| name | conducting-api-security-testing |
| description | Conducts security testing of REST, GraphQL, and gRPC APIs to identify vulnerabilities in authentication, authorization, rate limiting, input validation, and business logic. The tester uses the OWASP API Security Top 10 as the testing framework, combining Burp Suite interception with Postman collections and custom scripts to test endpoint security at every privilege level. Activates for requests involving API security testing, REST API pentest, GraphQL security assessment, or API vulnerability testing.
|
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | penetration-testing |
| tags | ["API-security","OWASP-API-Top10","REST","GraphQL","authorization-testing"] |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["ID.RA-01","ID.RA-06","GV.OV-02","DE.AE-07"] |
Conducting API Security Testing
When to Use
- Testing API endpoints for authorization flaws, injection vulnerabilities, and business logic bypasses
- Assessing the security of microservices architecture where APIs are the primary communication method
- Validating that API gateway protections (rate limiting, authentication, input validation) are properly enforced
- Testing third-party API integrations for data exposure and insecure configurations
- Evaluating GraphQL APIs for introspection disclosure, query complexity attacks, and authorization bypasses
Do not use against APIs without written authorization, for load testing or denial-of-service testing unless explicitly scoped, or for testing production APIs that process real financial transactions without safeguards.
Most Often Missed & How to Confirm
- BOLA on every object-bearing endpoint, not just the obvious ones — testers check
/users/{id} but skip nested resources (/orders/{id}/items, /accounts/{id}/statements), UUIDs assumed "unguessable", and write/delete methods. Enumerate IDs from a second low-priv account.
- Mass assignment and BFLA — scanners almost never find these. Send undocumented fields (
role, isAdmin, verified, balance) and replay each request with a lower-privilege token via Burp Autorize/two-session diffing.
- Business-logic and workflow abuse — negative quantities, repeated coupon redemption, race conditions on balance/transfer (send N concurrent requests), and skipping multi-step flow states. No scanner models intended workflow.
- Auth/token edge cases — JWT
alg:none and RS256→HS256 confusion, expired/refresh tokens still accepted, tokens accepted across tenants, and rate-limit absence on auth/OTP/reset endpoints.
- Hidden surface — undocumented versions (
/api/v1 still live after v2), GraphQL introspection, batched/aliased GraphQL queries for brute force, and verbose responses returning more fields than the UI.
- How to confirm: capture two HTTP responses side by side — attacker token receiving victim data (BOLA), or a 200 on a privileged action with a low-priv token (BFLA), with full request/response headers. For business logic, show the resulting state change (negative balance, duplicate redemption). Don't conclude an endpoint is secure until you have replayed it with every privilege level (unauth, user, admin) and tried every HTTP method, not just the documented one.
