| name | windiff-version-diff-analysis |
| description | Generate and interpret security-research diffs between Windows versions or patch levels using this repo's WinDiff CLI and databases. Use when comparing Windows builds or binaries such as ntoskrnl.exe, ntdll.dll, win32k*.sys, ci.dll, or cng.sys to find changed syscalls, symbols, types, mitigation flags, callbacks, ETW/EtwTi telemetry, code-integrity behavior, drivers, or attack surface. Explain likely intent and security relevance with Windows-internals knowledge, and frame findings for anti-malware/EDR, anti-cheat, and vulnerability-research audiences rather than returning an uninterpreted symbol list. |
WinDiff Version Diff Analysis
Compare two Windows builds and turn the raw symbol/type/syscall delta into a
security-research report: what was added, what it probably does, and why it
matters for attack surface, exploitation, or defense.
Run this skill from a WinDiff repository checkout. It uses windiff_cli to
generate the per-binary JSON databases, then diffs and interprets them. The
interpretation is the point: explain intent from Windows internals conventions
instead of merely listing symbols.
Locate bundled resources
Resolve all scripts/ and references/ paths relative to this SKILL.md, not
relative to the current working directory and not through a harness-specific
directory such as .claude/ or .agents/. Before running a bundled script, set
SKILL_DIR to the absolute directory containing this file. The examples below
assume that has been done:
SKILL_DIR="<absolute directory containing this SKILL.md>"
If separate shell-tool calls do not share environment, substitute that absolute
path for $SKILL_DIR in each command instead of relying on prior shell state.
Also identify the repository root (the directory containing windiff_cli/,
windiff_frontend/, and ci/) and run repository commands from there. Keep
generated configs, databases, and analysis artifacts under its git-ignored
local/ directory.
Workflow
1. Pin down scope
Establish, asking the user only if genuinely ambiguous:
- Two OS versions as WinDiff triples
version / update / architecture
(e.g. 21H2 / BASE / amd64 and 11-24H2 / KB5074105 / amd64). update is
BASE for an RTM image or a KB... number for a patch. The path suffix used
in filenames is version_update_architecture, e.g. 11-24H2_KB5074105_amd64.
- Binaries to compare. Default to the security-relevant core when the user is
vague:
ntoskrnl.exe, ntdll.dll, win32k.sys, win32kbase.sys,
win32kfull.sys, ci.dll, cng.sys. Read
$SKILL_DIR/references/windows-components.md for what each one governs.
- Focus: syscalls, mitigation flags, new attack surface, a specific
component/feature, etc. This steers interpretation, not data generation.
ci/db_configuration.json is the canonical list of tracked versions and binaries
— consult it for valid version/update spellings.
2. Generate the databases with windiff_cli
Write a minimal config containing only the two OS versions and the chosen
binaries, then run the CLI into a scratch output dir (keep it under the repo's
git-ignored local/). Use $SKILL_DIR/scripts/make_config.py to build the
config:
python3 "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/make_config.py" \
--os "21H2:BASE:amd64" --os "11-24H2:KB5074105:amd64" \
--binary ntoskrnl.exe --binary ntdll.dll --binary win32k.sys --binary ci.dll \
> local/windiff_diff_config.json
cd windiff_cli
cargo run --release -- --low-storage-mode \
../local/windiff_diff_config.json ../local/windiff_diff_out/
This downloads PEs from Winbindex and PDBs from MSDL, so it needs network
access and takes minutes per binary. Follow the active harness's normal
permission or approval flow for networked commands. --low-storage-mode keeps
memory bounded. If the CLI fails for one OS (a build may be missing from
Winbindex), report which version/update is unavailable and suggest the nearest
tracked one from ci/db_configuration.json.
If the user says the databases already exist (e.g. in windiff_frontend/public/),
skip generation and point the diff script at that directory instead.
3. Diff each binary
$SKILL_DIR/scripts/windiff_diff.py does the deterministic set/text diff so you
never hand-compute it. Run it per binary; it prints a summary to stderr and
structured JSON to stdout.
python3 "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/windiff_diff.py" \
local/windiff_diff_out ntoskrnl.exe 21H2_BASE_amd64 11-24H2_KB5074105_amd64 \
> local/diff_ntoskrnl.json
Use --list to see available suffixes, --kinds to restrict (e.g.
--kinds syscalls types). Anonymous _unnamed_0xNNNN types are hidden from the
top-level added/removed/modified lists by default (their synthetic ids churn
between builds — noise); pass --include-anon only if you specifically need them.
resolved_member_changes — where new mitigation flags actually show up.
