lisa-sentry-access

name	lisa-sentry-access
description	Vendor-neutral access layer for…
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Skill"]

Sentry Access: $ARGUMENTS

Single chokepoint for Sentry operations. Caller skills MUST NOT call mcp__sentry__*, sentry-cli, or https://sentry.io/api/ directly.

Invocation Contract

operation: list-issues org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT> query:<QUERY> [environment:<ENV>]
operation: get-issue issue_id:<ID>
operation: events org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT> query:<QUERY>
operation: releases org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT>

Return parsed JSON in a <result> block.

Substrate Selection

Probe in order — the ordering is the shared credential-substrate-precedence contract, not a Sentry-local choice. The first tier that is ready and identity-matches the configured org/project is used; a substrate authenticated against a different org is skipped, never used.

1. Tier 1 — configured-provider substrate: SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN bearer token against Sentry REST, resolved through lisa-secrets-access.
2. Tier 1a — sentry-cli, if installed and authenticated to the requested org/project from that same token (the CLI arm of the provider substrate).
3. Tier 2 — interactive MCP fallback: Sentry MCP, if available and authenticated. Used when tier 1 is genuinely unavailable: no SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN, no REST/CLI adapter for the operation, or a Sentry outage.

Sentry documents API auth tokens for REST API calls, and the same token works interactively and headlessly — which is why it leads. The REST tier uses:

# Resolve the token through the chokepoint before giving up on the environment.
# `$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` is the documented fallback, not the only rung: without
# this, a project that keeps its credentials in Bitwarden, Doppler, or AWS has
# no tier 1 path at all and silently resolves through the interactive MCP —
# the exact divergence `credential-substrate-precedence` exists to remove.
# Mirrors `linear-access`, `atlassian-access`, and `notion-access`.
read_sentry_token() {
  [ -n "${SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN:-}" ] && { echo "$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"; return; }
  #
  # Ordered across trusted machine-managed substrates, ending at the installed
  # package. Checkout-local paths are deliberately absent: a familiar generated
  # destination is still repository-controlled executable code. The plugin
  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
  # Execute only machine-managed plugin/package resolvers. Checkout-local
  # candidates are repository-controlled code, not trusted merely by path.
  local candidates=()
  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
    candidates+=()
  
   [ -n  ]; 
    candidates+=()
  
  
  
  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)

   resolver
   tried=()
   resolver  ; 
    tried+=()
     [ -f  ]; 
       via_lisa
      via_lisa=$(node  get SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \
        && [ -n  ] && {  ; ; }
      
    
  
  
  
  
  
    >&2
    >&2
     >&2
   1
}

() {
   path=
   token
  token=$(read_sentry_token) || {
      >&2
      >&2
     1
  }
  curl -sS  \
    -H 
}

Tier 1a authenticates sentry-cli from the same resolved token (SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=$(read_sentry_token) sentry-cli …) — never from a second credential store, and never from an interactive sentry-cli login keychain.

If neither tier works, fail with:

Error: no Sentry access substrate available. Authenticate Sentry MCP/CLI or set SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN.

Mutation boundary

Every operation in the Invocation Contract is read-only — issue, event, and release retrieval. So the credential-substrate-precedence guarded fallback for mutating operations (write, read back, assert the tenant from the response, roll back on mismatch) is not engaged here, and a failed tier is simply skipped. Any future operation that mutates Sentry state — resolving an issue, editing a release — is a write and MUST reconcile by read-back under that protocol before any retry; do not add one to the contract without it.

Invariants

• Tier order is credential-substrate-precedence: SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN first, the Sentry MCP as a preserved first-class fallback. Identity-match against the configured org/project is mandatory on every tier.
• The token is resolved through lisa-secrets-access, with the bare SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN environment variable as the documented fallback. Never read a second credential store (OS keychain, ~/.sentryclirc token) directly — the one-store rule lives at the chokepoint.
• Org/project come from .sentryclirc, .lisa.config.json, or explicit operation args; never infer by searching all accessible orgs.
• Consumer skills do not embed Sentry REST paths.