| name | mobile-ios-assessment |
| description | Assess an iOS app (static + dynamic). Load when the target is an IPA / iOS app, an iOS bug-bounty scope, or "test the iOS app". Signals: .ipa, Info.plist, Swift/Obj-C, Keychain, URL schemes, ATS exceptions, Frida/objection on a jailbroken device.
|
| domain | mobile |
| type | technique |
| stability | learning |
| modes | ["bugbounty","pentest"] |
| severity | high |
| owasp | ["M1:2024-Improper-Credential-Usage","M9:2024-Insecure-Data-Storage"] |
| cwe | ["CWE-919"] |
| tools | ["frida","objection","otool","class-dump","mobsf"] |
| schema_version | 1 |
iOS app assessment
When it applies
You have an IPA (or an app on a jailbroken test device) and scope covers the iOS client + its
backend. As with Android, most impact is the backend reached through the app, plus local data /
keychain leaks and insecure IPC (URL schemes, universal links).
Why it works
The app ships its logic and secrets, and trusts its own device. Decryption + class-dump reveal
endpoints and Obj-C/Swift classes; the Keychain and app container often hold tokens; and runtime
instrumentation removes jailbreak/pinning checks the server assumed held.
Method
- Unpack & inspect: decrypt the app (from a jailbroken device /
frida-ios-dump), then
otool -L, class-dump, and read Info.plist for URL schemes, NSAppTransportSecurity (ATS)
exceptions, permissions, and background modes. MobSF for an automated static pass.
- Local storage: inspect the app container —
NSUserDefaults, plists, sqlite, cached files —
and the Keychain for tokens/PII stored insecurely (objection → ios keychain dump).
- Dynamic:
objection -g <bundle> explore — bypass jailbreak detection and SSL pinning
(→ mobile-cert-pinning-bypass), hook methods, then proxy and test the backend (BOLA/mass-assignment).
- IPC: URL schemes / universal links (→
mobile-deeplink-abuse), pasteboard leakage, app extensions.
Gotchas
- Non-jailbroken testing is limited — you usually need a jailbroken device or a re-signed app.
- ATS exceptions (
NSAllowsArbitraryLoads) signal weakened TLS worth flagging.
- The high-impact bugs are usually server-side reached via the app — proxy and test the API.
Verify success
Concrete impact: leaked working credential/endpoint, keychain/token exposure, unauthenticated IPC
reach, or a backend bug proven through the app's traffic.
References
OWASP MASVS/MASTG (iOS); objection & frida-ios-dump; OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024).