Bitfields like _EPROCESS::MitigationFlagsValues, MitigationFlags2Values, or
_KPROCESS flag words are typed as anonymous _unnamed_0xNNNN structs, and the
individual bits (e.g. RedirectionTrustPolicyEnabled : 1) live inside them. When
Microsoft adds a mitigation, a new bit appears in that anonymous struct — and its
synthetic id churns, so a naive diff would either hide it or show it as noise. The
script resolves this for you: the types.resolved_member_changes array follows
each anonymous member back to its named parent (across the id change) and reports
the real per-member delta as <parent>::<member> with the added/removed
declarations. This is the first place to look for new mitigation bits and other
new bitfield flags — e.g. a new bit under _EPROCESS::MitigationFlags2Values, or
a new _KALPC_MESSAGE::u1::s1 flag. Resolution recurses through nested anonymous
structs/unions, so the path may be several :: levels deep.
Noise to discount when reading the output:
- The script already strips
modified lines that differ only by an anonymous type
id, and folds genuine anonymous-struct changes into resolved_member_changes.
What remains in modified is real: renamed/added named fields, size changes, new
enum values. Still sanity-check against resolved_member_changes for the bits.
- Exports differing only by ordinal/decoration are usually not meaningful.
- Syscall renumbering with no name change is a rebuild artifact (see
$SKILL_DIR/references/windows-internals.md §3).
4. Interpret with Windows internals knowledge — the core of the analysis
For every meaningful addition, infer what it is and why it matters. Do not
just relay names. Read $SKILL_DIR/references/windows-internals.md for the
reasoning toolkit: API prefixes
(Nt/Zw/Ps/Ke/Mm/Ob/Se/Cm/Alpc/Etw/Ci/Bcrypt), naming
patterns for mitigations, the structures where security flags live
(_PS_MITIGATION_OPTIONS, _KPROCESS/_EPROCESS flag bitfields,
_SEP_TOKEN_*, CI policy structs), and — equally important — the
non-mitigation security surface: kernel notification/callback registration,
ETW providers and the EtwTi threat-intelligence channel, ELAM/AMSI, PPL and
anti-tamper, minifilter hooks, and entirely new drivers/modules. Read
$SKILL_DIR/references/windows-components.md for per-binary roles.
Mitigations are only one of several things worth surfacing. Cast a wide net for
any new security-relevant feature or component and frame it for whichever of
these audiences it serves — $SKILL_DIR/references/windows-internals.md §7 maps
the signals:
- Anti-malware / EDR developers — new ETW providers/events (especially
EtwTi* / Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence), new Ps/Ob/Cm
notification callbacks, AMSI/ELAM, scanning/notification hooks: new visibility
they can consume, or blind spots Microsoft closed.
- Anti-cheat developers — process protection (PPL signers), anti-tamper,
handle/object hardening, integrity and VBS/HVCI surface, registry/handle
monitoring: primitives for protecting a game or detecting cheats.
- Vulnerability researchers — new syscalls/IOCTLs, new parsing surface, new
drivers/components, widened structs, callback registration reachable from low
privilege: fresh attack surface and exploit primitives (added or removed).
For each finding, aim to state: the prefix/component it belongs to, the subsystem
it touches, a concrete hypothesis about the feature/mitigation/component it
implements, the security angle (new attack surface, hardening, telemetry, exploit
primitive added/removed), and which audience(s) should care and why. Flag
uncertainty honestly — "likely", "consistent with" — and suggest how a researcher
could confirm (reverse the routine, check public symbols, diff the disassembly).
5. Write the report
Use the structure in $SKILL_DIR/references/report-template.md. Lead with the
highest-signal security findings (new syscalls, mitigation flags, new
ETW/callback surface, new components), not an alphabetical dump. Group related
symbols by component and feature. Every nontrivial item gets an interpretation,
not just a name, and a note on which audience (EDR / anti-cheat / vuln research)
it matters to. The report includes a dedicated section for security-relevant
features and components beyond mitigations so EDR and anti-cheat findings aren't
buried.
Quick reference
$SKILL_DIR/scripts/make_config.py — build a minimal WinDiff config for the
two versions
$SKILL_DIR/scripts/windiff_diff.py — diff one binary across two OS suffixes
(JSON + summary)
$SKILL_DIR/references/windows-internals.md — prefixes, mitigation structures,
how to infer intent
$SKILL_DIR/references/windows-components.md — role of each tracked binary
$SKILL_DIR/references/report-template.md — the report format