- name
- bloodhound-bhce
- description
- Operate BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 via Decepticon's bhce_* tools — health check, Cypher passthrough, SharpHound ZIP ingest. Replaces the in-house ingest + ESC* post-process pipeline per ADR-0005.
- metadata
- {"subdomain":"active-directory","when_to_use":"bloodhound bhce attack path adcs esc dcsync sharphound ingest cypher ad enumeration domain compromise","mitre_attack":["T1078.002","T1558.003","T1649","T1003.006"],"upstream_url":"https://bloodhound.specterops.io/"}
# BloodHound CE via Decepticon's `bhce_*` Tools
Decepticon ships a sidecar BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 stack
(see `docs/adr/0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md`). Three
`@tool` wrappers expose it to the agent:
| tool | what it does |
|---|---|
| `bhce_status` | Confirm BHCE is healthy and our HMAC token authenticates. Always call this first when an AD task starts. |
| `bhce_cypher` | Run any Cypher query against BHCE's graph. Mutations are off by default. |
| `bhce_ingest_zip` | Push a SharpHound `.zip` into BHCE — 3-step `file-upload` flow + polling until BHCE finishes parse + ESC* analysis. |
Use these instead of the legacy `bh_ingest_zip` / `dcsync_check` /
`delegation_audit` / `gpo_audit` / `adcs_audit` family — those are
the in-house port and are being retired per ADR-0005.
## Why we use BHCE rather than our own ingest
BHCE's `PostProcessedRelationships` Go pipeline emits every edge a
red-team operator expects: `ADCSESC1-13`, `GoldenCert`, `DCSync`,
`TrustedForNTAuth`, `IssuedSignedBy`, `CoerceAndRelayNTLMTo*`,
`HasSIDHistory`, `HasTrustKeys`, `SyncLAPSPassword`, … The list is in
`graphschema/ad/ad.go::PostProcessedRelationships()` in the BHCE
source. We deliberately do **not** re-implement these in our
codebase; the agent leans on BHCE's analyzer instead.
The Decepticon KGStore still owns web, cloud, and smart-contract
findings, and stays canonical for cross-domain chain planning.
BHCE is the AD layer.
## End-to-end loop the agent should follow
1. **Health check** — `bhce_status()`. Verify `version.data.server_version` matches the deployed v9.2.2 and `self.data.principal_name` is non-empty. If the diagnostic mentions `BHCE_URL` / `BHCE_TOKEN_*`, the sidecar is offline or the token has been revoked — stop and report.
2. **Ingest** — for every SharpHound collection drop:
```
bhce_ingest_zip(path="/abs/path/to/20260605_lab.zip")
```
Expected result envelope: `{job_id, terminal_status, last_payload, elapsed_seconds}`. `terminal_status` must be one of
`Complete`, `PartiallyComplete`, `Failed`, `Cancelled`. Anything else
(an `error` field, missing terminal_status) means BHCE never closed
the job — surface the error to the operator rather than continuing
with stale data.
3. **Walk the graph** with `bhce_cypher`. Some battle-tested starting
queries (BHCE node labels — `User`, `Computer`, `Group`, `Domain`,
`GPO`, `OU`, `CertTemplate`, `EnterpriseCA`, `RootCA`, `AIACA`,
`NTAuthStore`, `IssuancePolicy`):
- **All Domain Admins** (sanity check that ingest landed):
```cypher
MATCH (g:Group)
WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-512'
MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g)
RETURN n.name, labels(n)
```
- **Shortest path from a foothold to a Tier-Zero asset**:
```cypher
MATCH p = shortestPath(
(n {objectid: $foothold_sid})-[*1..15]->(t {system_tags: 'admin_tier_0'})
)
RETURN p
```
- **ADCS escalation paths** (BHCE post-processes ESC* edges, so the
agent never has to derive them):
```cypher
MATCH p = (u {objectid: $foothold_sid})
-[:MemberOf|ADCSESC1|ADCSESC3|ADCSESC4|ADCSESC6a|ADCSESC6b|
ADCSESC9a|ADCSESC9b|ADCSESC10a|ADCSESC10b|ADCSESC13|
Enroll|AutoEnroll|GenericAll*1..10]->
(t:Domain)
RETURN p LIMIT 10
```
- **GoldenCert opportunities** (CA + NTAuthStore + Domain triangle):
```cypher
MATCH (ca:EnterpriseCA)-[:TrustedForNTAuth]->(:NTAuthStore)
MATCH (ca)-[:GoldenCert]->(d:Domain)
RETURN ca.name, d.name
```
- **DCSync candidates**:
```cypher
MATCH (n)-[:DCSync]->(d:Domain)
RETURN n.name, labels(n), d.name
```
4. **Cross-domain plays** — when an AD path terminates and the chain
needs to cross into the Decepticon KGStore (web exploitation, cloud
pivots, smart-contract findings), hand the BHCE finding off to the
chain planner. Do not try to write web/cloud nodes into BHCE; BHCE
is AD-only.
## Common failure modes
- **`bhce_status` returns a `BHCE_URL` diagnostic** — the sidecar
isn't running (`docker compose up -d bhce-neo4j bhce`) or the
agent's environment is missing `BHCE_TOKEN_ID` / `BHCE_TOKEN_KEY`.
- **`bhce_cypher` returns 401 `signature digest mismatch`** — clock
skew. BHCE enforces ±1 hour (`cmd/api/src/api/auth.go:276-296`).
Check the container time before opening a wider investigation.
- **`bhce_ingest_zip` reports `terminal_status: Failed`** — the ZIP
is corrupt or BHCE rejected an unknown JSON schema version
(`meta.version`). Look in `last_payload` for the BHCE-side reason.
- **An expected ADCS edge is missing after ingest** — BHCE only
derives ESC* / GoldenCert / DCSync at analysis time, which runs
after ingest closes. Wait for `terminal_status` (the tool already
polls until terminal) rather than re-running cypher in a busy loop.
## Where authoritative information lives
- **BHCE source code**: `github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound` (current
release v9.2.2, 2026-06-01). This is the single source of truth
for every edge, post-process algorithm, and Cypher passthrough
guard. When the upstream changes the schema, the agent's queries
here have to follow.
- **Official BHCE REST API spec**: shipped at
`packages/go/openapi/src/openapi.yaml` in the BHCE repo, also
reachable at runtime via `GET /api/v2/spec` on the sidecar.
- **SpecterOps documentation site**:
https://bloodhound.specterops.io — official methodology, AD / Azure
/ ADCS guides, and the canonical attack-path query library.
Consult it directly for novel attack patterns; we deliberately
avoid vendoring it here so the agent always reads the latest.
- **ADR**: `docs/adr/0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md` — why
the agent talks to a sidecar BHCE instead of using the in-house
port that PRs #560..#578 built.
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