stack security minimums:
.ai-engineering/overrides/<stack>/security_floor.md.
.ai-engineering/overrides/_shared/security_floor.md — cross-stack security floor..ai-engineering/manifest.yml — non-negotiables and gate thresholds..ai-engineering/reference/semgrep-update-model.md — two-tier Semgrep scan + manual version-bump model.
$ARGUMENTS
