| name | workload-identity-federation-implementation |
| description | >- Use when this capability is needed. |
Workload Identity Federation Implementation
When to Use This Skill
Cloud Storage Access
from google.cloud import storage
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
Secret Manager Access
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
Cross-Project Access
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
Implementation
Containers need cloud access. But service account keys are static credentials that never rotate, frequently get stolen, and live forever.
Workload Identity Federation lets containers prove their identity to cloud providers without ever storing keys. The Kubernetes cluster itself becomes a trusted identity provider.
Production Hardening
Workload Identity eliminates the largest attack surface in containerized environments. This is foundational. Get it right.
What is Workload Identity Federation?
Instead of storing a static key, your container presents a signed JWT token to prove it's running in your cluster.
| Approach | Token | Rotation | Revocation | Audit |
|---|
| Service Account Keys | Static, never changes | Manual | Manual | Weak |
| Workload Identity | Dynamic, short-lived | Automatic | Immediate | Full |
Service account keys are abandoned credentials. Workload Identity is ephemeral proof.
How It Works
- Pod requests token - Kubernetes API issues signed JWT
- Token presented to GCP - GCP validates signature
- GCP issues access token - Short-lived credential for GCP APIs
- Automatic rotation - Token refreshes before expiration
Architecture
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Implementation Guide
This guide is split into focused modules:
Setup
Application Integration
Operations
Quick Start
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Verification
Test authentication from inside a pod:
kubectl run -it --image=google/cloud-sdk:slim test-wi \
--serviceaccount=app-sa \
-n production \
-- gcloud auth list
Benefits
Security
- No static credentials: Tokens expire automatically
- Immediate revocation: Disable service account, access stops
- Audit trail: Cloud Audit Logs track all impersonation
- Least privilege: Fine-grained IAM per workload
Operations
- Zero key management: No rotation, no storage, no exposure
- Simplified onboarding: Annotate ServiceAccount, deploy
- Cross-project access: Impersonate service accounts in other projects
- External identity: GitHub Actions, external OIDC providers
Common Mistakes
- Forgetting to annotate the Kubernetes ServiceAccount
- Using wrong format in IAM binding (
serviceAccount:PROJECT_ID.svc.id.goog[NAMESPACE/SA_NAME])
- Not granting
roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser role
- Metadata server enabled on nodes (
workloadMetadataConfig.mode must be GKE_METADATA)
Migration from Service Account Keys
Before (Static Keys)
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Problems:
- Key never expires
- If leaked, must manually revoke and rotate
- Stored in cluster (potential exposure)
- No audit trail of usage
After (Workload Identity)
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: app-sa
annotations:
iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account: app-gcp@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com
Benefits:
- Token expires every hour (automatic rotation)
- Revoke by disabling GCP service account
- No secrets stored in cluster
- Full audit trail in Cloud Audit Logs
See Migration Guide for detailed migration steps.
Use Cases
Cloud Storage Access
from google.cloud import storage
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
Secret Manager Access
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
Cross-Project Access
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
References
Related Content
Workload Identity eliminates static keys. Tokens rotate automatically. Access revokes immediately. Audit trail complete. Zero-trust credential model in place.
What is Workload Identity Federation?
Instead of storing a static key, your container presents a signed JWT token to prove it's running in your cluster.
| Approach | Token | Rotation | Revocation | Audit |
|---|
| Service Account Keys | Static, never changes | Manual | Manual | Weak |
| Workload Identity | Dynamic, short-lived | Automatic | Immediate | Full |
Service account keys are abandoned credentials. Workload Identity is ephemeral proof.
How It Works
- Pod requests token - Kubernetes API issues signed JWT
- Token presented to GCP - GCP validates signature
- GCP issues access token - Short-lived credential for GCP APIs
- Automatic rotation - Token refreshes before expiration
Architecture
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Implementation Guide
This guide is split into focused modules:
Setup
Application Integration
Operations
Quick Start
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Verification
Test authentication from inside a pod:
kubectl run -it --image=google/cloud-sdk:slim test-wi \
--serviceaccount=app-sa \
-n production \
-- gcloud auth list
Benefits
Security
- No static credentials: Tokens expire automatically
- Immediate revocation: Disable service account, access stops
- Audit trail: Cloud Audit Logs track all impersonation
- Least privilege: Fine-grained IAM per workload
Operations
- Zero key management: No rotation, no storage, no exposure
- Simplified onboarding: Annotate ServiceAccount, deploy
- Cross-project access: Impersonate service accounts in other projects
- External identity: GitHub Actions, external OIDC providers
Common Mistakes
- Forgetting to annotate the Kubernetes ServiceAccount
- Using wrong format in IAM binding (
serviceAccount:PROJECT_ID.svc.id.goog[NAMESPACE/SA_NAME])
- Not granting
roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser role
- Metadata server enabled on nodes (
workloadMetadataConfig.mode must be GKE_METADATA)
Migration from Service Account Keys
Before (Static Keys)
See examples.md for detailed code examples.
Problems:
- Key never expires
- If leaked, must manually revoke and rotate
- Stored in cluster (potential exposure)
- No audit trail of usage
After (Workload Identity)
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: app-sa
annotations:
iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account: app-gcp@PROJECT_ID.iam.gserviceaccount.com
Benefits:
- Token expires every hour (automatic rotation)
- Revoke by disabling GCP service account
- No secrets stored in cluster
- Full audit trail in Cloud Audit Logs
See Migration Guide for detailed migration steps.
Use Cases
Cloud Storage Access
from google.cloud import storage
client = storage.Client(project='PROJECT_ID')
bucket = client.bucket('my-bucket')
blob = bucket.blob('data.txt')
blob.download_to_filename('data.txt')
Secret Manager Access
from google.cloud import secretmanager
client = secretmanager.SecretManagerServiceClient()
secret_name = f"projects/PROJECT_ID/secrets/api-key/versions/latest"
response = client.access_secret_version(request={"name": secret_name})
api_key = response.payload.data.decode('UTF-8')
Cross-Project Access
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
service-account-b@PROJECT_B.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--role="roles/iam.serviceAccountUser" \
--member="serviceAccount:service-account-a@PROJECT_A.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
References
Related Content
Workload Identity eliminates static keys. Tokens rotate automatically. Access revokes immediately. Audit trail complete. Zero-trust credential model in place.
Examples
See examples.md for code examples.
Full Reference
See reference.md for complete documentation.
Related Patterns
- GKE Hardening Guide
- IAM Configuration
- Secure
References
Converted and distributed by TomeVault — claim your Tome and manage your conversions.