Guidance for responding to and recovering from a significant identity/tenant compromise - regaining administrative control, evicting the adversary in a single coordinated action, and hardening to prevent reentry. Covers trusted foundation (PAW), containment, eviction, identity recovery (krbtgt, federation), and post-eviction hardening. WHEN: compromise recovery, incident response, regain control after breach, evict attacker, tenant compromise, rebuild trust, ransomware recovery, post-breach hardening, kick out adversary, emergency response, attacker is in our tenant right now, ransomware hit our organisation, regain admin access after a breach, adversary has domain admin or Global Admin. DO NOT USE for routine SOC investigation (use defender-xdr / sentinel) or for preventive hardening with no active compromise (use security-architecture / entra-id).
Installation
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Guidance for responding to and recovering from a significant identity/tenant compromise - regaining administrative control, evicting the adversary in a single coordinated action, and hardening to prevent reentry. Covers trusted foundation (PAW), containment, eviction, identity recovery (krbtgt, federation), and post-eviction hardening. WHEN: compromise recovery, incident response, regain control after breach, evict attacker, tenant compromise, rebuild trust, ransomware recovery, post-breach hardening, kick out adversary, emergency response, attacker is in our tenant right now, ransomware hit our organisation, regain admin access after a breach, adversary has domain admin or Global Admin. DO NOT USE for routine SOC investigation (use defender-xdr / sentinel) or for preventive hardening with no active compromise (use security-architecture / entra-id).
license
MIT
metadata
{"author":"Microsoft","version":"0.1.0"}
Compromise Recovery
Compromise recovery is the disciplined process of regaining administrative control of an
environment during or after a significant breach, evicting the adversary in a single
coordinated action, and re-establishing a trustworthy security posture so the attacker
cannot return.
When to use
Responding to a confirmed widespread compromise - tenant-wide Entra/AD compromise, ransomware,
persistent adversary with Global Admin or Domain Admin - where normal remediation is
insufficient and the existing infrastructure cannot be trusted.
Do not use this skill for:
Routine alert triage or single-host malware (use defender-xdr)
Rule of thumb:Never start eviction from the compromised environment. Stand up a
trusted foundation first - dedicated admin workstations (PAW), out-of-band communications,
a clean Entra tenant or cleanly-rebuilt admin accounts. Acting from untrusted infrastructure
hands the adversary your response plan in real time.
Approach
Engage qualified incident responders immediately - For major incidents, engage Microsoft
Incident Response or a qualified DFIR partner. The cost of delay (re-entry, ransomware
double-extortion, regulator timelines) dwarfs the engagement cost.
Verify: an IR partner is engaged within the first 24 hours of confirmed compromise.
Establish a trusted foundation - Stand up out-of-band communications (separate Teams
tenant, signal/voice), secure admin devices (PAWs), and a clean admin identity path.
Assume existing infrastructure - mail, chat, jump hosts, admin accounts - may be untrusted
or monitored by the adversary.
Verify: incident bridge is on out-of-band channel; responders authenticate from PAW or
equivalent isolated workstation; no compromised admin account is used.
Preserve forensic evidence before remediating - Snapshot affected systems, export sign-
in logs, audit logs, mail items, and Entra/AD changes. Once you remediate you lose
evidence; regulators and insurers will ask for it.
Verify: forensic acquisitions are stored on isolated, write-protected media with chain of
custody documented.
Contain without tipping off - Limit the adversary's ability to act: protect crown
jewels (privileged accounts, federation/signing keys, backup credentials), tighten
Conditional Access in stealth mode where possible, monitor known adversary accounts without
blocking them yet. Partial eviction warns the adversary and invites re-entrenchment
under a new identity.
Verify: containment actions are recorded in a sequenced runbook, not ad-hoc; nothing
visible to the adversary has changed unless deliberate.
Evict in a single coordinated action - Plan a sequenced removal across all known
persistence: compromised accounts (disable + reset), app registrations and consent grants
(review and revoke), mailbox rules and forwarding (delete), scheduled tasks / startup
items, golden/forged Kerberos tickets, federation/SAML tokens, any added admin roles. Aim
for one decisive action window rather than piecemeal changes.
Verify: an eviction runbook lists every persistence artefact with owner, time, and
verification step; rehearsed before execution.
Reset identity trust - Reset the krbtgt account (twice, with sufficient interval
for replication), reset all privileged credentials, rotate federation/SAML signing
certificates, rotate Entra Connect sync account, and reset any service principal secrets
the adversary could have touched.
Verify: krbtgt reset is logged twice; federation cert rollover is complete; sign-in logs
show no remaining sessions from compromised tokens.
Harden to prevent reentry - Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all privileged and
high-risk users, move privileged roles into PIM with just-in-time activation and
approvals, deploy or expand PAW for admin work, expand Defender + Sentinel monitoring with
detections tuned to the observed adversary TTPs, and apply the least privilege model
across the privileged tier.
Verify: 100% of privileged accounts in PIM and behind phishing-resistant MFA; named PAW
estate for admin work; new detections deployed for the specific TTPs seen.
Transition to BAU - Hand off to a sustained security operations and improvement
programme with a 90-day watch period, a documented lessons-learned, and committed
investment in the gaps that allowed initial compromise.
Guardrails
Engage qualified incident responders (e.g. Microsoft Incident Response) for any major
incident. This is not a self-service exercise above a certain threshold.
Sequence eviction carefully - partial eviction warns the adversary and invites re-
entrenchment. Plan, rehearse, then execute as one action.
Preserve forensic evidence before remediating where investigation, regulatory, or
insurance obligations apply. Wiping is destruction of evidence.
Never act from compromised infrastructure - establish a trusted foundation and
PAW before touching the adversary's territory.
Reset krbtgt twice with replication interval between resets - a single reset still
leaves valid golden tickets in flight.
MFA without phishing-resistant factors is not enough post-AiTM-era. Move privileged
users to FIDO2 / Windows Hello for Business / certificate-based auth.
PIM and least privilege are post-eviction non-negotiables - if the adversary got in via
standing privilege, removing standing privilege is the eviction.
Common anti-patterns
Piecemeal eviction. Disabling one compromised account tips off the adversary, who pivots
to the next persistence and digs deeper. Plan and execute as one coordinated action.
Acting from the compromised admin workstation. The adversary watches the response in
real time and adapts. Always operate from PAW or equivalent.
Skipping krbtgt reset because "the password changed". krbtgt is the AD trust root - if
it was harvested, every Kerberos ticket is forged-capable until reset (twice).
Forgetting service principals and app registrations. Modern Entra compromises persist
via consent grants and app secrets long after user accounts are reset.
Declaring victory too early. Without a 90-day watch period and new detections tuned to
the observed TTPs, you will not see the re-entry attempt.
No lessons learned, no investment commitment. The compromise will recur if the root
cause (weak MFA, no PIM, flat network, no PAW) is not funded for remediation.
Example prompts
An attacker has Global Admin in our tenant right now. Walk me through evicting them.
Walk me through the Microsoft incident response process for a ransomware attack.
How do I evict an adversary from an Entra ID tenant without tipping them off?
What should I do in the first 24 hours after discovering a tenant compromise?
How do I harden the tenant after eviction so the attacker cannot return?
How do I rebuild trust in our admin accounts after a breach?
