mcp-gateway-security

name	mcp-gateway-security
description	MCP gateway security patterns, token management, request validation, and audit logging for parliamentary data access
license	MIT

MCP Gateway Security Skill

Context

This skill applies when:

• Securing MCP gateway communications between clients and the EP MCP Server
• Implementing token-based authentication for MCP client connections
• Validating and sanitizing MCP requests at the gateway boundary
• Configuring audit logging for all parliamentary data access through the gateway
• Implementing defense-in-depth for multi-server MCP deployments
• Managing secrets and credentials for EP API backend authentication
• Protecting against common MCP protocol attack vectors

MCP gateways are a critical security boundary. All parliamentary data requests flow through the gateway, making it the primary enforcement point for authentication, authorization, input validation, and audit logging.

Rules

1. Authenticate All MCP Clients: Require token-based authentication (API key, OAuth2, or mTLS) for every client connection to the gateway
2. Validate Request Schemas: Validate all incoming MCP requests against the protocol schema before forwarding to backends
3. Sanitize Tool Arguments: Apply input validation and sanitization to all tool arguments at the gateway level, before they reach the EP MCP Server
4. Implement Audit Logging: Log every tool invocation with client identity, tool name, timestamp, and response status — never log argument values containing personal data
5. Rotate Tokens Regularly: API keys and service tokens must have configurable expiration; implement automated rotation
6. Enforce Transport Security: All MCP gateway connections must use TLS 1.3; reject plaintext connections
7. Rate Limit per Client Identity: Enforce rate limits based on authenticated client identity, not just IP address
8. Isolate Backend Credentials: Gateway-to-backend credentials must be stored in a secrets manager, never in configuration files
9. Detect and Block Anomalies: Monitor for unusual request patterns (high volume, unusual tools, off-hours access) and alert or block
10. Implement Request Signing: For high-security deployments, require request signing to ensure message integrity between client and gateway

Examples

✅ Good Pattern: Token Validation Middleware

import { z } from 'zod';

const AuthHeaderSchema = z.string().regex(/^Bearer [A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*$/, 'Invalid bearer token format');

async function validateMCPClient(authHeader: string | undefined) {
  if (!authHeader) throw new Error('Authentication required');
  const bearerToken = AuthHeaderSchema.parse(authHeader).replace('Bearer ', '');
  const client = await tokenStore.validate(bearerToken);
  if (!client) throw new Error('Invalid or expired token');
  return client; // { clientId, tier, allowedTools }
}

✅ Good Pattern: MCP Request Validation

const MCPRequestSchema = z.object({
  jsonrpc: z.literal('2.0'),
  id: z.union([z.string(), z.number()]),
  method: z.enum(['tools/call', 'tools/list', 'resources/read', 'resources/list']),
  params: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),
}).strict();

function validateMCPRequest(request: unknown): void {
  const result = MCPRequestSchema.safeParse(request);
  if (!result.success) throw new Error(`Invalid MCP request: ${result.error.message}`);
}

✅ Good Pattern: Security Audit Logging

interface AuditLogEntry {
  timestamp: string;
  clientId: string;
  toolName: string;
  responseStatus: 'success' | 'error' | 'denied';
  durationMs: number;
  // Never log: argument values, personal data, token values
}

function logToolInvocation(entry: AuditLogEntry): void {
  console.log(JSON.stringify({ level: 'audit', ...entry, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() }));
}

✅ Good Pattern: Secrets Validation at Startup

function validateSecrets(): void {
  const required = ['EP_API_KEY', 'GATEWAY_TOKEN_SECRET', 'AUDIT_LOG_ENDPOINT'];
  const missing = required.filter(key => !process.env[key]);
  if (missing.length > 0) {
    throw new Error(`Missing required secrets: ${missing.join(', ')}`);
  }
}

Anti-Patterns

❌ Bad: No Authentication on Gateway

// NEVER allow unauthenticated MCP access
server.onRequest(async (request) => {
  return await forwardToBackend(request); // No auth check!
});

❌ Bad: Logging Sensitive Data

// NEVER log token values or personal data
console.log(`Client token: ${token}, query: ${JSON.stringify(args)}`);
// Leaks credentials and potentially personal MEP queries

❌ Bad: Hardcoded Secrets

// NEVER embed credentials in source code
const EP_API_KEY = "ep-key-a1b2c3d4e5f6";
const TOKEN_SECRET = "super-secret-signing-key";

ISMS Compliance

• AC-001: Authentication required for all MCP client connections
• AC-003: Authorisation enforcement based on client tier and tool access policies
• AU-002: Comprehensive audit logging for all parliamentary-data access
• SC-001: Transport security (TLS 1.3) for all gateway communications
• SM-001: Secrets management for backend credentials and signing keys
• IR-001: Anomaly detection and incident-response triggers for suspicious access patterns

Policy References

Primary:

• Access Control Policy
• Secure Development Policy
• Cryptography Policy

Related:

• Information Security Policy
• Privacy Policy — Personal-data access audit
• Incident Response Plan — Gateway compromise playbook
• Vulnerability Management — Patching cadence for gateway dependencies
• OWASP LLM Security Policy — Prompt-injection defence at the gateway boundary
• Open Source Policy — Gateway licence / supply chain