Menu
Hypothesis-driven hunt plan for suspicious PowerShell, plus query snippets for common telemetry.
Install with Codex or Claude Copy this prompt, paste it into Codex, Claude, or another assistant, and let it review the skill page and install it for you.
Based on SOC occupation classification
Apply the NATO Admiralty System (AJP-2.1) to assess source reliability and information credibility in cyber threat intelligence, OSINT, and breach analysis. Use this skill whenever you need to evaluate a CTI report, breach claim, dark web forum post, threat actor advertisement, vendor blog, social media intel claim, leaked database listing, or any source plus information pair where trust matters. Trigger phrases include "assess this source", "rate this report", "is this breach real", "evaluate credibility", "source assessment", "should I trust this claim", "admiralty rating", "A1 to F6", and any review of CTI or OSINT material where you need to decide how much weight to give it. Use proactively when the user shares a breach post, threat actor claim, or vendor report and asks for analysis, even if they do not explicitly mention the Admiralty System. Also use when teaching, building courseware, or producing a training example around source evaluation.
Build structured threat actor profiles using the 5W1H framework and the Diamond Model. Use this skill whenever the user wants to profile a threat actor, create a TA report, analyze an APT group, build an adversary profile, assess threat actor capability, map TTPs to MITRE ATT&CK for a specific group, or produce any intelligence deliverable about a threat actor. Also trigger when the user mentions threat actor names (e.g. APT29, Lazarus, FIN7), asks about victimology, modus operandi, or wants to structure threat intelligence around an adversary. This skill applies to both internal tracking profiles and incident-driven analytical deliverables.
Help users write, validate, and troubleshoot osquery SQL queries using provided osquery table schemas as the authoritative source.
Professional malware analysis workflow for PE executables and suspicious files. Triggers on file uploads with requests like "analyze this malware", "analyze this sample", "what does this executable do", "check this file for malware", or any request to examine suspicious files. Performs static analysis, threat intelligence triage, behavioral inference, and produces analyst-grade reports with reasoned conclusions.
Analyse Mitre ATT&CK tactics, techniques and sub-techniques. Use when performing analysis of threat detections, threat models, security risks or cyber threat intelligence
Create a targeted intrusion timeline for a Windows incident using whatever artifacts are available (event logs, EDR, SIEM exports, triage notes).
| id | hunting.suspicious-powershell-hunt |
| name | Suspicious PowerShell hunt (cross-platform ideas) |
| description | Hypothesis-driven hunt plan for suspicious PowerShell, plus query snippets for common telemetry. |
| version | 0.1.0 |
| author | awesome-dfir-skills contributors |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| tags | ["powershell","hunting","lolbas","defense-evasion"] |
| category | hunting |
| platforms | ["windows","any"] |
| inputs | [{"name":"telemetry_stack","description":"What you want to query (EDR, Sysmon, Windows Event Logs, MDE, Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic).","required":true},{"name":"time_window","description":"Start/end time and timezone.","required":true}] |
| outputs | [{"name":"hunt_plan","description":"Prioritized hypotheses + what to query + what to pivot to next."},{"name":"query_snippets","description":"Query fragments (generic + some platform-specific)."}] |
Role: You are a detection engineer / threat hunter.
Task: Build a PowerShell abuse hunt plan for the given environment and time window.
Telem stack: {{telemetry_stack}}
Time window: {{time_window}}
Deliverables:
- Top hypotheses (3–7) for PowerShell abuse in this environment
- For each: what to query, expected true positives, common false positives, and next pivots
- Query snippets (generic string/regex and, if possible, one version for the named stack)
Constraints:
- Prefer fields commonly present: process name, parent process, command line, parent command line, user, host, network dest.
- If you propose a platform-specific query, explain field mapping.
-enc / -encodedcommandIEX / Invoke-ExpressionFromBase64StringDownloadString / DownloadFile-w hidden-ExecutionPolicy Bypasswinword.exe, excel.exe, outlook.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe